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The recent discoveries of natural gas in Tanzania, estimated at about fifty-seven trillion 
cubic feet (tcf), have sparked tremendous hopes for socio-economic development in the 
country. While this optimism seems to be supported by conventional wisdom and 
economic insights, evidence from other oil-rich African countries shows that in spite of 
the ongoing oil and gas extraction, they are floundering in poverty, corruption and 
political instability. This phenomenal dichotomy between oil and gas wealth and socio-
economic development is referred to as the “resource curse”. As this study demonstrates, 
the “curse” is partly a result of under-taxation. 
This study uses the resource curse study to analyze and evaluate tax-related challenges in 
the Tanzanian upstream oil and gas industry. In doing so, the study identifies three factors 
that may cause loss of potential tax revenues - referred to as “tax revenue leakage”. First, 
the discretionary tax incentives, such as tax exemptions, lowering tax rates and special 
tax treatment, result in non-payment of taxes that would have otherwise been payable. 
Second, the International Oil Companies (IOCs) adopt a variety of techniques, such as 
transfer pricing, thin capitalization, corporate re-organization tax evasion and treaty 
shopping to exploit the loopholes or gaps in the tax laws to minimize, reduce or eliminate 
their tax obligations without being detected or punished. Third, corrupt Government 
officials willfully fail to collect taxes due, short levy taxes, grant undeserving tax 
incentives to the IOCs or divert revenues collected for their own account. All these factors 
demonstrate the close connection between under-taxation, corruption and tax avoidance. 
As this study argues, in the absence of counteractive measures, the Government will 
collect only a fraction of potential taxes, thus losing revenues required to finance 
development projects.  
The study establishes that Tanzania counteracts tax avoidance and tax evasion through 
anti-avoidance legislation. Tanzania also has accountability measures, which impose 
restraints on the exercise of public power and prevent corruption. The study concludes 
that although Tanzania has a competitive fiscal regime, anti-avoidance legislation and 
systems of accountability, the level of Government’s tax revenue nevertheless depends 
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1 The Paradox of Oil Wealth 
The recent discoveries of natural gas in Tanzania, estimated at approximately fifty-seven 
trillion cubic feet (tcf),1 have sparked tremendous hopes for socio-economic development 
in the country. 2  While conventional wisdom and economic insights support this 
optimism, other oil-rich African countries, such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Equatorial 
Guinea and Chad, are floundering in poverty, corruption and political instability.3 This 
                                                 
1 According to EWURA by March 2016 the discovery natural gas reserve was at 57.25 trillion standard 
cubic feet. Information available at http://www.ewura.go.tz/?page_id=70 (accessed on 05 March 2017). 
Further details on natural gas exploration and discoveries are provided by the Tanzania Petroleum 
Development Corporation (TPDC) at http://www.tpdc-tz.com/activitymap.php.(last visited on 15 July 
2017) 
2 For example, the former Minister for Energy and Minerals Prof. Sospeter Muhongo asserted that natural 
gas extraction has the potential to increase the per capita income from $500 to $5000 by 2025. See Chatham 
House Africa Meeting Summary Tanzania as an Emerging Energy Producer (2013) 6 available at 
www.chathamhouse.org (accessed on 13 March 2014).Similarly, the financial simulations show that after 
commercial production of all fifty seven trillion cubic feet (tcf), the Government will earn about U$S 3 
billion annually compared to the current development assistance at U$S 2 billion. See also Baunsgaard, T 
United Republic of Tanzania: Selected Issues IMF Country Report No. 14/121(2014)9 available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14121.pdf (accessed on 10 March 2015); Pedersen, RH 
and Bofin, P The politics of gas contract negotiations in Tanzania: a review Danish Institute for 
International Studies Working Paper 03 (2015) 28 available at 
http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/615479/WP_2015_03.pdf. (Accessed on 10 February 2016). 
3  Two methods are used to evaluate development in oil-rich countries namely the level of human 
development and poverty or per gross domestic product (GDP) compared to other countries. See Davis, 
GA “Extractive Economies, Growth, and the Poor” in Richards, JP (ed) Mining, Society, and a Sustainable 
World (Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, Springer, 2009) 38. These are example of how countries fail to transform 
their oil and gas wealth into socio-economic development. See Africa Progress Panel Africa Progress 
Report: Equity in Extractives Stewarding Africa’s natural resources for all (2013)14 available at 
http://appcdn.acwupload.co.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2013/08/2013_APR_Equity_in_Extractives_25062013
_ENG_HR.pdf (accessed on 28 February 2017). For the general discussion on the resource curse study see  
Karl, TL The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (California, University of California Press, 
1977) 2; Heilbrunn, JR. Oil, Democracy and Development in Africa (New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 2014) 2; Jensen, N and Wantchekon, L “Resource wealth and political regimes in Africa” (2004) 37 
Comparative Political Studies at 816-818 and Humphreys M, Sachs J and Stiglitz J “Introduction: What is 
the Problem with Natural Resource Wealth?” in Humphreys M, Sachs J and Stiglitz J (eds.) Escaping the 
resource curse (Irvington, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007) 2-3 UNCTAD World Investment Report 
2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development (New York and Geneva, 2007) 
93; Shikwati, J “How geological resources can aid Africa’s development” in Runge, J and Shikwati J 
Geological Resources and Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa Holistic Approaches to Transparency 
and Sustainable Development in the Extractive Sector (London, Taylor & Francis Group, 2011) 9-10; 
Buchholz, P and Stürmer, M “An overview of geological resources in Sub-Saharan Africa: Potential and 
opportunities for tax revenue from the extractive Sector” in Runge, J and Shikwati J Geological Resources 
and Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa Holistic Approaches to Transparency and Sustainable 
Development in the Extractive Sector (London, Taylor & Francis Group, 2011) 20. The disconnect between 




phenomenal dichotomy between oil and gas wealth and socio-economic development is 
referred to as the “resource curse”. 4  However, the resource curse proposition is 
challenged by evidence showing other oil-rich countries, such as Norway, Canada and 
Australia, and even some from the developing world, such as Chile, have high living 
standards for their citizens, diversified economies and stable economic growth.5 This 
suggests that the supposed “curse” is not to be found in the oil and gas resources as such.6 
Instead, the quality of governance, and the competency of a country’s Governmental 
institutions determine the impact of the presence of oil and gas resources.7  
1.1 Tax Revenue Leakage and the Resource Curse  
From a taxation perspective, the description of the resource curse study has two limbs.8 
First, Governments in most oil-rich countries do not obtain a fair share of resource rents 
                                                 
oil and gas wealth and socio-economic development resonates with Kapuscinski’s argument that the 
discovery of oil and gas creates an “an illusion of a completely changed life”, but the reality is that this 
illusion is a ‘fairy tale’ with a “bit of a lie” see  Kapuscinski, R Shah of Shah (Vintage International, 1992) 
35. 
4 The resource curse in theory represents an inverse relationship between extraction of natural resources 
and socio-economic development. Richard Auty, who coined the phrase “resource curse”, argued that most 
resource rich countries performed worse in terms of socio-economic development and good governance 
than their counter parties with less endowment. See Auty RM Sustaining Development in Mineral 
Economies: The Resource Curse Study (London and New York, Routledge, 1993) 1. Similary, Sachs, JD 
and Warner, AM “The Curse of National Resources” 45 European Economic Review (2001) 827-838 at 
827-831 demonstrate the missing link between resource wealth and economic growth. See also the general 
discussions by Africa Progress Panel Africa Progress Report: Equity in Extractives Stewarding Africa’s 
natural resources for all (2013) 12-16; Ross, ML The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the 
Development of Nations (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2012) 1-3; Humphreys et al 
“Introduction: What is the Problem with Natural Resource Wealth?” (2007)1-5; Ross, ML “The Political 
Economy of the Resource Curse” (1999) 51 World Politics 297-322 at 297-298 and Dell, M “The Devil's 
Excrement: The Negative Effect of Natural Resources on Development” (2004). 26 (3) Harvard 
International Review at38. 
5 These countries are considered an exception to the resource curse theory. In Africa Botswana has also 
been able to avoid the resource on its minerals. See Mehlum H, Moene KO and Torvik, R “Cursed by 
Resources or Institutions?” 29(8) The World Economy (2006) 17-20. See also Carmignani, F and 
Chowdhury, A Why are natural resources a curse in Africa, but not elsewhere? (2010) 3-4 available at 
http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/406.pdf; (Accessed on 15 April 2014). 
6 Carmignani and Chowdhury Why are natural resources a curse in Africa, but not elsewhere? (2010) 3-4; 
Mikesell, RF “Explaining the resource curse, with special reference to mineral-exporting countries” (1997) 
23(4) Resources Policy, 191-199 at 191; Torvik, R “Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed 
while others do not? (2009) 245-250. 
7 Because of weak governance revenues accruing to the Government are wasted, rather than being invested. 
See Carmignani and Chowdhury Why are natural resources a curse in Africa, but not elsewhere? (2010) 
3-4. See also Hogan, W Sturzenegger, F and Tai, L “Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources” in 
Hogan, W and Sturzenegger, F (eds) The Natural Resources Trap Private Investment without Public 
Commitment (Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 2010) 2. 
8 Ross The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (2012) 4. 




commensurate with the extracted oil and gas resources.9 This also explains the reason 
why despite the oil and gas industry being one of the largest industries in the world and 
the IOCs amongst the world’s richest companies, several African countries in which they 
operate, such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea and Chad, rank amongst the 
poorest countries in the world.10 According to this view, there is a one-to-one relationship 
between the occurrence of resource curse and systemic under-taxation in the oil-rich 
countries.11 Accordingly, the resource curse epitomizes the State’s failure to discharge its 
trusteeship duties in the management of its oil and gas resources.12 Second, the resource 
curse occurs as the result of mismanagement of revenues obtained from the oil and gas 
industry. 13 This could be a result of the “Dutch Disease”,14 volatility of oil and gas 
                                                 
9 See general discussion under Chapter 3, Section 3. See also Ross The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth 
Shapes the Development of Nations (2012) 4. Calder, J Administering Fiscal Regimes for Extractive 
Industries: A Handbook (2014) 51 See also Duruigbo, E “Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource 
Curse in Africa” (2005) 26 (1) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1-67 at 2; Le Billon 
Extractive sectors and illicit financial flows: What role for revenue governance initiatives? (2011) 1; Africa 
Progress Panel Africa Progress Report: Equity in Extractives Stewarding Africa’s natural resources for all 
(2013) 63. It is also argued that between 2008 and 2010 Africa lost $ 38 billion dollars (higher than the 
total aid received during this period), from tax avoidance alone. See Pfister, M Taxation for Investment and 
Development: An overview of policy challenges in Africa (2009) 10 available at 
https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/43966821.pdf (accessed on 12 December 
2016). 
10 The CIA World fact book names top 10 oil producing countries in 2014 to include Nigeria which the 
largest producer followed by Angola, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
South Sudan and Ghana available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html. (accessed on 25 February 2015) See also Africa Progress Report Equity 
in Extractives Stewarding Africa’s natural resources for all (2013)1, 14 
11 See Chapter 3 section 3  
12 The title to oil and gas resources vests in the state as a matter trust. Therefore, the Government has the 
duty to ensure that it obtains an equitable share of the economic benefits arising from oil and gas extraction. 
See general discussions under Chapter 3 section 3.1 and Chapter 5 section 2.1.. 
13 Duong, WN “Partnerships with Monarchs- Two Case Studies: Case One- Partnership with Monarchs in 
the Search for Oil: Unveiling and Re-examining the Patterns of Third World Economic Development in 
the Petroleum Sector (2004) 25 The University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1171- 1295 
at 1242. See also Carmignani and Chowdhury Why are natural resources a curse in Africa, but not 
elsewhere? (2010) 3-4. 
14 This was coined after the discovery of natural gas in the Northern Sea in Netherlands in 1960’s, when 
the revenues from oil and gas led to sharp appreciation of exchange rates, which in turn, rendered local 
agricultural and other tradable goods very expensive and less competitive. See Humphreys “Introduction: 
What is the Problem with Natural Resource Wealth?” (2007) 7-8; See Also Bauer, A and Quiroz, J.C 
“Resource Governance” in Goldthau, A (ed) The Handbook of Global Energy Policy (John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd, Ebook 2013) 246. Ross The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations 
(2012) 4. Another example is Nigeria, which before the discovery of oil was the second producer of cocoa 
in the world and agriculture contributed about three quarters of total exports but now oil makes about 85% 
of total exports. See Shaxson, N Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil (New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan 2007) 18. 




commodity prices,15 “rent seeking” activities16 and the enclave nature of the oil and gas 
industry.17 
In most developing countries, such as Tanzania, International Oil Companies (IOCs) 
undertake oil and gas extraction in exchange for payment of royalties, taxes and other 
charges.18 This in turn, presents an opportunity for the Government to raise a stream of 
tax revenues, which could then be re-invested, through the public finance system, for the 
provision of social amenities and infrastructure.19 Thus, oil and gas extraction has the 
potential to enhance socio-economic development, economic growth, and eradicate 
                                                 
15 Generally, the prices of oil and gas commodities are volatile. This volatility of commodity prices render 
economic planning for the Government difficult. Usually Government expenditures increase with the price 
booms but it is difficult to adjust during the downswing of prices. Consequently, Governments are forced 
to  borrow excessively on anticipation of future booms. This results into debt crisis when the commodity 
prices decline See Omeje, K “Avoiding the Natural Resource Curse: Lessons from Nigeria and Policy 
Implications” (2013) 42(4) Africa Insight 91-103 at 94. See also Bauer and Quiroz “Resource Governance” 
(2013) 246; Shaxson Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil (2007) 21; Hausmann, R and 
Rigobon, R “An Alternative Interpretation of the ‘Resource Curse’: Theory and Policy Implications” in 
Davis, J.M. Ossowski, R. and Fedelino, A. (ed) Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-
Producing Countries (Washington D.C, International Monetary Fund, 2003)16.  
16 It is argued that oil and gas revenues create an impetus for Government officials and rulers to capture 
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tomorrow (New York, Routledge, 2008) 1-3. 
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poverty.20 However, most developing countries face formidable challenges in the design 
and implementation of oil and gas fiscal regimes.21 The next section highlights the three 
challenges of oil and gas tax regimes in developing countries. 
1.2 The Three Challenges of Taxation Regimes  
In imposing taxes, the Government faces three challenges. These are: striking the balance 
between maximizing revenue and attracting investments, addressing tax avoidance, tax 
evasion and fiscal corruption.22  
The first major challenge for the Government is how to design a tax regime that ensures 
revenue maximization whilst simultaneously attracting investments. 23  In general, 
divergent interests characterize the relationship between the Government and IOCs.24 
While the Government interest is revenue maximization, the IOCs interest is to recover 
investment costs and obtain a return thereupon.25 Similarly, the capital intensity and 
advanced technology required to operate the industry, imply that the Government must 
strive to attract more investments.26 It also implies that without these investments, no 
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and Growth” 59 Journal of Development Economics (1999) 43-76 at 43-47. Eifert B, Gelb A and Tallroth 
NJ The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and Economic Management in Oil-Exporting Countries 
(Washington DC, World Bank Africa, 2002) 4.  
21 See Chapter 3 section 3. 
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Issues” (2013) 136; Duong “Partnerships with Monarchs - Two Case Studies: Case One: Partnerships with 
Monarchs in the search for Oil: Unveiling and Re-examining the Patterns of ‘Third World’ Economic 
Development in the Petroleum Sector” (2004) 1215 &1232; Johnston International Petroleum Fiscal 
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Investment in Natural Resources” (2010) 2. 
24  IMF Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and Implementation (2012) 13 available at 
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exploration or extraction can be undertaken.27 In turn, this would mean loss of revenue-
creating opportunies for the Government.28  
In response to the need to attract investments and maintain the existing ones, 
Governments offer multiple tax incentives, such as tax exemptions, lowering tax rates 
and special tax treatment.29 By offering these fiscal incentives, a Government sacrifices 
or waives its right to receive the potential tax revenues. 30  Consequently, these tax 
incentives result in reduction, deferral or non-payment of taxes that would have otherwise 
been payable.31 Additionally, in most African countries these tax incentives are not only 
discretionary, but are also negotiated and granted in the absence of public scrutiny.32 As 
a result of the lack of vigilance and oversight mechanisms, most of these fiscal incentives 
are extremely profligate than needed for attraction of investments.33 Consequently, these 
tax incentives deny the Government both current and future revenues. 34 
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27 See Chapter 3 section 3.1. 
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31 Cleeve “How Effective Are Fiscal Incentives to Attract FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa?” (2008) 138; Tax 
justice Africa The Taxation Chain: Understanding the National and International Dimension of Taxation 
(2012) 19-20 available at http://www.taxjusticeafrica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Taxation-
Trainning-Module-Two-16-April-2013.pdf (accessed on 30 July 2015) See also Guttentag and Avi-Yonah 
“Closing the International Tax Gap” (2005) 15. 
32 Tax Justice Africa The Taxation Chain: Understanding the National and International Dimension of 
Taxation (2012) 20. 
33 It is argued that costs of these incentives outweigh their benefits. See Cleeve “How Effective Are Fiscal 
Incentives to Attract FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa?” (2008)138-39; IMF Fiscal Regimes for Extractive 
Industries: Design and Implementation (2012) 14. 
34 CRC Sogema Tanzania Per Tax Exemptions Study Final Report and Briefing Note submitted to the 
Ministry of Finance of Tanzania (2013) 84 
http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/fileadmin/documents/external/public_expenditure_review/Reports/PER_Tax_Exe
mptions_Study_Final_Report_and_Briefing_Note.pdf (accessed on 05 April 2015); Duong “Partnerships 
with Monarchs- Two Case Studies: Case One- Partnership with Monarchs in the Search for Oil: Unveiling 
and Re-examining the Patterns of Third World Economic Development in the Petroleum Sector (2004) 
1241; It is estimated that tax exemptions leads to loss of revenue between 20% and 30% of the potential 
revenue See Guttentag and Avi-Yonah “Closing the International Tax Gap” (2005)16. 




Second, while taxation is generally viewed as a contribution towards Governmental 
expenditure, to the IOCs taxes are costs of investment that are to avoided or minimized.35 
To this end, any elimination or reduction of tax liabilities means increased profits, 
dividends to shareholders and, as well as bonuses to the company’s executives.36 To 
ensure maximum profits, the IOCs explore the loopholes and gaps in the tax system to 
minimize or eliminate their tax obligations without being detected or punished.37 For 
instance, the IOC may adopt variety of techniques to avoid taxes, such as abuse of double 
tax treaties, transfer pricing manipulation, and thin capitalization.38 Moreover, the IOCs 
may engage in outright criminal conducts, such as fraud, under declaration of profits, 
non-filing of return and bribes.39 Because of tax avoidance and tax evasion, Governments 
in oil-rich countries in Africa lose enormous sums of the “would-be tax revenues”.40 
Against this background, tax avoidance and tax evasion are not unique to the oil and gas 
industry.41 Rather, they are currently a global concern. For instance, the exposure by the 
Panamanian law firm – Mossack Fonseca – showed that the Multi-National Corporations 
(MNCs) often pay little or no corporate income tax in countries where they operate.42 
Another study also shows that in Africa alone, about $50 billion worth taxable income 
goes untaxed annually.43 How does Tanzania, as a new entrant in the oil and gas industry, 
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protect its revenue base from these evasive techniques without compromising its 
competitive edge to attract investments? This is one of the questions addressed by this 
study. 
Third, the oil and gas industry is susceptible to corruption.44 The increased Governmental 
intervention in the oil and gas industry for regulatory and taxation purposes creates 
windows of opportunity for corrupt practices.45 Because of corruption, unscrupulous tax 
administrators intentionally fail to collect taxes due, short levy taxes, grant tax incentives 
to unqualified entities or divert revenues collected to their own account. 46 Similarly, 
corrupt policy makers and legislators may create favourable fiscal terms for IOCs, thus 
denying the Government massive potential revenues. 47  These corrupt practices are 
perpetuated by factors, such as uncontrolled discretionary powers to make decisions, 
concentration of powers in one individual and weak oversight mechanisms imposed on 
the exercise of public power.48 In addition, the enormous sums of money involved in the 
oil and gas industry entice or motivate some Government officials to engage in corrupt 
practices. 49  Consequently, corruption may lead to loss of Government’s potential 
revenues from oil and gas extraction.50 
The inference drawn from these challenges – exorbitant tax incentives, tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, and corruption – is that the extraction of oil and gas resources is neither an 
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automatic blessing nor an immutable curse.51 Instead, positive results depend on legal 
framework and administrative capacity to counteract tax revenue leakage. 52  It also 
implies that, without counteractive measures, the Government collects only a fraction of 
potential tax revenues.53 This represents a general view that the extractive industry in 
Africa is characterized by systemic under-taxation.54 For example, in Africa generally, 
the tax per domestic product (GDP) ratio ranges between 10 and 20 percent compared to 
that of the OECD countries, which ranges between 30 and 40 percent. 55 This trend of 
under-taxation accordingly manifests itself in the oil and gas industry. 56 
The Government’s failure to collect a sufficient share of revenues has far-reaching 
consequences. Particularly in the oil and gas sector, tax revenue leakage denies the 
Government funds required for development and thus hinders Government’s measures to 
eradicate poverty. 57  This also partly explains reason why most oil-rich countries in 
Africa, despite the ongoing extraction of oil and gas, are still floundering in poverty.58 In 
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addition, both tax avoidance and tax evasion erode equity in taxation. It means that the 
IOCs enjoy the protection of the State and the infrastructure at the expense of few honest 
taxpayers and without contributing.59 Hence, tax avoidance and tax evasion defeat the 
very basic function of taxation – contribution towards Governmental expenditures.60 In 
view of these challenges, this study examines the measures that counteract tax revenue 
leakage in the upstream oil and gas industry in Tanzania. The next section discusses the 
motives for selecting Tanzania as a case study. 
2 Background: Oil and Gas Exploration and Production in Tanzania 
A number of factors motivated the choice of Tanzania as a case study. For one, Tanzania 
is new to the oil and gas sector. Exploration for oil and gas in Tanzania commenced in 
1952, and natural gas was discovered at Songo Songo Island in 1974 and Mnazi Bay in 
l982.61 Nonetheless, commercial extraction only began in 2004 at Songo Songo and in 
2006 at Mnazi Bay.62 In addition, there is one PSA, which is at the development stage 
and expected to start production soon.63 Moreover, the construction of a 530 kilometres 
pipeline, meant to transport natural gas from the producing regions to the commercial 
capital Dar es Salaam, was completed in 2016.64 All these facts indicate that Tanzania is 
an emerging natural gas producer. 
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Moreover, Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world.65 Currently, domestic 
revenues contribute only 63 percent of the total budget and the country is dependent on 
aid and grants for 12 percent and borrowing for 25 percent.66 Consequently, Tanzania is 
heavily indebted with a national debt stock amounting to US$20.94 billion. 67  This 
indicates that Tanzania, like many other developing countries, is in a dire need for revenue 
to finance developmental projects and eradicate poverty.68  
Contextually, the need for domestic revenue is now more relevant than it was in the past 
where developing countries depended heavily on external sources of revenue, such as 
foreign aid and grants.69 Currently, developing countries are finding it difficult to raise 
revenue from external sources.70 For example, in Tanzania donor funding has declined 
from 7% percent of GDP in 2004/5 to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2014/15.71 In this regard, 
the discovery and subsequent extraction of natural gas has been hailed as good news to 
the Tanzanian economy. 72  Revenues from natural gas are expected to contribute to 
Government coffers and stimulate other sectors of the economy. 73  
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While there is optimism for revenues from natural gas extraction, the Tanzanian 
experience with the mining industry has not been particularly positive, and skeptics await 
a similar experience with oil and gas extraction.74 By way of contextualizing, Tanzania’s 
mining boom75 positioned it to be the third largest producer of gold in Africa,76 and placed 
it in the higher ranks of non-oil African economies in terms of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) receipts.77 However, during this period the total contribution of the mining sector 
to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was only between 1.7 percent and 3.8 percent.78 It 
has been argued that one of the reasons for this low contribution was that the mining 
companies did not pay sufficient taxes. 79  For instance, Resolute Tanzania Limited 
operated from 1997 to 2012, exported gold and silver worth US$ 1.5 billion, but paid 
corporate tax only once, three years before it closed its operations.80 During this period, 
Resolute Tanzania Limited paid royalties amounting to US$ 47.3 million and other 
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Government taxes and levies amounting to US$ 82.5 million.81 All these payments only 
amounted to 8.6 per cent of the total revenues generated.82 
Moreover, evidence shows that Tanzania is not a corruption free country. For instance, 
the corruption perception index ranks Tanzania as number 116 out of the 176 countries 
in terms of perceived corrupt practices. 83  The threat of corruption in the extractive 
industry is real. An example is the case of Basil P. Mramba & Daniel Yona v R84 in which 
two former Ministers were convicted for abuse of office when granting tax exemptions 
and occasioning loss to the Government.85 Similarly, the Government has suspended the 
top management of Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) on 
allegations of violating procurement laws and conflict of interests. 86  
Furthermore, Tanzania has tax-to-GDP ratio of 12.4% compared to an average of 16.8% 
in Sub Sahara Africa. 87 In addition, while the Tanzania has the tax capacity of 15.2 
percent of GDP, the actual tax collections for the period between 2011 and 2013 was only 
11.9 percent of the GDP, thus under-taxation by 3.3 percent of the GDP.88 All these facts 
indicate that Tanzania has challenges on imposing taxes generally and the complexities 
of the oil and gas industry may further exacerbate this problem.89  
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17 & 19. 
88 IMF United Republic of Tanzania Selected Issues (2016) 24. 
89 Tordo S, Tracy, BS and Arfaa, N National Oil Companies and Value Creation (Washington DC, World 
Bank, 2011) 1. 




Similarly, there are several incidences of tax avoidance in the extractive industry 
generally. For instance, in African Barrick Gold Plc v Commmissioner General TRA,90 a 
parent company paid dividends to its shareholders in London while its subsidiaries in 
Tanzania, which were the sole source of income, were declaring losses.91 Furthermore, 
the Court of Appeal in Commissioner General TRA v Pan African Energy Tanzania Ltd 
held that there was no provision of the law imposing withholding taxes on services 
rendered outside Tanzania by a non-resident. 92 In its judgment, the Court indicated that 
although this lacuna might encourage tax avoidance but it was not for the Court to amend 
the law. Consequently, the revenue authority failed to collect $ 1.7 million which was the 
tax assessed d the amount of tax assessed.93 In addition, the recent $55 billion takeover 
of the British Gas group by the Royal Dutch Shell has raised serious issues as regards the 
imposition of capital gains tax. 94  The Tanzania Revenue Authority subjected this 
transaction to capital gains tax to the tune of $ 502 million. 95 This tax liability is strongly 
contested by British Gas group.96 
All these facts indicate that Tanzania is an ideal case study. As such, it is at particular risk 
to succumbing to the resource curse. On the upside, Tanzania is also particularly well 
placed to learn from its more experienced counterparts. It thus may be able to respond to 
identified challenges. Thus, it is imperative to examine and evaluate the Tanzania’s oil 
and gas tax regime to establish how the country responds to these tax-related challenges. 
It is also important to examine the fundamental principles of oil and gas taxation, identify 
the major factors causing tax revenue leakage, and explore the remedial measures.  
                                                 
90 Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal Appeal No. 16 of 2015 (unreported). 
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3 Objectives, Research Question and Significance of Study 
The major aim of this study is to examine how Tanzania, as new entrant in the oil and gas 
industry, protects its revenue base from tax revenue leakage.97 In doing so, this study 
analyses and evaluates the legislative and administrative measures meant to close the gaps 
and loopholes in tax system to counteract tax avoidance, tax evasion and fiscal 
corruption.98  
To achieve the aim of the study, this study has the following specific objectives: First, it 
aims to examine the main legal assumptions underlying the ownership and control of oil 
and gas in situ in Tanzania. Second, it aims to identify the procedures for the grant of 
exploration and production rights, and institutions mandated to grant these rights. Third, 
it aims to scrutinize the methods used by the Government to create revenue from the oil 
and gas industry. Fourth, it aims to identify the factors that cause tax revenue leakages 
and recommends remedial measures.  
This study uses Tanzania as a case study to raise several issues, which are of concern to 
other oil-rich countries in Africa. These issues need immediate response. In doing so, the 
study provides a general understanding of how the oil and gas industry operates and how 
taxes are imposed. The study also identifies the factors that are likely to cause tax revenue 
leakage and recommends remedial measures. Similarly, the study highlights the 
circumstances that make it possible for the IOCs to avoid or evade taxes without being 
detected or punished. In addition, the study identifies the factors that motivate or create 
the window of opportunity for fiscal corruption in the oil and gas industry. Thus, the study 
contributes to the existing knowledge and debates on tax-related challenges in the oil and 
gas industry. For this reason, the study sets Tanzania as a model that can be replicated by 
other African countries. By using the analytic tools identified in this study, oil rich 
African countries can estimate the likely financial benefits from oil and gas extraction.99 
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In addition to setting out the agenda for reforms by policy makers and legislators, the 
study also hints out the areas requiring further research. 
Generally, the literature on tax revenue leakage in the oil and gas industry has taken a 
rather disjointed approach. For one, the oil and gas taxation discourse uses the canons of 
taxation – efficiency, stability, convenience, equity and risk sharing – to evaluate and 
gauge the efficacy of different fiscal instruments.100 Conversely, as demonstrated by this 
study, the occurrence of the resource curse is not a result of lack of legal framework for 
taxation but rather existence of factors that negate the spirit of tax laws.101 For instance, 
developing countries often have fiscal regimes similar to those of developed countries, 
yet developing countries collect only a portion of the potential taxes. 102  This is an 
indication that the best fiscal terms do not guarantee optimal revenues to the Government. 
Instead, the level of Government’s revenue depends on how tax laws and the mechanisms 
for fighting revenue leakages are enforced.103  
Secondly, the resource curse literature uses an econometric analysis – dependence on the 
resource revenue, economic growth, poverty levels, peace and stability – to evaluate 
whether the country benefits from its oil and gas resources.104 The resource curse study 
concludes that most Governments have failed to obtain appropriate share of the revenue 
                                                 
100 Nakhle Petroleum Taxation, Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today and 
tomorrow (2008)12-13. See also Mgaya, RBT Petroleum Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Oil and Gas 
Fiscal Regime in Tanzania Msc dissertation Robert Godon University of Aberdeen (2014) 53-58. 
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101 See Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. 
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103 See Chapter 4 section 3 and Chapter 6 
104 General discussion of the resource curse by Ross, ML The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes 
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commensurate with the extracted resources.105 The resource curse discourse identifies 
corruption as one of the major factors for the occurrence of the resource curse.106 One of 
the notable shortcomings of the resource curse discourse is that it gives too little weight 
on technical aspects of the oil and gas industry.107 It ignores the fact that the relationship 
between the Government and the IOC is that of a willing-buyer-willing-seller.108 For the 
IOCs, it means they can use every opportunity available to them to reduce their tax 
obligations. Similarly, the resource curse discourse concentrates on measures such as 
transparency and governance initiatives. 109  While transparency has the potential to 
minimize corruption in the oil and gas industry, it has its shortcomings. For instance, 
transparency measures focus on revenue paid to the Government rather than what ought 
to be paid.110  Consequently, the IOCs have been compliant with these transparency 
initiatives, yet only a fraction of potential tax revenues accrue to the Government.111 
As indicated by the discussion above, remedial measures to the problem of tax revenue 
leakage have taken a rather disjointed approach. While the taxation discourse 
concentrates on measures closing the gaps and loopholes in the law, such as rules on thin 
capitalization and transfer pricing,112 the governance measures focus on accountability 
and transparency. 113  By contrast, this study argues that the channels of tax revenue 
leakage – exorbitant tax incentives, tax avoidance, tax evasion and fiscal corruption – are 
interrelated. The unifying factor for these channels is that they all result in reduction or 
loss of Government potential tax revenues. 114  Since this study aims at identifying 
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measures to counteract tax revenue leakage in general, these remedial measures are 
combined. 115 
This study accepts that taxation should be considered as a process from policy 
formulation, legislation, and contract negotiation to tax administration.116 In doing so, 
this study argues that four factors, namely tax avoidance, tax evasion, tax incentives and 
fiscal corruption are responsible for revenue leakage.117Accordingly, this study concludes 
that an ideal fiscal regime is the one that closes the gaps and loopholes in the tax system 
as well as governance measures that limit the windows of opportunity for corrupt 
practices and creating disincentives to corruption. By taking this approach, this study 
identifies and addresses issues not dealt with by each individual approaches identified 
above and hence fills the gap in the literature by examining how technical and governance 
aspects of oil and gas taxation can be merged. 
This study reduces the gaps in insight and responds to the challenges plaguing many oil-
rich countries in Africa. It reflects on how to address tax revenue leakage: how are 
extraction rights granted? How is Government revenues created? How the Government 
strikes a balance between the need to attract investments and maximization of 
Government revenue? What are the factors that are likely to cause tax revenue leakage? 
What are the circumstances that make it possible for the IOCs to avoid taxes without 
being detected or punished? How does the Government address tax revenue leakage? 
How effective are these remedial measures? 
4 Research Methodology 
A conceptual analysis is followed in studying the problems encompassed in the research 
question. This study uses the resource curse theory to evaluate tax-related challenges in 
the oil and gas industry. It does so in relation to Africa generally, and draws specific 
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lessons for Tanzanian upstream oil and gas industry, specifically. The resource curse 
study shows the symptoms of the problem, such as poor development, abject poverty, low 
revenues and slow economic growth. 118  To respond to the challenges raised by the 
resource curse study, the study examines the fundamental principles of oil and gas 
taxation. The study describes the upstream oil and gas sector and highlights the tax-related 
challenges it poses. The description covers issues such as ownership and control, geology, 
value chain, fiscal instruments, fiscal incentives and classification of fiscal regimes. The 
aim of this description is to identify factors that may cause loss of potential tax revenues 
– referred to as “tax revenue leakage”. Moreover, the study applies this understanding in 
the specific context of Tanzania to analyze the regulatory and administrative practice for 
the upstream sector, on how to grant extraction rights, how to tax and how to strike the 
balance between attracting investments and maximizing revenues 
In addition, the study adapts the Cobham’s model of tax revenue leakage to examine how 
Tanzania counteracts tax revenue leakage. 119 The analysis of Cobham’s models identifies 
three factors underlying the occurrence of tax revenue leakage.120 First, the existence of 
gaps and loopholes in the tax system that permits certain transactions to go untaxed.121 
The IOCs usually exploit loopholes and gaps in the tax system to reduce, defer or 
eliminate their tax obligations.122 In addition, the IOCs sometimes adopt illegal means, 
such as non-filing of returns, underreporting transactions and misrepresentation of 
transactions to evade taxes.123 Second, certain factors, such as discretionary powers and 
monopolization of power by one individual, create a window of opportunity for corrupt 
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practices.124 Third, factors such as the benefits from corruption and the low probability 
of being detected and punished motivate Government officials to engage in corrupt 
practices.125  
The identification of the nature of the problem of tax revenue leakage facilitates the 
design the effective counteractive measures. It also helps shape how such remedial 
measures may succeed in addressing the problem. In the light of the underlying factors 
for the tax revenue leakage, this study proposes four remedial measures namely closing 
windows of opportunity for corrupt practices, removing incentives for corruption, closing 
gaps and loopholes in the tax system and mechanisms for prevention, detection and 
punishment of tax avoidance and tax evasion.126 These remedial measures are used as 
analytic tools to examine and evaluate how Tanzania addresses tax revenue leakage in its 
oil and gas industry.127 Each of these tools is firstly examined and analysed in isolation 
and then applied as a benchmark for evaluating the Tanzanian fiscal framework.  
5 Scope and Delimitations of the Study 
Although the challenges facing African countries in managing oil and gas resources cut 
across the spectrum, this study focuses on Tanzania as a case study. It is important to note 
at this juncture that Tanzania is a union of two countries namely Tanganyika (now 
referred as Mainland Tanzania) and Zanzibar.128 While oil and gas form part of the union 
matters, each constituent part of the Union has its regulatory framework.129 This study is 
confined to Mainland Tanzania. Therefore, reference to Tanzania in this study, unless the 
context suggests otherwise, means Mainland Tanzania.  
Similarly, while the oil and gas industry has three segments, namely upstream, midstream 
and downstream, this study focuses on the upstream sector only.130 The reason for this 
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choice is that the law in Tanzania concerning taxation and regulatory framework separates 
the upstream operations from midstream and downstream operations.131 It is in this regard 
the taxation for upstream and downstream operations are treated differently. In addition, 
while in theory taxation is defined as compulsory contribution to the Government, in the 
oil and gas industry, there are several levies, such as royalties, bonuses, profit sharing and 
dividends, which do not technically qualify as taxes.132 This study uses the term “fiscal” 
and “taxation” interchangeably to encompass all tax and non-tax instruments. 
The study highlights several factors that may lead to tax revenue leakage and the 
corresponding responses. There are several remedial measures for tax avoidance but this 
study focuses only on legislative and administrative measures addressing tax avoidance 
and tax avoidance. The judicial and international counteractive measures, though 
highlighted, are beyond the scope of this study. The study also discusses accountability 
measures, such as transparency, oversight mechanisms and sanctions. 
The major constraint to this study is that only two of the twenty-six Production Sharing 
Agreements (PSAs) which are at the production stage. This implies that the current taxes 
from the industry are not significant.133 In addition, the negotiability of certain fiscal 
terms, such as bonuses, cost recovery, profit sharing, and State participation means that 
there is no standard rate applicable.134 It implies that each PSA may have its own specific 
rate. Furthermore, tax avoidance, tax evasion and corruption are clandestine activities and 
thus, difficult to establish the actual revenue lost.135 For these reasons, the study relies on 
information available in the public domain. 
6 Course of Inquiry 
The major aim of this study is to examine how Tanzania, as a new entrant in the oil and 
gas industry, protects its revenue base from exorbitant tax incentives, tax avoidance and 
                                                 
131 Section 65 K(4) Income Tax Act 2004. 
132 Nakhle Petroleum Taxation, Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today and 
tomorrow (2008) 12-13. 
133 See Chapter 5 section 2.5. 
134 See Chapter 5 section 2.5. 
135  Otusanya et al “The effect of fiscal corruption on economic development and sustainability in 
developing economies: the case of Nigeria” (2013) 318. 




corruption. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to contextualize the problem. The 
remainder of this study is divided into three parts. Part I provides a general context of 
issues and challenges addressed in this study. It deals with conceptualizing tax revenue 
leakage in the upstream oil and gas sector. To achieve this objective, Part I is divided into 
three chapters. Chapter 2 provides a general introduction of oil and gas taxation. It 
describes the formation and occurrence of oil and gas, explains the different terminologies 
used, examines the question of ownership of oil and gas resources in situ, and analyzes 
the value chain in the oil and gas industry. It also highlights general principles and 
concepts of oil and gas taxation. It covers issues such as tax-related features of the oil and 
gas industry, fiscal instruments, the classification of fiscal regimes around the world and 
fiscal incentives. This theoretical analysis sets the framework for analyzing the Tanzanian 
oil and gas fiscal regime. 
Chapter 3 describes the concept of tax revenue leakages, and then proceeds to analyze the 
factors that may lead to tax revenue leakages. This analysis forms a basis for evaluating 
the Tanzanian oil and gas fiscal regime to establish whether it sufficiently responds to the 
challenges.  
Chapter 4 analyses the legal and social context within which tax revenue leakage occurs. 
The aspects covered include the actors in the tax system, the structural gaps in the tax 
system, the conducts of the identified actors and their impact on revenue collection. The 
chapter also identifies five legal measures that can be adopted to counteract tax revenue 
leakage. These measures aim at closing the window of opportunity for corrupt practices, 
removing incentives for corruption, closing gaps and loopholes in the tax system, 
criminalization of tax evasion and administrative measures to prevent, detect and punish 
tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
Part II applies the analytical tools developed under Part I to examine and evaluate the 
Tanzanian upstream oil and gas taxation. Part II is divided into two chapters. Chapter 5 
explores legal framework under which oil and gas operations are carried out in Tanzania. 
It also analyzes the concept of production sharing agreement (PSA) as mechanism of 
creating Government revenue in Tanzania. The chapter examines different fiscal and non-
fiscal instruments, such as royalties, bonuses, State equity participation, profit-based 
taxes, production sharing, rental fees as well as indirect taxes. It also highlights tax 
incentives, such as royalty and tax exemptions, accelerated cost recovery, relief from 




double taxation and fiscal stabilization. The chapter analyses the legal and institutional 
framework for tax assessment, tax audits, tax collection and management.  
Chapter 6 examines and evaluates remedial measures that have been adopted by the 
Government of Tanzania to address tax revenue leakage. The remedial measures 
examined include the anti-corruption regime that criminalizes and sanctions corrupt 
practices. It also covers oversight mechanisms that close the windows of opportunity for 
corrupt practices. The chapter also examines the anti-tax avoidance measures that close 
gaps and loopholes in the tax system as well as the administrative capacity to detect, 
prevent and punish tax avoidance and tax evasion.  
Part III consists of only Chapter 7, which provides a summary of main issues highlighted 
by the study. It also provides a conclusion on how the Government prevents tax revenue 




PART I: CONCEPTUALIZING TAX REVENUE 
LEAKAGE IN THE UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS 
INDUSTRY 
The first chapter of this study introduced the research problem and question. This part I 
provides a general understanding of the concept of tax revenue leakage. To contextualize 
tax revenue leakage in the upstream oil and gas industry, this part is covers three major 
issues. First, it provides a general understanding of the upstream oil and gas taxation. This 
covers issues such as geology and occurrence of oil and gas, value chain creation, tax-
related features of the oil and gas industry, fiscal instruments and classification of fiscal 
regimes around the world. Second, it examines the academic discourse on the concept of 
tax revenue leakage. In doing so, it defines tax revenue leakage and identifies the factors 
that are likely to cause tax revenue leakage. Third, it analyses the legal and social context 
within which tax revenue leakage occurs. It also identifies and examines the different 







CHAPTER TWO: OIL AND GAS TAXATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general introduction of the upstream oil and gas taxation. It 
describes the geological and chemical aspects pertaining to the formation and occurrence 
of oil and gas and the different terminologies used. In addition, the chapter analyzes the 
value chain in the oil and gas industry. The value chain –processes of search for, 
extraction of oil and gas, processing, manufacturing and selling of final products– 
identifies the points at which either costs are incurred or a profit is made.1 Thus, the value 
chain informs the Government on how and to whom the extraction rights should be 
granted, how to supervise and monitor oil and gas operations and identify incidences 
where taxes can be imposed.2  
Likewise, for investors, the value chain helps them to identify not only the timing of the 
profits and cost recovery, but whether the project, as a whole, is profitable.3 The chapter 
also provides a theoretical exposition of the general principles and concepts of oil and gas 
taxation. It discusses tax-related features of the oil and gas industry, such as ownership 
of oil and gas resources in situ, the concept of economic rents, uncertainties of the oil and 
gas industry and the involvement of International Oil Companies (IOCs). It also provides 
a discussion of a variety of fiscal instruments, the classification of fiscal regimes around 
the world and fiscal incentives.  
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The general objective of this theoretical analysis is to establish the basis for evaluating 
the Tanzanian oil and gas taxation regime and to set the framework for analysis in the 
later chapters. The discussion on the general features of oil and gas industry follows. 
2 General Understanding of the Oil and Gas Industry 
The word “petroleum”, a generic term for oil and gas, owes its origin from two Greek 
words petra (“meaning rock”) and oleum (“meaning oil”).4 These oil rocks consist of 
naturally occurring hydrocarbon-rich fluids (“hydrogen and carbon”) and associated non-
hydrocarbon substances (“oxygen, nitrogen and sulphur”).5 Geologically, these rocks are 
formed as a result organic materials that were accumulated and deposited below the 
earth’s surface million years ago, decomposing and forming hydrocarbon.6 Subsequently, 
these hydrocarbons were, due to high pressure and temperatures, compressed and 
transformed into sedimentary rocks containing petroleum.7  
These sedimentary rocks can be composed of both porous and easily permeable 
sedimentary layers or tight and impermeable rock made up of extremely small pore sizes.8 
The petroleum produced from permeable rocks is referred to as “conventional” petroleum 
while the one from impermeable rocks is referred to as “unconventional” petroleum.9 The 
                                                 
4 petra (meaning rock) and oleum (meaning oil) Hyne, NJ Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, 
Exploration, Drilling, and Production 2 ed (Tulsa, PennWell Corporation 2001) 1. Even though history 
shows that, as far as 400 BC, petroleum substances existed and were applied for various uses, however the 
ground-breaking invention of petroleum as a major energy source occurred in 1859, when Colonel Edwin 
Drake, struck oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania, USA. See Yergin, D The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money 
and Power (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1991) 26-31; Petrie, TA The Oil and Gas Industries- An 
Overview (1993) 3, Deutsche Bank A guide to the oil & gas industry (2013) available at 
http://www.wallstreetoasis.com/files/DEUTSCHEBANKAGUIDETOTHEOIL%EF%BC%86GASINDU
STRY-130125.pdf (accessed on 02 June 2015) 
5 Taverne, B Petroleum, Industry and Governments: A Study of the Involvement of Industry and 
Governments in the Production and Use of Petroleum 2 ed (Alphen aan den Rijn Kluwer Law International, 
2008) 1. See also Lowe, JS Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell 6th edn (West Publishing, 2014).1 
6 Devold, H Oil and Gas Production Handbook: An introduction to oil and gas production (Olso, ABB 
2009) 22. 
7 Lowe Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell (2014) 3; Abdel-Aal, H.K Petroleum and Gas Field Processing 
(2003) 18; Devold Oil and Gas Production Handbook: An introduction to oil and gas production (2009) 
22. 
8 Ratner, M and Tiemann, M An Overview of Unconventional Oil and Natural Gas: Resources and Federal 
Actions Congressional Research Service (2015) 2 available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43148.pdf 
(accessed 22 February 2017). 
9 Unconventional petroleum is classified as “not occurring naturally” See Ratner and Tiemann An Overview 
of Unconventional Oil and Natural Gas: Resources and Federal Actions (2015) 2. Le Leuch, H “Recent 
Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal Issues” in Andreas 




tightness and impermeability of sedimentary rocks means that oil and gas can only be 
extracted by using special methods as opposed to ordinary drilling.10 The methods of 
extracting unconventional petroleum, such as hydraulic fracturing are costly and may 
have negative impacts on the environment. 11  For this reason, it considered very 
expensive, and thus uneconomical, to extract the unconventional petroleum.12  In its 
natural state in the underground reservoirs, petroleum may occur in gaseous form or liquid 
form.13 The next section discusses the occurrence of petroleum. 
2.1 Crude Oil and Natural Gas 
The petroleum occurring in liquid form is referred to as crude oil.14 The extraction of 
crude oil begins by lifting up the hydrocarbon substance from the underground petroleum 
reservoir.15 Then, these hydrocarbon substances are taken through a refining process to 
produce different products, such as gasoline, lubricants, kerosene, jet fuel, diesel, residual 
fuel oils as well as feedstock.16 The unit used to measure the volumes of crude oil is a 
barrel (bbl) which is equivalent to 42 U.S gallons or 158.987 litres.17 
                                                 
Goldthau (ed) The Handbook of Global Energy Policy (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Ebook 2013) 141; Inkpen, 
A and Moffett, MH The Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance (Tulsa, 
PennWell Corporation, 2011) 310. 
10 Since it is impossible to recover unconventional petroleum through ordinary drilling and pumping, the 
method extraction method used is artificial fracturing of the sedimentary rocks (“source rocks”). See Ratner 
and Tiemann An Overview of Unconventional Oil and Natural Gas: Resources and Federal Actions (2015) 
2. See also Gordon, D Understanding Unconventional Oil (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace 2012) 6. 
11 Le Leuch “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal 
Issues” (2013)141. 
12 Ratner and Tiemann An Overview of Unconventional Oil and Natural Gas: Resources and Federal 
Actions (2015) 1. 
13 Kirk-Othmer (ed) Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology (John Wiley & Sons 2014) 5. 
14 Wheeler, R R. Oil from Prospect to Pipeline (4th Ed) (Houston: Gulf Publishing Company (1981) 1. 
Brock et al Petroleum Accounting: Principles, Procedures & Issues (6th ed) (North Texas State University 
2007)2. 
15 Hyne Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production (2001) 7. 
16 Wheeler Oil from Prospect to Pipeline (1981) 1-2; Hyne Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, 
Exploration, Drilling, and Production (2001) 7. 
17 Hyne Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production (2001) 7. See 
also Brock et al Petroleum Accounting: Principles, Procedures & Issues (2007) 3. 




On the other hand, the petroleum occuring in gaseous form is referred to as natural gas.18 
In its natural condition, natural gas may occur simultaneously with crude oil. This type 
of natural gas is produced as a by-product of crude oil (“associated gas”).19 Conversely, 
natural gas may occur, as it is the case in Tanzania, alone and independent of crude oil 
(“non-associated gas”).20 Another form of natural gas is the one occurring in a reservoir 
that contains a semi-liquid hydrocarbon called condensate.21 The unit of measurement of 
volumes natural gas is cubic foot (cft) which is equivalent to 28.3 litres.22  
For a long time, the gaseous form of natural gas impeded its use as a source of energy.23 
Natural gas, unlike crude oil, was not easily transportable by ship, train or road.24 In 
addition, its gaseous form means that it had to converted into liquid form before being 
transported.25 The process of converting natural gas into liquid form (“liquefaction”) is 
expensive.26 This equally hampered by the fact the liquefied natural gas (LNG) could 
only be transported through pipelines, thus difficult to reach distant markets. 27  In 
                                                 
18 Chandra, V Fundamentals of Natural Gas: An International Perspective (Tulsa, Oklahoma: Pennwell 
2006) 3. See also Speight, JG. Handbook of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations (Texas, Gulf Publishing 
Company, 2015) 17 and Brock et al Petroleum Accounting: Principles, Procedures & Issues (2007) 2. 
19  Le Leuch, H Good Practice Note on (Upstream) Natural Gas (2012) viii, 4, 5 & 18 available at 
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/files/good_practice_note_on_(upstream)_natural_gas.pdf (accessed on 
11 May 2014); Inkpen and Moffett The Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance 
( 2011) 306.  
20 Le Leuch Good Practice Note on (Upstream) Natural Gas (2012) viii & 5, 18; Hyne Nontechnical Guide 
to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production (2001)11; Lowe Oil and Gas Law in a 
Nutshell (2014) 1, The reserves of natural gas discovered in Tanzania constitute non-associated natural gas. 
21 Similar to crude oil. Generally, natural gas with condensate is referred to as wet gas while natural gas 
occurring without condensate referred to as dry gas Hyne Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, 
Exploration, Drilling, and Production (2001)11; Inkpen and Moffett The Global Oil and Gas Industry: 
Management, Strategy and Finance ( 2011) 306. 
22 1000 cubic feet is (Mcf), one million cubic feet (MMcf), billion cubic feet (Bcf) and trillion cubic feet 
(Tcf) Condensate contents are measured by barrels per cubic feet of gas (BCPMM). Hyne Nontechnical 
Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production (2001) 12-13. See also Chandra 
Fundamentals of Natural Gas: An International Perspective (2006) 7. 
23 Inkpen and Moffett The Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance (2011) 335. 
24 Inkpen and Moffett The Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance (2011) 335. 
See also Le Leuch, H Good Practice Note on (Upstream) Natural Gas (2012) 3; Brock et al Petroleum 
Accounting: Principles, Procedures & Issues (2007)2. 
25 Inkpen and Moffett The Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance ( 2011) 335 
26 Chandra Fundamentals of Natural Gas: An International Perspective (2006) 1. Inkpen and Moffett The 
Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance ( 2011) 309; 
27 Chandra Fundamentals of Natural Gas: An International Perspective (2006) 1.  




addition, upon reaching the destination, the LNG must be converted into gaseous form 
(“regasification”) for distribution to end users.28  
All these factors indicate that, in the past, before developing natural gas fields, it was 
important for investors to ascertain the presence of markets, and infrastructure for 
processing and distribution of natural gas to the ultimate consumers.29 A good example 
is the discovery of non-associated natural gas, which was rather unexpected, in Tanzania 
at Songo Songo Island in 1974 and Mnazi Bay in l982.30 Because of lack of reliable 
markets in Tanzania and the distance from European and Asian markets, the lack of 
infrastructure for processing and transportation, commercial production commenced in 
2004.31  
Against this background, the technological advancement, in terms of exploitation, 
transportation and usage, has made it possible to exploit natural gas economically.32 
Although currently it is possible to exploit natural gas with a profit, it is still important 
for legislation, taxation, regulation and contracts to take into account the unique features 
of natural gas.33 In addition, unlike crude oil, which has spot prices, there no single world 
reference price for natural gas. 34  As a result, the price of natural gas depends on 
agreements between producers and buyers or in reference to distant markets ready to 
purchase that natural gas.35 This may exacerbate the problem of transfer pricing.36  
                                                 
28 Inkpen and Moffett The Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance (2011) 335. 
29 Influenced by location reserves and type of consumer Inkpen and Moffett The Global Oil and Gas 
Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance (2011) 335. See also Le Leuch Good Practice Note on 
(Upstream) Natural Gas (2012) 3;11 
30 Tanzania Natural Gas Policy (2013) 1; Pedersen and Bofin The politics of gas contract negotiations in 
Tanzania: a review 03 (2015) 8-9.  
31  Tanzania Natural Gas Policy (2013) 1. See also Pedersen and Bofin The politics of gas contract 
negotiations in Tanzania: a review 03 (2015) 8-9. 
32 Chandra Fundamentals of Natural Gas: An International Perspective (2006) 1; Inkpen and Moffett The 
Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance (2011) 303, 319-22. 
33 Le Leuch Good Practice Note on (Upstream) Natural Gas (2012) viii & 18. 
34 Le Leuch Good Practice Note on (Upstream) Natural Gas (2012) 15. 
35 Le Leuch Good Practice Note on (Upstream) Natural Gas (2012) 15-16. 
36 See Chapter 3 section 3.2.2 




2.2 Oil and Gas Value Chain Creation 
Generally, oil and gas resources in the subsurface are not valuable until extracted from 
the ground and transformed into tradable commodities.37 The processes and activities 
involved in transforming subsurface oil and gas resources into saleable products are 
referred to as “value chain creation”.38 These processes and activities are divided into 
three segments namely the upstream, midstream and downstream segments.39  
The upstream segment involves the search for oil and gas reservoirs underground or under 
the seabed, and the ultimate extraction when the deposits are discovered.40 The midstream 
segment involves the transportation, refining and conversion of raw oil and gas into 
finished or semi-finished tradeable goods.41 Finally, downstream segment involves the 
distribution and marketing of oil and gas products to final consumers. 42 It is possible for 
all these three segments to be undertaken by one company (“integrated companies”) or 
each segment is undertaken one specializing firm (“independents”). 43 The diagram below 






                                                 
37 Tordo S, Tracy BS, and Arfaa N National Oil Companies and Value Creation (Washington DC, World 
Bank, 2011).1. 
38 Tordo, Tracy and Arfaa National Oil Companies and value chain creation (2011) 1 Tordo S, Johnston 
D and Johnston D Petroleum Exploration and Production Rights Allocation Strategies and Design Issues 
(Washington DC, World Bank 2009) 1. ‘value’ is defined as the ‘price’ customers are ready to pay for see 
Inkpen and Moffett The Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance (2011) 20. 
39 Brock et al Petroleum Accounting: Principles, Procedures & Issues (2007) 15; other countries merge the 
midstream and downstream sectors. See Tordo, Tracy and Arfaa National Oil Companies and value chain 
creation (2011) 2; Dyer E, Reinbott D, and Williams, M “Liquefied natural gas” in Picton-Turbervill, G 
(ed) Oil and Gas: A Practical Handbook (London, Globe Business Publishing Ltd 2009) 116; Kellas, G 
“Natural gas Experience and issues” in Daniel, P Keen, M, McPherson C (eds) The Taxation of Petroleum 
and Minerals Principles, Problems and Practice, (London, Taylor & Francis, 2010) 165-166; Thorpe, CP 
Fundamentals of Upstream Petroleum Agreements (CPI Antony Rowe, Eastbourne UK, 2008)1.  
40 Brock et al Petroleum Accounting: Principles, Procedures & Issues (2007) 16 Alramahi, M Oil and Gas 
Law in the UK (West Sussex Bloomsbury Professional Limited 2013)9. 
41 Le Leuch Good Practice Note on (Upstream) Natural Gas (2012) 14. 
42 Brock et al Petroleum Accounting: Principles, Procedures & Issues (2007) 17. 
43 Inkpen and Moffett The Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance (2011) 20. 
See also Brock etal Petroleum Accounting: Principles, Procedures & Issues (2007) 16. 




Figure 1.2 Diagrammatic Representation of oil and gas value chain 
 
3 Tax-Related Features of the Oil and Gas Industry 
Generally, the essence of oil and gas taxation is the apportionment of the economic 
benefits between the Government and the IOCs.44 A good tax system, at least in theory, 
must adhere to the canons of taxations: taxes should be certain and not arbitrary, 
considerable convenience to taxpayers, taxes should be fair and equitable and taxes 
should be efficient.45 Certainty entails the stability of fiscal terms or predictability of 
changes in fiscal terms.46 For the taxpayers, certainty enables them to understand the 
                                                 
44 Le Leuch “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal 
Issues” (2013) 127. 
45 These qualities have formed the bedrock of the modern tax policy Smith, A An Inquiry Into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Pennsylvania State University, Ebook 2005) 777-779. See also Edrey, 
Y “Constitutional Review and Tax Law: An Analytical Framework” (2007) 56(5) American University 
Law Review at 1193-1194; Morse, Williams and Salter Davies Principles of Tax Law, (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell 1996) 5 and Nakhle, C Petroleum Taxation Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation 
yesterday, today and tomorrow (New York, Routledge, 2008) 12-13.  
46 Tordo, S Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons Design Issues (Washington, D.C: The World Bank 2007) 14; 
Ajayi, O Resource Taxation as a tool for Development (2009) 14-16 available at: 
http://works.bepress.com/oladiran_ajayi/1/.(accessed on 09 January 2014) 
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•Acquisition of extraction rights
•Exploration: search for oil and gas
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applicable tax regime and plan their investment projections accordingly.47 Similarly, for 
the Government certainty makes it easy to predict the likely revenues to be collected, thus 
facilitates expenditure forecasting and budgetary planning.48  
In addition, a simple tax system makes it easy for tax payers to establish their tax 
liabilities and also a convenient way of assessing and collecting taxes by tax 
administrators.49  Similarly, convenience in a tax system implies that Government to 
generate revenue only when the investor earns a profit and not when the investor suffers 
a loss. 50  It also means Government’s costs in tax administration and taxpayer’s 
compliance costs are as minimal as possible.51 Finally, the principle of equity in taxation 
requires that taxpayers in similar circumstances be treated equally and taxpayers in 
different circumstances be treated differently.52 This is congruent with the rule of law that 
requires equality before the law.53 
While the canons of taxation provide guidance of an ideal fiscal regime, the oil and gas 
industry has certain unique features, which call for special attention.54 For one, there are 
                                                 
47 Onorato, WT Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) 15. See also 
Nakhle Petroleum Taxation Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today and 
tomorrow (2008) 5. 
48 Nakhle Petroleum Taxation Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today and 
tomorrow (2008) 14. Onorato Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) 15. 
49 Nakhle Petroleum Taxation Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today and 
tomorrow (2008) 14. 
50 Nakhle Petroleum Taxation, Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today and 
tomorrow (2008) 11. See also Morse et al Davies Principles of Tax Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) 
7-8. 
50 Nakhle Petroleum Taxation, Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today and 
tomorrow (2008) 11-15. 
51 OECD Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy: OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project OECD Publishing (2014) 30 available http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264218789-en ( 
accessed on 05 August 2016) 
52 Morse, Williams and Salter Davies Principles of Tax Law (1996) 6-7. Lencho, T “The Ethiopian Tax 
System: Excesses and Gaps” (2012) 20(2) Michigan State International Law Review 327-380 at 334; 
Luoga, F “Taxation in the Advent of Democratisation and Transition to Free Market Economy in Tanzania 
and Concerns on the Rule of Law and Human Rights’ 2002 (1) at 25-27, available at 
http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/02-1/luoga.html (accessed on 20 March 2014); Vanistendael, F “Legal 
Framework for Taxation” in Victor Thuronyi (ed), Tax Law Design and Drafting Vol. 1 (Washington DC, 
International Monetary Fund 1996) 5-6; Kaplow, L The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008) 396-398. 
53 Tamanaha, BZ “The History and Elements of the Rule of Law” Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
(2012) 233-247 at 233-236. 
54 Nakhle Petroleum Taxation, Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today and 
tomorrow (2008)12-13. 




certain factors, such as none-renewability, volatility of price, State ownership of the 
resources, which distinguish the oil and gas industry from other sectors.55 In addition, the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSONR), which confers a 
right to each country to determine a fiscal regime that suits the country’s political, 
economic and environmental conditions, makes design fiscal regime country-specific.56 
For these reasons, the ultimate the design of the fiscal regime largely depends on the 
policy objective the Government aims to achieve.57 In view of these unique features, the 
question is whether it is justifiable to have special tax regime for oil and gas industry or 
just adopt the generally applicable tax system.58 The next section highlights the oil and 
gas tax-related characteristics. 
3.1 Ownership of Oil and Gas in situ 
The concept of ownership of oil and gas in situ is of paramount importance in the oil and 
gas taxation.59 This is because the ownership regime determines persons who can have 
access to the oil and gas resources.60 Without this access, no exploration or extraction 
may be undertaken.61 In addition, when a person other than the owner undertakes the 
extraction, the ownership regime determines the methods of apportioning revenues 
between the owner of the resources and the extractive company. 62  Similarly, the 
                                                 
55 Collier “Principles of Resource Taxation for Low-Income Countries” (2010) 75. 
56 The doctrine argues that the resource-rich countries have the right and freedom to dispose of their natural 
resources, use natural resources for development as well as the right to regulate foreign investments. The 
doctrine has been incorporated in several UN General Assembly resolutions and the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 12 December 1974. 
For further discussion on the doctrine see Ng'ambi, SP “Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 
and the Sanctity of Contracts, From the Angle of Lucrum Cessans” 12 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 153-172 
(2015) 154-155. See also Nakhle “Petroleum fiscal regimes Evolution and challenges” (2010) 104 &117. 
57 Nakhle “Petroleum fiscal regimes Evolution and challenges” (2010) 105. 
58 Collier “Principles of Resource Taxation for Low-Income Countries” (2010) 75. 
59 Mahoney Economic Foundations of Strategy (2015) 114. 
60  Mahoney Economic Foundations of Strategy (2015) 114; Le Leuch “Recent Trends in Upstream 
Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal Issues” (2013)128. 
61 Omorogbe, Y and Oniemola, P “Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes” in A McHarg, 
B Barton, B Bradbrook and L Godden (eds), Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010) 114, Le Leuch, “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum 
Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal Issues” (2013) 128. 
62  Omorogbe, Y Fiscal Regimes (2005) 1 A paper Presented at the Nigerian Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Civil Society Capacity Building Workshop, Presidential Hotel, Port 
Harcourt, Rivers State, 27th – 28th July 2005, on Thursday 28th July 2005 
http://www.nigerianlawguru.com/articles/oil%20and%20gas/FISCAL%20REGIMES.pdf (accessed 8 
August 2016) Alford, CJ Mining Law of the British Empire (1906) 7; Mahoney Economic Foundations of 




ownership regime determines the role of the State as the owner of the resource or the 
regulator or both.63 For these reasons, the ownership regime influences the design and 
contents of the fiscal regime. 
Generally, ownership of oil and gas in the subsoil may vest in either the individual 
landowner or the State.64 The ownership of subsurface oil and gas by the landowner is 
summarized through the maxim cuius es solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos 
(cujus est solum doctrine).65 The cujus est solum doctrine implies that the ownership of 
land “extends from the depth of the earth to the height of the sky”.66 It means that 
ownership of land carries with it the ownership of all the oil and gas substances in the 
sub-surface.67 This system is applied some jurisdictions, such as Australia, as well as 
                                                 
Strategy (2005) 114; Omorogbe and Oniemola “Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes” 
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some parts of the USA and Canada.68 Under this system, the landowners have right to 
explore and extract oil and gas themselves, leave them unexploited or grant extraction 
rights to third parties.69  From the taxation point of view, private ownership system 
distinqushes between royalties and other levies payable to the landowners and generally 
applicable taxes,, such as corporate income tax, payable to the Government.70 
The other system posits that, regardless of the nature of landownership system, oil and 
gas resources in situ are a gift of nature and thus owned by the State on behalf and for the 
benefit of all citizens.71 According to this view, unlike agriculture, which requires the 
planting of seeds before reaping the produce, oil and gas in situ are nature’s bounty and 
thus not dependent on any human inventiveness or labour. 72  For this reason, the 
occupation of soil, does not justify ownership of oil and gas found beneath the land.73 
Instead, oil and gas resources in the subsurface are classified as public property, to be 
utilized for the benefit of all citizens in the country.74  
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Pietrowski Jr “Changing Concepts in the World's Mineral and Petroleum Development Laws” (1976) 15; 
Bret-Rouzaut et al Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Reserves, costs, contracts (2011) 171. 
70 Nakhle “Petroleum fiscal regimes Evolution and challenges” (2010) 91. See also Ely and Pietrowski Jr, 
“Changing Concepts in the World's Mineral and Petroleum Development Laws’ (1976) 21. Aalberts and 
Siedel III Real Estate Law (2008) 68. 
71 Veit, PG and Larsen, G Overlapping Land and Natural Resource Property Rights: A Comparative 
Analysis from Africa World Resources Institute, Washington, DC 15 April (2013) 8. See also De Fooz, 
JHN Fundamental Principles of the Law of Mines (1860) 2; Wieland, P “Going Beyond Panaceas: Escaping 
Mining Conflicts in Resource-Rich Countries through Middle-Ground Policies” (2014) 209.; Omorogbe 
and Oniemola “Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes” (2010) 118; Emel, J et al 
“Extracting sovereignty: Capital, territory, and gold mining in Tanzania” (2011) 72; Nakhle  “Petroleum 
fiscal regimes: evolution and challenges” (2010) 121; Le Leuch “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum 
Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal Issues” (2013) 128;  
72 De Fooz Fundamental Principles of the Law of Mines (1860) 11; Crabbe “Turgot's Brief on Mines and 
Quaries: An Early Economic Analysis of Mineral Land Tenure” (1985) 272; 
73 De Fooz Fundamental Principles of the Law of Mines (1860)11 See also Aladeitan, L “Ownership and 
Control of Oil, Gas, and Mineral Resources in Nigeria: Between Legality and Legitimacy” (2013) 163. 
74 Wieland “Going Beyond Panaceas: Escaping Mining Conflicts in Resource-Rich Countries through 
Middle-Ground Policies” (2014) 209; see also Schaber, P ‘Property Rights and the Resource Curse’ (2011) 
17 Global Governance at 186, The Supreme Court of India held in Association of Natural Gas v Union of 
India (2004) 4 SCC 489 (CB) that “the people of the entire country have a stake natural gas and its benefit 
has to be shared by the whole country”. 




Another reason for rejecting private ownership, foresees instances where landowners 
either lack capital and expertise or are unwilling to undertake the extraction, hence 
rendering the underground oil and gas resources sterile.75 Furthermore, since oil and gas 
resources in oil-rich countries form the “patrimony” of the State politically and 
economically, it would therefore be unfair to permit a few individual landowners to 
control and enjoy the benefits of such resources.76 
State ownership of oil and gas in the subsurface takes two forms namely regalia and 
domanial systems.77 Under the regalian system, the Crown reserved the royal right (“jura 
regalia”) to dispose, for the benefit of society, the ownership of subsurface mineral 
substances including oil and gas.78  In summary, the regalian system has five major 
features.79 First, it espouses a spilt-tenure between the surface of land and the oil and gas 
it covers.80 While the landholder has the right to occupy and use the soil the State retains 
ownership of oil and gas in situ.81 However, the oil and gas estate is created only when 
the State grants oil and gas rights before that there is only one estate.82 Second, it permits 
private ownership of land to co-exist with public ownership of land.83 Third, oil and gas 
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in situ, regardless of whether discovered on private or public land belongs to the State.84 
Fourth, only the State can grant authorization to prospect, mine or dispose the oil and gas 
resources.85 Fifth, with the exception of a few jurisdictions where the State shares its 
royalties with landowners, landoweners are generally entitled to compensation only for 
disturbance of surface rights.86  
The second form of State ownership is the domanial system.87 The domanial system vests 
the State with the “direct, absolute, exclusive and inalienable property” of both the oil 
and gas and the land covering them.88 It means the absolute title to land vests in the State, 
while landholders are only entitled to the right to use, occupy and manage the land.89 In 
this regard, the State retains the right to either engage in the direct exploitation of oil and 
gas resources or grant extraction right to extractive companies.90 It also means that in the 
event that oil and gas are discovered, landholders are only entitled to compensation for 
the loss of surface rights.91 As this study will demonstrate, the Tanzanian oil and gas 
rights regime falls squarely within the precincts of the domanial system.92 
As regards to ownership of oil and gas in the sea, States under international law have a 
general claim of ownership of all natural resources found in the sea and the seabed.93 A 
                                                 
84 Wieland, “Going Beyond Panaceas: Escaping Mining Conflicts in Resource-Rich Countries through 
Middle-Ground Policies” (2012-2014) 206. 
85 De Castro “Acquiring Mineral Rights in the Philippines: Updates On Mining Law and Jurisprudence” 
(2008-2009) 610-612. See also Veit and Larsen Overlapping Land and Natural Resource Property Rights: 
A Comparative Analysis from Africa (2013) 9. 
86 For example, under section 98(3) read together with the Ugandan Mining Act 2003 owners or lawful 
occupiers of land subject to mineral right are entitled to a 3% of the royalties paid to the Government. See 
also the general discussions by Veit and Larsen Overlapping Land and Natural Resource Property Rights: 
A Comparative Analysis from Africa (2013) 9; Aladeitan “Ownership and Control of Oil, Gas, and Mineral 
Resources in Nigeria: Between Legality and Legitimacy” (2013) 167-168. 
87 Omorogbe and Oniemola “Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes” (2010) 115. 
88 The term domanial comes from demanio- Spanish law- means assets owned by the State for the common 
good of the whole society and important to the economy. Gonzalez “Civil Law Treatment of the Subsurface 
in Latin American Countries” (2014) 69. See also Omorogbe and Oniemola “Property Rights in Oil and 
Gas under Domanial Regimes” (2010)120. 
89 Omorogbe and Oniemola “Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes” (2010) 115. 
90 Gonzalez “Civil Law Treatment of the Subsurface in Latin American Countries” (2014) 69; Egede, H 
“African ‘Social Ordering’ Grundnorms and The Development of an African Lex Petrolea?” (2016) 28 
Denning Law Journal 138-165 at 144. 
91 Omorogbe and Oniemola “Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes” (2010) 120. 
92 Chapter 5 section 2.1. Also most African countries fall under the domanial system. See Egede “African 
‘Social Ordering’ Grundnorms and The Development Of An African Lex Petrolea?” (2016) 141. 
93 Mitchell, Marcel and Mitchell What Next for the Oil and Gas Industry? (2012) 35. 




State’s claim of ownership arises either from the United Nation Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) or on international customary law.94 The UNCLOS vests coastal 
States with authority to manage the territorial sea and contiguous zone.95 In addition, the 
coastal States have sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage all natural 
resources found in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).96 It includes an exclusive right 
to construct, install and operate structures for purposes of exploration or exploitation of 
natural resources.97  
Ideally, under State ownership, oil and gas resources are a common property of all citizens 
whereby everybody has equal rights to enjoy and benefit from their exploitation.98 In this 
regard, State ownership of oil and gas resources is “not proprietary, but fiduciary”.99 The 
Privy Council in Attorney General (Quebec) v. Attorney General (Canada) 100 interpreted 
the phrase “vest in public” as a conferment of powers in a public body to enable it control, 
manage properties or discharge its functions efficiently. 101 This implies that the vesting 
provisions are meant to enable the State, as a trustee of the people it represents, to manage 
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the petroleum resources for the benefits of the whole nation.102 This also means that the 
State, as a trustee of the people at large, has a duty and obligation to protect and exploit 
the resources for the enjoyment and use of the citizens including those yet unborn.103 
Thus, the State must ensure not only optimal exploitation of the resources, but also obtains 
adequate financial benefits commensurate with the extracted oil and gas.104  
In the context of taxation, the legal implication of State ownership is that the State acts 
as both the owner of the resource and the sovereign.105 The State-as-sovereign exercises 
its power by imposing taxes on all persons within its territorial boundaries. 106  This 
implies the general taxes which are applicable not only to the oil and gas industry but to 
all sectors. 107  The State-as-owner is entitled to payment of rent from the IOCs to 
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undertake the extraction through different fiscal instruments, such as user fees, royalties 
and bonuses used as compensation for allowing extraction of oil from his land.108  
In practice, the extraction may be undertaken by the IOCs alone or in partnership with 
the Government.109 The dual role of the State - both the owner and the sovereign - requires 
special rules of taxation.110 The State has to decide whether to create a special tax system 
or just use the existing system. In addition, whether to use the existing tax administration 
structure or create a new one.  
3.2 The Concept of Economic Rent 
Generally, the oil and gas industry, especially during the price booms, produces 
exceedingly enormous profits.111 The difference between the costs of producing oil and 
gas products and the sale price in the market is referred to as “economic rent”.112 For 
example, the average costs of producing a barrel of oil ranges between 5 US$ and 30 US$ 
while its price in the world on July 2008 was 145 US$.113This explains the reason why 
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the oil and gas industry is one of the largest industries in the world.114 In addition, these 
profit margins (“economic rent”) provide justification for the Government to impose 
special taxes, such as excess profit taxes.115 
Impliedly, if the Government in countries, such as Tanzania, which owns the oil and gas 
in situ, undertook the extraction it means the Government would take the full amount of 
rents.116 However, since the IOCs undertake extraction alone or in partnership with the 
State, the State as the owner of the resource shares such “economic rents” with the 
IOCs.117 For this reason, the mechanisms for sharing the rents influences the grant of 
extraction rights to IOCs, whether concessional or contractual. 118  The State grants 
extraction rights to the IOCs based on the promise to share the economic rents through a 
pre-determined mechanism.119 Accordingly, the Government usually imposes higher or 
special taxes, such as excess profit tax and bonuses, to ensure that it captures an equitable 
share of the economic rent.120 
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Several uncertainties surrounds the oil and gas industry. For instance, the non-
renewability of oil and gas resources implies that extraction depletes the stock.121 For the 
IOCs, this implies that they may not be able to recover their investment cost or make a 
profit while for the State, it implies oil and gas taxation is not a sustainable source of 
revenue.122 In addition, the prices of oil and gas products in the market are very volatile.123 
The price volatility is exacerbated by the uncertainties on the quantity and quality of oil 
and gas deposits in the subsoil, accessibility, and expected extraction costs.124 All these 
uncertainties render it difficult to quantify the future cashflows over the life of an oil and 
gas project.125  
Furthermore, for countries, which are over dependent on the oil and gas revenues, price 
volatility means their economies will stand or fall with price of oil and gas.126 Because of 
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price volatility, some oil-rich countries tend to increase the fiscal terms during the upsurge 
of price and grant excessive fiscal incentives during the downswing of prices.127 The 
bottom-line is that these uncertainties render it difficult to determine how to share the 
economic rent between the Government and the IOC.128  
Moreover, the process of exploration, development and production involves enormous 
costs 129 Most of these costs are incurred upfront even before the discovery is made or 
production commences. 130  In addition, when the normal rules of cost recovery are 
applied, it means that the payback period is too long.131 The long period of cost recovery 
(through deductions or amortization) creates a time consistency problem.132 It means that 
the amount recovered is not the same as the one invested.133 In addition, the IOCs are 
concerned whether the Government will honour its commitments over the lifespan of the 
project.134 There are several instances where Governments have intervened, contrary to 
the PSAs, to expropriate the license or change of fiscal terms.135 These uncertainties raise 
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several issues on how to design a fiscal regime that is flexible, and how to manage the 
fluctuaction of prices.136 
3.4 Involvement of International Oil Companies (IOCs) 
Although ownership of oil and gas in situ vests in the State, however, since most of these 
States, including Tanzania, lack capital, technology as well as expertise, the extraction is 
usually undertaken by  International Oil Companies (IOCs). 137  One of the defining 
characteristics of the IOCs is that the shareholders are not residents in the country where 
the extractive operations are taking place.138 In addition, the IOCs may have operations 
in different countries.139 
The involvement of IOCs raises a number of complex tax issues. The first issue regards 
the sharing of taxing rights between the host country and the IOC’s country of origin.140 
Since each country has its own tax laws, taxing the IOC entails interaction between 
domestic and international tax law. 141 In principle, the host country imposes taxes on the 
IOCs because they generated profits or earned an income from the host country. 142 On 
the other hand, the country of origin imposes taxes on the IOCs on their worldwide 
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income because they are its residents. 143 The imposition of taxes on the IOCs by both 
host country and the country of origin results in double taxation. Double taxation occurs 
when the IOCs is taxed twice on the same income in both the host country and the country 
of origin. 144 Consequently, the IOCs are interested to know how they will be relieved 
from juridical double taxation. 145 
Another related challenge is how to counteract tax avoidance techniques adopted by the 
IOCs. 146 In practice, the IOCs take advantage of their multinational character to allocate 
costs and profits amongst their subsidiaries to avoid taxes.147 Furthermore, the IOCs have 
a more competitive edge over the Government. For one, the IOCs employ competent 
lawyers and accountants on global scale.148 In addition, the IOCs control the market and 
thus monopolize the industry.149  
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The unique features of the oil and gas industry discussed above require sector-specific 
tax system. 150 In view of these unique features, the question is whether the industry 
should be taxed differently. The discussion of fiscal regimes follows. 
4 Mechanisms for Capturing Resource Rent –Fiscal Instruments 
In designing an oil and gas fiscal regime, the Government wants to achieve three policy 
objectives. 151  First, division or apportionment of the economic rent between the 
Government and the IOC.152 This is equally important for the IOCs whose decision 
whether to make an investment depends so much on the expected return from the 
investment.153 Accordingly, the Government is constrained to strike a balance between 
encouraging the IOCs to make more investments and ensuring that the country obtains 
fair share of the revenues commensurate with the extracted resources. 154Second, the 
Government aims at attracting more investments in the industry and thus grants a variety 
of tax incentives.155 Third, the Government wants to exert control over the exploration 
and production activity. 156 This aims at controlling the flow of revenues, 157ensuring 
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efficient extraction and supply for security and strategic grounds.158 The discussion of 
these levies and taxes follows. 
4.1 Ownership-Based Levies  
Generally, given the high costs involved in exploration and development of gas wells, 
IOCs would prefer to start paying taxes and levies after recovering some of these costs.159 
However, most Governments, as the owners of the resource, require a certain portion of 
the resources produced (rents) be shared with them regardless of whether a profit has 
been made.160 The following paragraphs describe and discuss the applicability of these 
levies. 
4.1.1 Bonuses 
Bonuses are single lump sum payments payable upon on occurrence of events, such as 
signing of contract, discovery of oil or commercial production of oil.161 Signature bonus 
and discovery bonus are undesirable for investors as they are paid upfront before the 
project makes any profit.162 For this reason, bonuses also discourage small companies 
without access to large financial resources. 163  For the Government, the payment of 
bonuses constitutes a source of revenue that may be used to meet the administrative costs 
for operating the industry. 164  Even though payment of bonuses ensures that the 
Government obtains early revenue, the fact that the bonuses are tax deductible, means 
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that they will be offset against future tax liabilities.165 Therefore, bonuses constitute an 
early form of payment of taxes.  
4.1.2 Royalties 
Royalty refers to payment for the right to use another’s property for purposes of gain.166 
In the oil and gas industry context, the owner of the oil and gas in situ claims 
compensation for the irreplaceable loss resulting from exploitation of non-renewable 
resources.167 The royalty is payable immediately after the commencement of commercial 
production of oil and gas.168 The payment of royalties is determined by reference to either 
the volume of production (“per-unit royalty”) or gross revenue (“ad-valorem royalty”).169 
Under the per-unit royalty the Government collects its share at wellhead while the ad-
valorem royalty is charged based on the price of oil or gas at wellhead, shipment point or 
point of delivery. 170 The rate of royalty payable may be fixed by the law or subject to 
negotiations.171 
For the Government, royalties have two major advantages. First, unlike profit-based 
taxes, which are difficult to administer, royalties are easy to administer.172 This is because 
royalties are based on unit produced or revenue generated without deducting the costs of 
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production. 173  Second, the fact that royalties are payable as soon as production 
commences and are not tied to profits, guarantees upfront revenues to the Government.174 
However, for income tax purposes, royalties are treated as a credit (“credited royalties”) 
akin to advance income tax or as an expense (“expensed royalty”) which is an allowable 
deduction when calculating income tax. 175 This implies that the early royalties paid are 
offset against future incomes generated by the IOC.176  
Although royalties guarantee early Government revenues, the fact that they are payable 
regardless of whether a profit has been made, make them very unpopular with the IOCs.177 
To address the regressive nature of royalties, most Governments charge a very low rate 
of royalties, ranging between one and fifteen per cent.178 Similarly, the Government may 
levy a lower royalty for high cost fields, such as deep water offshore projects and vice 
versa.179 The other available policy option is the adoption of a progressive or sliding scale 
royalty, which increases or decreases with the rate of production.180  
From the IOCs viewpoint, the charging of royalties may lead to pre-mature closure or 
non-development of marginal fields. 181  Marginal fields, whose operational costs are 
higher than the revenues, cannot be operated in a regime that charges royalties.182 This is 
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exacerbated by the fact that cost fields pay the same royalty as low cost fields. 183 
Consequently, both the Government and the IOCs may lose the potential revenues from 
these marginal fields.184 To ensure that marginal fields remain productive, countries, such 
as Norway and the UK do not levy royalties for projects in marginal fields.185 
4.1.3 Production Sharing 
In situations where the Government enters into a contract with the IOCs, agreeing the 
methods of sharing the economic rent through sharing the produce or value of production 
based on a pre-determined formula. 186  Under the production-sharing contract, the 
investor bears all the costs and risks of exploration and development.187 If the project is 
successful, the IOC is given a part of production as an entitlement for cost recovery, while 
the remainder production is split between the Government and IOC at a pre-determined 
share.188 The rate of share for the parties may fixed or progressive.189 Although this form 
of sharing rent is not a tax per se, but it represents a form of non-tax instrument.190  
4.1.4 Excess Profit Tax 
Generally, certain factors, such as chemical composition or the sharp increase in oil and 
gas prices that lead to creation of exceptionally big profit margins.191 Governments as the 
owners of the resource envision this situation; therefore want to capture as large a 
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proportion as possible of the excess profit generated.192 To capture these excess profits, 
Governments impose excess or additional profit tax. 193 The excess profit tax is charged, 
in addition to the normal corporate income tax, when the profits earned by the IOC exceed 
the reasonable return set by the Government. 194 The excess profit tax was introduced for 
the first during the price boom in the 1970 and 1980. 195 The justication for charging 
excess profit tax is that super normal profits (above normal market level) accrue to the 
IOC but “not caused” by the IOC.196 
There are two bases for charging excess profit tax. 197 The first is the investment payback 
ratio. Under this aspect, the excess profit tax is charged when the IOC has earned a 
payback on investment that exceeds certain predetermined limits. 198 The second basis is 
the rate of return or cash flow obtained by the IOC. 199 Excess is charged only when the 
IOC has earned positive cash flows.200 In practice, excess profit tax is normally not 
payable during early years of production.201 This is because it takes time for the IOC to 
                                                 
192 Le Leuch “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal 
Issues” (2013) 132,  
193  This special tax has different names. For example, in Norway (Special Petroleum Tax), the UK 
(Petroleum Revenue Tax), and the US (the Windfall Profit Tax). See Nakhle, C Petroleum Taxation 
Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today and tomorrow (2008) 28. See also 
Blinn etal International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements: Legal, Economic and Policy 
Aspects (1986) 240, Nakhle “Petroleum fiscal regimes: evolution and challenges” (2010)96; Boadway et al 
The Taxation of Natural Resources Principles and Policy Issues (1993) 6. In Tanzania is referred to as 
Additional Profit Tax (APT).See Chapter 5 section 2.5.4.4. 
194 Le Leuch “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal 
Issues” (2013) 132. See also OECD Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy (2014) 33 and 
Sunley et al Revenue from the Oil and Gas Sector: Issues and Country Experience (2002) 6 Khan 
“Petroleum Taxation and Contracts in the Third World-A Law and Policy Perspective” (1988) 78 
195 Le Leuch “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal 
Issues” (2013) 132. 
196 Aldazosa, ARV “Windfall Profits Tax on Oil and Gas: US and Latin American Approach” (2009) 37(1) 
Intertax 74-80 at 74, 76. 
197 Baunsgaard Primer on mineral taxation (2001) 8. Naazneen H. Barma Rents To Riches? The Political 
Economy of Natural Resource–Led Development (2012) 130. 
198 Baunsgaard Primer on mineral taxation (2001) 8. 
199 Baunsgaard Primer on mineral taxation (2001) 8. 
200 Nakhle “Petroleum fiscal regimes Evolution and challenges” (2010) 97. Khan “Petroleum Taxation and 
Contracts in the Third World-A Law and Policy Perspective” (1988) 78. 
201 Blinn et al International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements: Legal, Economic and 
Policy Aspects (1986) 241; Barma et al Rents to Riches? The Political Economy of Natural Resource-led 
Development (2012) 131. 




earn positive cash flows. For the IOC, the excess profit tax is considered a balanced tax 
payable only where the IOC has earned exceedingly high returns. 202 
For the Government, excess profit ensures that the Government obtains its share from the 
supernormal profits earned by the IOC.203 It also means flexibility, as no amendments to 
the tax laws are required during the price booms.204  However, there are challenges, 
especially for developing countries, in the design and implementation of the excess profit 
tax. For example, most IOCs are reluctant to disclose their preferred rate of return. 205 
Given the information asymmetry, it is extremely difficult for the Government to choose 
the appropriate discount rate of rate of return that would guarantee payment of excess 
profit tax. 206  In addition, the excess profit tax, like corporate income tax, is affected by 
different tax avoidance schemes adopted by the IOCs. 207 If it is difficult to collect profit-
based taxes, such as corporate income tax, then, it will be even more difficult to collect 
excess profit taxes.208 In view of these challenges, it is considered extremely difficult for 
developing countries to enforce excess profit tax.209 
4.2 General Taxes 
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, oil and gas taxation entails both industry-
specific levies as well as general taxes.210 The general taxes imply that the IOCs will be 
subjected to the same tax rates like any other business. The most common forms of 
generally applicable taxes is the corporate income tax (CIT), capital gains tax, and 
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withholding taxes The next section discusses in detail these different forms of general 
taxes and the rules of their applicability. 
4.2.1 Corporate Income Tax 
Corporate income tax (CIT) is usually imposed both corporate level as well as in the 
hands of shareholders. 211 The CIT being a profit-based tax implies that no tax is payable 
where the project does not generate any profits. Profits are calculated as the difference 
between the gross revenue and the deductible investment and operational costs. 212 In 
addition, the Government may decide to impose special rate of CIT for oil and gas 
industry or use the general tax rate.213 The IOCs consider CIT as the best mechanisms for 
sharing economic rent. 214  Moreover, the payment of CIT qualifies for tax credit in the 
OICs’ home countries, thus relieves the problem of double taxation.215  
The Government faces several challenges in managing CIT. First, the determination of 
gross revenue, which is dependent on oil and gas prices, is very difficult.216 The difficulty 
arises from the price volatility in the world market.217 It is also because IOCs, in view to 
reduce their tax liability, devise different techniques, such as transfer pricing to reduce 
their gross revenues.218 Second, the IOCs devise a variety of techniques, such as transfer 
pricing and thin capitalization to “gold plate” their deductible expenses. 219 Third, the tax 
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incentives, such as accelerated depreciation have the effect of lowering taxable income.220 
To this end, the combination of these factors implies that no or low corporate tax will be 
payable to the Government. 221  This may be partly the reason why most IOCs, despite 
being among the richest companies in the world, do not pay CIT in the countries where 
they operate.222 The non-payment of CIT means that certain entities enjoy protection by 
the State and benefit from other social services without making their due contribution.223 
On this basis, the sole dependency on CIT as the source of State revenue has been 
challenged.224 To ensure that every entity pays taxes, some countries have introduced a 
special tax for companies that do not make profits for two consecutive years.225 
4.2.2 Withholding tax 
The IOC may engage several subcontractors, who are non-residents in the host country, 
to provide services and goods.226 It may also involve financiers and owners of intellectual 
propery.227 Since all these entities receive income that has a source in the host country, 
the the host country will have a right to impose taxes on such income.228 However, since 
the recipients of income do not have a place of business nor tangible assets in the host 
country it is difficult to subject them to income tax.229 To ensure that the non-residents 
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pay taxes, the Government imposes withholding taxes.230 The withholding tax places an 
obligation on the resident taxpayer to deduct and withhold taxes on income earned by 
non-residents. 231 The common forms of payments subject to withholding tax include 
interests, dividends, and rental income, technical services offered by non-residents, 
royalties, and branch remittance.232 Unlike corporate income tax, where taxpayers deduct 
their expenses, there are no deductions for withholding taxes. This explains the reason 
why withholding tax rates are usually lower than corporate income tax. 233  
4.2.3 Capital Gains Tax 
It is common in the oil and gas industry for the petroleum right or interests in the 
petroleum right to exchange hands from one investor to another.234 In this process, large 
premiums or capital gains accrue to investors. 235  For instance, share transfers or 
petroleum rights transfers may create profits for the transferor, which are taxable. 236 The 
gains are usually attributed to factors, such as the discovery of new deposits, geological 
features of the deposits or increases of oil and gas commodity prices, which lead to an 
appreciation of the value of petroleum right.237 The increase in the value of petroleum 
right means that transfer of such right gives holder rights a substantial gain on the original 
capital investment.238 The same applies to the shares or interests in the petroleum right, 
which are deemed to derive their value from the petroleum right (“underlying assets”) 
held by the IOC. 239 While these gains are not taxable in other jurisdiction, in countries, 
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such as Tanzania they are subject to capital gains tax.240 The capital gains tax is imposed 
on the transfer or disposal of right. Generally, the host country claims the right to impose 
tax because the gains have a source in the host country.241 Alternatively, the host country 
may claim that the petroleum right as an immovable property which is subject to corporate 
income tax or capital gains tax.242  
One of the most important elements in the design and implementation of capital gains tax 
relates to the structure of transfer of the petroleum rights. The easiest form to tax is the 
direct transfer of interests, which involves the transfer of the whole or part of the right 
itself. 243 By contrast, the indirect transfer of petroleum right or an interest in petroleum 
right poses several hurdles in the implementation of CGT. 244 The indirect transfer may 
take the form of a farm out arrangement where the holder of a petroleum right transfer a 
percentage interests in the right to another in exchange for cash or future commitments.245 
The IOCs may decide to farm-out where it does not have sufficient capital to undertake 
the extraction singlehandedly or where the company wants to diversify the risk. 246 
Similarly, shareholders of the company holding petroleum right may dispose their shares 
in the company.247  
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While direct transfer are easily taxable, the indirect transfers are subject to several 
limitations, such as change of control. 248 The major challenge with indirect transfers is 
that it is difficult to detect transactions occurring abroad and those, which involve non-
resident taxpayers. 249 Even when these transactions are discovered, it is difficult for the 
tax authority reach the non-resident transferor. 250  
In addition, the fact that capital gains tax is usually calculated as difference between the 
sale price of an asset and its acquisition costs, creates problems where there is 
consideration other than cash. 251  For instance, where the right is transferred before 
commercial discovery, parties may agree to pay cash up front and contingent interests in 
case any commercial discovery is made. 252 There are challenges on treatment of future 
commitments. 253 
4.2.4 Indirect taxes 
The upstream oil and gas sector may also be subjected to several indirect taxes. 254 One 
of the most common forms of indirect taxes is Value Added Tax (VAT). In most countries 
including Tanzania, VAT is usually charged on the destination of petroleum products. 255  
This means that no VAT is charged on exported oil and gas commodities. 256 In addition, 
VAT is also charged on imported machinery and equipment. However, to attract 
investments, most countries exempt all machinery and equipment used in the exploration 
or production of gas from VAT. 257  Similarly, the machinery and equipment used in the 
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exploration or production of gas are usually exempted from import duties.258 The other 
forms of indirect taxes include excise duty, stamp duty, local Government levies and 
payroll taxes 259 
4.3 Non-Tax Instruments  
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs the Government devises different mechanisms 
to capture a fair share of the economic rents. These mechanisms include both tax and non-
tax instruments. The next section highlights the non- tax instruments applied in the oil 
and gas industry. 
4.3.1 State Equity Participation 
Apart from charging taxes, the host State may decide to participate directly in the oil and 
gas project.260 The State participation is motivated by the need to have more control over 
the activity of the IOC, technology transfer and maximizing revenues from the oil and 
gas extraction.261 The Government may acquire direct interest by purchasing shares in the 
IOC.262 The challenge with direct equity participation is that it diverts the much-needed 
public funds away from social amenities.263 In another form of State equity participation, 
the IOC pays for the Government’s equity participation (“carried interests”).264  This 
payment may be considered as loan to the State Government and is setoff against the 
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Government taxes. 265  The carried interests approach is the most preferred system by 
developing countries. 266 
4.3.2 Rental and Bidding Fees 
The Government as the landowner charges rental fees for all persons using its land. In 
respect of upstream oil and gas, rental fees are payable based on the land covered by an 
exploration or production license.267 Usually, the rental fees involve nominal sums of 
money. 268  Apart from using the rental fees to cover some administrative costs, the 
Government uses the rental fees to encourage the IOC to engage in effective exploration 
operations. 269 For example, rental fees are used to discourage IOCs from holding big 
areas without engaging in exploration. The Government also charges bidding fees and 
information fees 270 
5 Fiscal regimes classification 
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the State devises different mechanisms for rent 
collection.271 All these fiscal and non-fiscal instruments have been clustered into two 
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5.1 Concessionary System 
Under the concessionary system, the Government transfers to the IOC an exclusive right 
to explore and produce petroleum 272  The IOC undertakes to develop and extract 
petroleum products at its own risk and expense.273 When production commences, the 
IOCs will be liable to pay royalties, income tax and special petroleum tax. 274  The 
concessionary system is applied in countries, such as the UK, US, Brazil, Australia 
Canada.275 One of the major advantages of the concessionary system is that all the fiscal 
terms are fixed in a statute leaving no room for negotiations.276 This ensures not only 
equal treatment of all licensees, but also limits the room for corrupt practices by 
Government officials. 277  The concessionary system also does not use stabilization 
clauses. Therefore, the legislature may enact laws that alters or affects the terms of the 
concession.278 
5.2 The Contractual System 
Unlike the concessionary system, under the contractual system the Government retains 
the ownership of oil and gas in situ as well as after production. .279 The IOC is engaged 
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as contractor and operates at its own risk and expense. 280  The IOC will only be 
reimbursed for its costs if oil or gas is discovered. 281 One of the most common contractual 
arrangements is the Production Sharing Contract (PSC). Under the PSC, the IOCs are 
compensated through a share of production.282 In addition, the Government imposes other 
levies, such as royalties, corporate income tax, bonuses as well as equity participation. 283 
The major setback of the PSC system is that certain fiscal terms are subject to 
negotiations.284 This increases the potential corruption risk.285  
The other forms of contractual arrangement include service contracts and risk service 
contracts. Under a Service Contract, the IOC bears all the risks for agreed fixed fee in 
cash or in kind. 286  By contrast, under Risk Service Agreement, the exploration and 
development costs are borne by the State and the IOC is contracted to supply services and 
technical expertise, such as consulting, engineering, construction, operational and 
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managerial services.287 In return, the Government pays a service fee to the IOCs for 
services offered.288 
6 Conclusion 
The chapter briefly highlighted oil and gas industry-specific features that inform the 
design of oil and gas tax regimes. In doing so, the chapter provided a general overview 
of the value chain in the oil and gas industry. The understanding of the oil and gas value 
chain helps to identify at which point a profit is made, taxes are imposed and is thus 
important for policy formulation. The chapter also highlighted tax-related features of the 
oil and gas industry, mechanisms for the creation of Government revenues as well as the 
different fiscal systems around the world. In this regard, the chapter identified the role of 
Government in the grant of rights, supervision and monitoring of the industry and 
imposition of taxes. While these discussions have highlighted the design of an ideal fiscal 
regime, several factors impede the Government’s ability to collect tax revenues. As 
argued in Chapter one,  although most oil-rich countries in Africa have fiscal regimes that 
are similar to their counterparts in developing countries, but these African countries are 
not able to obtain a fair share of revenues from oil and gas extraction. For this reason, the 
next chapter examines the challenges Governments face when implementing oil and gas 
fiscal regimes. 
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The previous chapter discussed a variety of fiscal terms adopted by the Government to 
raise revenues from oil and gas operations. The design of fiscal terms, which includes tax 
base, tax rate and mechanisms for calculating the taxes payable, is just one of the 
important components of the oil and gas taxation framework. 1  Another important 
component is tax administration. Tax administration entails the system of assessing taxes 
payable, auditing tax returns and collecting taxes due. 2 While the fiscal terms create an 
obligation to pay taxes, tax administration entails the enforcement of such fiscal terms 
and the actual collection of the taxes due. 3  Accordingly, tax administration is as 
“significant as the fiscal terms themselves”.4  
This chapter provides an analysis of the interaction between fiscal terms and tax 
administration. The aim of this analysis is to identify factors that are likely to cause 
leakage of tax revenues. This chapter first describes the concept of tax revenue leakages, 
then proceeds to analyze the causative factors for the tax revenue leakage. This analysis 
forms a basis for evaluating the Tanzanian oil and gas fiscal regime to establish how 
Tanzania responds to the problem of tax revenue leakage. The next section examines the 
concept of tax revenue leakage. 
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2 What is Tax Revenue Leakage? 
As discussed in preceding chapter, one of the major policy objective is maximizing tax 
revenues while attracting new investments and maintaining the existing ones.5 To achieve 
this objective, the Government formulates policies which are subsequently codified into 
laws. 6  Once enacted into law, the Government sets up institutional framework for 
interpretation of such laws and ultimate assessment and collection of taxes due.7 It is a 
noteworthy aspect that these three aspects of oil and gas fiscal system – tax policy, tax 
laws and tax administration – are interrelated.8 For example, poorly drafted tax laws result 
into multiple interpretations and thus create loopholes for tax avoidance and tax evasion.9 
Likewise, with a poor tax administration, even the best tax laws will not produce the 
expected outcomes.10 Equally, where tax administrators divert the collected tax revenues, 
the exchequer will miss out the potential revenues.11 
Assuming that the tax policy, tax laws and tax administration are all intact, and then it is 
possible to predict the likely Government tax revenues from the oil and gas industry. This 
assumption is based on the fact that it is possible to estimate the revenues, rates of 
productions as well as profits. 12  Similarly, with financial modeling it is possible to 
forecast revenue or cash flows from the oil and gas productions. 13  Based on these 
estimated revenue streams, it possible to calculate the expected profit-based taxes as well 
as the dividends from Government equity participation.14 Further to that, several levies, 
                                                 
5 See Chapter 2 section 4. 
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such as bonuses and rental fees involve once- off payments and thus can be estimated 
with higher certainty.15 
While it is possible, based on fiscal instruments, to forecast the likely cash flow from the 
oil and gas industry, several factors impede on the Government ability to collect such 
revenues. 16 For one, the IOCs (taxpayers) may not comply with the provisions of the law 
and thus the expected taxes will not be collected. 17 Non-compliance entails the failure by 
taxpayers to discharge their tax obligations. 18 For instance, taxpayers may deliberately 
decline to file tax returns, under-declare or conceal taxable income.19 The other form of 
non-compliance is the “use the tax law to get a tax advantage that Parliament never 
intended”.20 Consequently, non-compliance results in significant loss of tax revenues.21  
The non-compliance of taxpayers and the tax administrators’ ineptitude result in a 
significant difference between the potential tax revenues and the actual revenues collected 
(referred to as the “tax gap”).22 While the tax gap concept considers non-compliance by 
taxpayers as the major source for loss of tax revenues, there are other factors may lead to 
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Toder, E What Is the Tax Gap? TAX NOTES, October 22, (2007)1; Mazur, MJ and Plumley, AH 
Understanding the Tax Gap National Tax Journal, Vol. 60, No. 3, Tax Policy—Unfinished Business 
(September, 2007) 569; Dubin, JA The Causes and Consequences of Income Tax Noncompliance (New 
York, Springer 2012) 5; Doran, M “Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance” (2009) 46 Harvard Journal on 
Legislation 111-161 at 112. 




significant loss of tax revenues. 23 For instance, the Government may deliberately exempt 
certain activities from taxation or imposes lower tax rates. 24 In addition, the loss of tax 
revenue may result from the inability of the tax authority to interpret the tax laws correctly 
and thus fail to collect the appropriate amount of taxes.25 Moreover, unscrupulous tax 
officials may extort or accept bribes and short-levy taxes due or granting tax incentives 
to undeserving recipient as well as diverting the collected revenues to the own accounts.26  
As discussed above, by focusing on non-compliance of taxpayers, the tax gap analysis 
takes a rather narrower approach in explaining loss of potential tax revenue. Conversely, 
the tax revenue-leakage approach takes a comprehensive approach in describing the 
factors that may lead to loss of potential tax revenues, and thus fills this gap.27 According 
to this view, five channels may contribute to loss of potential Government revenues 
namely tax evasion, tax avoidance, fiscal corruption and fiscal incentives. 28  This 
approach arguably take a wider than the “tax gap” approach discussed above. Literally, 
leakage is defined as “the loss of fluid through a hole in a vessel”.29 Contextually, this 
study adopts the concept of tax revenue leakage to mean the existence of gaps or 
loopholes in the tax system that permit the loss of Government tax revenue. 30 It also 
includes, in addition to non-compliance by taxpayers, the conduct of tax collectors, the 
Government’s policy and competence of tax authorities.31The next section highlights the 
channels of tax revenue leakage. 
                                                 
23 For example, fiscal corruption and tax incentives discussed below. 
24 See section 3.1 below. 
25 Kirchler The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour (2007) 21; Otusanya et al “The effect of fiscal 
corruption on economic development and sustainability in developing economies: the case of Nigeria” 
(2013) 318. Calder Administering Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: A Handbook (2014) 17. 
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29 Oxford English Dictionary http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/106657?redirectedFrom=leakage#eid  
30 Otusanya et al “An examination of tax leakages in Government tax revenues: the case of Nigeria” (2013) 
103. 
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Arowomole SSA and. Adeyeye, GB “An examination of tax leakages in Government tax revenues: the case 
of Nigeria” (2013) 4 (1) Int. J. Economics and Accounting. 93–122 at 103. 




3 Channels of Tax Revenue Leakage 
Although policy makers cannot predict with certainty whether the fiscal instruments will 
bring the expected returns, it is possible to identify the risk factors.32 The risk factors 
include non-compliance by the IOCs tax incentives, and fiscal corruption. 33  The 
discussion of these factors follows. 
3.1 Tax Incentives 
Generally, oil and gas in situ does not have value until extracted and reduced into 
tradeable commodities.34 Since most oil-rich countries, lack capital and expertise or are 
not ready to take the risks associated with oil and gas exploration, they grant exploration 
or production rights to IOCs.35 It is noteworthy that investment in the petroleum industry 
is arguably one of the riskiest ventures. 36  The oil and gas industry involves high 
investment costs, geological uncertainty and commodity price volatility.37 In fact, not 
every exploration results in discovery of oil or gas. 38  In addition, there is a risk of 
                                                 
32 Cobham, A “Tax evasion, tax avoidance and development finance” (2005) 8-10,16. See also Guttentag, 
J and Avi-Yonah, R S. “Closing the International Tax Gap” in M. B. Sawicky (ed) Bridging the Tax Gap: 
Addressing the Crisis in Federal Tax Administration, (Washington D.C, Economic Policy Institute, 2005) 
14. 
33 While the general pattern in taxation discourse is that tax avoidance and tax evasion are treated as the 
major source of tax revenue leakage, Cobham attempts to bring in other two factors. These factors are tax 
exemptions and fiscal corruption. See Cobham, A “Tax evasion, tax avoidance and development finance” 
(2005) 8-10,16. See also Otusanya et al “An examination of tax leakages in Government tax revenues: the 
case of Nigeria” (2013) 103. 
34 Tordo National Oil Companies and value chain creation (2011) 1. 
35 Le Leuch, H “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal 
Issues” in Goldthau, A (ed) The Handbook of Global Energy Policy (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Ebook 2013) 
135 
36 Nakhle, C Petroleum Taxation Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today 
and tomorrow (New York, Routledge, 2008) 13, Johnston, D International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and 
Production Sharing Contracts (Tulsa, Oklahoma PennWell Corporation 1994). 5 Idubor et al “Appraising 
Taxation and the Nigerian Oil Industry” Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization Vol.37, (2015) 190; 
Thorpe, CP Fundamentals of Upstream Petroleum Agreements (CPI Antony Rowe, Eastbourne UK, 2008) 
9. 
37  IMF Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and Implementation (2012) 13 available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/081512.pdf (accessed on 25 June 2014) Blinn et al 
International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements: Legal, Economic and Policy 
Aspects (1st ed) (New York, Barrows Company Inc., 1986) 60. 226-27; Khan, K.I.F “Petroleum Taxation 
and Contracts in the Third World-A Law and Policy Perspective” (1988) 22 (1) Journal of World Trade 
67–88 at 60. Otto, JM Mining Taxation in Developing Countries (2000) 1. 
38 Dry holes or not commercially viable Blindermann Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic 
Analysis (1999) 5. 




expropriation or change of fiscal terms by the Government.39 Moreover, most developing 
countries, such as Tanzania have a poor infrastructure, and thus making investment 
difficult.40 In addition, most oil-rich countries compete with each other to attract more 
investments.41 Since investors are interested in making profits, they normally invest in 
countries where tax rates are low.42 In this regard, the tax incentives, such as tax holidays 
and reduced tax rates directly reduce the cost of investment.43 
To attract investments and maintain the existing ones, most African countries, including 
Tanzania, grant several investment incentives.44 The most common form of investment 
incentives are tax incentives.45 The proponents of tax incentives argue that the incentives 
are necessary to attract investments. 46  The incentives respond to competition and 
compensate for the poor investment climate.47 Moreover, before granting tax incentives, 
the Government weighs the trade-offs between the costs and benefits of such incentives.48 
The attracted investments, in turn, create a spillover effect to the socio-economy through 
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42 Rozner Taxing Oil: Issues and Trends (2009) 2; Centre for Sustainability in Mining and Industry (CSMI) 
Granting Mineral Rights: A Good Practice Note (2010) 4; Nakhle Petroleum Taxation, Sharing the Oil 
Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today and tomorrow (2008) 5; Bindemann Production-
Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 1999) 5. Zee et al “Tax 
Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Tax Policy Makers in Developing Countries” (2002) 458-
459. Hogan, W Sturzenegger, F and Tai, L “Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources” (2010) 1. 
43 Ault and Arnold “Protecting the tax base of developing countries: an overview” (2015) 43. 
44 Cleeve “How Effective Are Fiscal Incentives to Attract FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa?” (2008) 137; See 
also Holland and Vann “Income Tax Incentives for Investments” (1996) 989; Hines Jr, JR “Tax Sparing 
and Direct Investment in Developing Countries” in Hines Jr. JR (ed) International Taxation and 
Multinational Activity (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 2001) 39-71 at 40. 
45 Tax incentives are defined as “fiscal measures that are used to attract local or foreign investment capital 
to certain economic activities or particular areas in a country”. Nathan−MSI Group Effectiveness and 
Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC Region (2004) 1-4. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacy929.pdf 
46 Nathan−MSI Group Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC Region (2004) 3-
5. 
47 If similar investment is made in another country has the potential to earn a higher return. See Barma NH, 
Kaiser K, Le TM and Viñuela L Rents to Riches? The Political Economy of Natural Resource-led 
Development (Washington, The World Bank 2012) 132; Zee HH, Stotsky, JG and Ley, E “Tax Incentives 
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increased Government revenue, job creation, and infrastructure development. 49 
According to this view, certain investments may not take place without tax incentives, 
thus the Government may lose potential benefits from such anticipated investments.50  
The opponents of tax incentives argue that although these incentives have the potential to 
attract investments, the incentives given by the African countries are more exorbitant than 
necessary for attraction of investment.51 Worse still, these incentives are granted as “gifts 
to investors” even in respect of highly profitable projects that would occur anyway.52 
Another challenge of these tax incentives is that they usually deviate from the general 
principles of taxation, and thus reduce, waive or defer the payment of would-be taxes.53 
In practice, most of these incentives are granted on a project-to-project basis and thus 
create administrative hurdles for the tax authority. 54  It requires the creation of 
mechanisms to verify the eligibility of IOCs on an individual basis as well as monitoring 
compliance with the terms of such incentives.55 It is also notable that these incentives are 
prone to abuse by the IOCs. Example of such abuses include forming a new company to 
                                                 
49 Cleeve “How Effective Are Fiscal Incentives to Attract FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa?” 138; Nathan−MSI 
Group Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC Region (2004) 1-3; James 
Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy 
Implications(Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2013) v, 3; Ault and Arnold “Protecting the tax base 
of developing countries: an overview” (2015) 43; Zee et al “Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A 
Primer for Tax Policy Makers in Developing Countries” (2002) 1497-1498. 
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(3-2) Ault and Arnold “Protecting the tax base of developing countries: an overview” (2015) 43. James, 
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54 Ault and Arnold “Protecting the tax base of developing countries: an overview” (2015) 43; Zee et al “Tax 
Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Tax Policy Makers in Developing Countries” (1497); 
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continue benefiting, shifting profits from incentive holders to non-incentive holders, or 
entering into sale and leaseback agreements for depreciated equipment.56 Thus, efficiency 
of tax incentives depends on the capacity of the Government to vet the eligible projects 
as well as preventing abuse of tax incentives granted.57  
It is further argued that some tax incentives are discretionary and granted through 
Ministerial fiat, and thus lack effective checks and balances.58 This practice arguably 
opens up windows of opportunity for corrupt practices. 59 To sum up, the tax incentives 
imply that the Government sacrifices or waives its rights to receive tax revenues. This in 
turn, implies loss of tax revenues, which would have otherwise been received by the 
Government.60 For these reasons, the opponents of tax incentives argue that revenue 
forgone through tax incentive exceeds the benefits received through the attracted 
investments. 61  
Despite these shortcomings, the competition among countries for FDI and poor 
investment climate, make the use of incentives inevitable. 62 In principle, IOCs consider 
taxation as a cost to investments and thus one of the factors that influence investment 
decisions. Usually, IOCs will prefer to invest in countries with favourable tax rules. As it 
is demonstrated in this study, the problems are not the tax incentives per se but rather the 
legal framework within which such incentives are granted. The next section highlights a 
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variety of tax incentives and evaluates how they contribute to leakage of Government tax 
revenues.  
3.1.1 Royalty and Tax Exemptions  
The first form of tax incentives may entail a complete elimination of an obligation to pay 
taxes. For instance, most Governments do not charge duties on exports. 63  In other 
instances, with the view to address price volatility, the Government may waive the 
obligation to pay certain taxes or levies during the downswing of oil and gas prices. 64 
This is usually applicable to production-based levies, such as royalties.  
Second, it involves the suspension of an obligation to pay certain taxes for a specified 
period.65 The common tax relief in this category is the relief from paying taxes, such as 
VAT and import duty for imported equipment and machinery used at the exploration or 
development stage.66 It means the investors do not pay any tax during this period. The 
suspension of tax obligations may also take the form of a tax holiday. Under a tax holiday, 
the investors are permitted to retain all their earnings (not to pay taxes or royalties) for a 
specified period.67 This form of tax incentive aims at attracting investments in new oil 
and gas ventures.68 
Third, tax incentives may entail reduction or lowering of tax rates, such as withholding 
tax reduction or corporate tax reduction.69 It may also cover reduced rate for import duty 
and VAT on equipment and capital goods.70 A tax rate reduction does not eliminate the 
tax obligation. Instead, requires the investors to pay a lesser amount of tax. All these 
forms of tax and royalty exemptions means that the Government sacrifies an enormous 
sum of potential tax revenue. Thus, the lack of vigilance in granting these tax exemptions 
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as well as weak monitoring systems makes tax exemptions one of the major channels for 
tax revenue leakage. 
3.1.2 Accelerated Cost Recovery 
Since the exploration and development costs are incurred before production commences 
or income is earned, the tax system has mechanisms of recovering these costs against 
future incomes.71 In principle, the operating costs recovered in the year within which they 
are incurred. By contrast, the costs for acquisition of equipment and the exploration costs 
are recovered by dividing the costs of acquisition over the expected useful life of, such 
assets or the expected life span of the well. 72 Strict adherence to these accounting rules 
means that the time taken to recover the costs will be too long.73 This is contrary to the 
IOC’s motive for investment, which requires the recovery of investment costs as soon as 
practicable.74 It also creates a time consistency problem, as amount to be recovered is not 
the same as the one invested.75 
To deal with the time inconsistency, the State offer higher costs recovery than the one 
contained in the tax laws. 76  It implies the deviation from accounting principles of 
depreciation or amortization.77  Since profit is dependent on costs of production, the 
higher the cost of production the lower the profit. 78  By allowing accelerated cost 
recovery, the Government defers the payment of profit-based taxes, such as corporate 
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74 Walron, G and Kumar, R Options for Developing Countries in Mineral Development (New York, St. 
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income tax and additional profit tax.79 In addition, accelerated cost recovery poses a 
transfer pricing risk.80 The Government needs to follow up to ensure that only the actual 
costs are recovered.81 
3.1.3 Reliefs from Double Taxation 
The IOCs, being multinational corporations, are subject to taxation in more than one 
country.82 Under international taxation, the jurisdiction to tax arises from the relation 
between the State and the taxpayer.83 This relationship is established by looking at the 
country where the oil and gas operations take place (“source country”) and the IOC’s 
country of origin (“country of residence”).84 In principle, source country has jurisdiction 
to impose taxes on the IOC in respect of income that has source in that country (“territorial 
principle”).85 By contrast, most the countries of residence exercise jurisdiction to impose 
taxes on their residents on their worldwide income (“worldwide principle”).86 The tax 
implication of these principles is that the IOC’s income is subject to tax in both the 
country of origin and the country where the operations are taking place (“double 
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taxation”).87 The existence of double taxation has the impact of lowering profits thus 
deterring investments.88 
To eliminate the effect of double taxation, both the host country and the country of origin 
enter into double tax agreements to share their taxing rights.89 The double tax reliefs take 
four forms. First, the income taxable in the source country is exempted from income 
taxation in the country of residence.90 Second, the source country agrees to impose lower 
rates of taxes for IOCs on interests, royalties and dividends than those set in the domestic 
tax laws. 91 Third, the income taxes paid in the source country are credited against income 
taxes in the country of residence92 Fourth; taxes paid in the source country are deducted 
against income taxes in the country of residence. 93 
While the double tax reliefs have the potential to attract investment, several challenges 
exist in respect to their implementation. For capital importing countries, commonly 
African countries including Tanzania, it means sacrificing some tax revenues.94 This is 
because there is no reciprocity in trade between these countries. 95 Apart from sacrificing 
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the right to tax, the IOCs may also abuse these reliefs from double taxation.96 Similarly, 
the advantages offered by tax treaties, such as reduced tax rates and tax credits create an 
impetus for tax planning. 97  Sometimes the IOCs engage in treaty shopping to take 
advantage of the most generous provisions of treaties. 98  
3.1.4 No Ring Fencing 
Given the finite nature of the resources, the Government policy may encourage IOCs to 
engage in many exploration projects. To encourage new investments in the exploration 
of oil and gas, Governments may permit the exploration costs to be offset against the 
profit earned by the IOC from its other operations.99 This deviates from the ring fencing 
rules, which treat different projects owned by the one taxpayer as separate and distinct 
projects from each other.100 Thus, by dispensing with the ring fencing rules, costs and 
income of different projects are consolidated at firm’s level.101 The consolidation of 
books of accounts at the firm’s level, though attracts fresh investments in exploration and 
development of oil and gas resources, defers or lowers profit-based revenues. 102  
The non-ring fencing is problematic in a number of ways. First, under the contractual 
system, each project is subject to individually negotiated contracts, thus taxed 
differently.103 This creates an administrative burden to tax administrators due to lack of 
consistency in the application of tax rules.104 Similarly, where the stabilization clauses 
are applicable, means the investor is able to shift the tax burden from more profit-making 
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projects to loss making ones.105 More importantly, by allowing non-ring fencing, the 
Government is sure of missing out the payment of excess profit tax.106 Since the excess 
profit tax is based on surplus profit, the consolidation of books of accounts from more 
than one project means no excess profit will be created.107  
3.1.5 Fiscal Stabilization 
Generally, investors are interested in understanding the tax base and tax rates, and 
certainty in their applicability.108 This is congruent with long-term nature of oil and gas 
investments. However, there are several risk factors in the oil and gas industry, such as 
volatile commodity price, resource nationalism, change of fiscal regime and long lag of 
time for return on investments. 109  Considering these risks, the IOCs have limited 
confidence for their operations in the developing countries.110 The IOCs fear that the State 
may change the fiscal terms applicable to an agreement or concession.111  
To be in a safe position, the IOCs request a fiscal stability clause in the concessions or 
license. 112 These clauses restrict Government’s discretionary powers to increase taxes or 
tax rates during the subsistence of the concession. 113 The stability clauses provide a 
guarantee that the tax laws will not be changed or modified over a specified period or the 
life span of the project. 114 Alternatively, where such changes are imminent, they should 
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subject to mutual consent between the Government and the IOCs.115 While stabilization 
clauses are a common practice in developing countries, no such clauses exist in developed 
countries. 116 For developing countries, stabilization clauses limit the legislative powers 
of the parliament to amend or alter the fiscal terms.117 This, in turn, has the potential to 
deny the Government its ability to receive future tax revenues even during commodity 
price boom. 118  
3.2 Tax Avoidance 
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, potential taxes may not be collected in the tax 
administration process.119 In practice, IOCs look at taxation as a cost to investment that 
has to be “managed or avoided”.120 For this reason, any elimination or reduction of taxes 
means increased profits, dividends to shareholders and bonuses to the executives.121 To 
achieve this objective, the IOCs devise variety of techniques to exploit gaps and loopholes 
in the tax system to reduce, defer or eliminate their tax obligations.122 The gaps and 
loopholes in the law may be a result of poor draftsmanship, genuinely negotiated contracts 
or corruption. 123  This is also possible because tax statutes are capable of multiple 
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interpretations.124 This provides an opportunity for the IOCs to shop around the best 
interpretation, usually the one against the spirit of the tax statute.125 
The process of taking advantage of the gaps and loopholes in the law to minimize tax 
liability is referred to as “tax avoidance”.126 Tax avoidance is defined as “the art of 
dodging taxes without breaking the law”.127 Under tax avoidance schemes, taxpayers 
arrange their transactions in such a way that they are able to obtain tax advantages, benefit 
or reduction not intended by the Parliament.128 It arises from the fact that taxpayers are 
permitted to arrange their affairs so that they can pay as low as possible taxes.129 The next 
section discusses the techniques that may be used by the IOCs to avoid the payment of 
taxes.  
3.2.1 Indirect Transfer of Petroleum Rights or Interests in Petroleum 
Rights 
As discussed previously, it is relatively easy to impose capital gains taxes on direct 
transfer of petroleum right or direct sale of interests in petroleum right.130 The difficulties 
in taxing indirect transfer of petroleum rights or interests in petroleum rights creates a 
window of opportunity for the IOCs to avoid payment of capital gains tax. In doing so, 
the IOCs ensure that the license is held through a conglomerate of foreign companies.131 
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As a result, during the transfer of interests in the petroleum right both the transferor and 
transferee are non-residents.132 This renders it difficult for the revenue authority to detect 
the transaction and, thus fails to collect tax due. 
For example, company Y holder of a petroleum right in country A is a subsidiary of 
company X resident in country B. 133 Company X is also a subsidiary of Company Z 
resident in country C. So when company Z transfers its shares in company X, though 
capital gains may be generated, no capital gains tax will be payable in country A.134 This 
is because the transaction occurs abroad and between non-resident taxpayers.135 For this 
reason, the holding of a petroleum right through a “multi-tiered corporate structure” 
renders it difficult for the host country to detect the transaction and even where detected 
still difficult to collect the capital gains taxes due.136 
3.2.2 Transfer Pricing Manipulation 
The IOCs are normally integrated entities with subsidiary companies all over the world.137 
These IOCs take advantage of the different tax rates between one country and another to 
shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdiction.138 The most common technique used 
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by the IOCs is transfer-pricing manipulation.139 Transfer pricing occurs when related 
companies make an intra-company transactions (usually cross-border transactions) whose 
price is pre-determined for purposes of reducing taxable profits.140 In doing so, the IOCs 
will set a high prices for goods to claim high amount of deductions while the undervaluing 
the cost of products to reduce the taxable income.141 Conversely, if unrelated parties were 
involved in a transaction, then the price would have reflected the business purpose.142 
The related-party transactions may involve tangible property, machinery, rental or leasing 
of property, intangible property rights, technical or finance services as well as oil and gas 
products.143 In practice, a constituent part of the IOC usually charge higher royalties than 
the prevailing market rates for the use of intellectual property rights, such as franchise, 
patents and copyrights by its sister companies in the host country. 144  In turn, these 
royalties increases the operating costs and thus reduce the taxable profits.145 Likewise, 
loans from sister companies bear higher interest rates than the domestic rates and 
therefore increase the deductible expenses. 146 Moreover, the IOCs purchase machinery 
and equipment through its intermediaries instead of purchasing directly from suppliers 
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and therefore pays a price which is inclusive of service fees.147 In a similar pattern, the 
IOC sells the oil and gas products to its subsidiary company at a lowest price than the 
prevailing market rate so as to reduce the taxable income.148  In addition, the parent 
company offers multiple administrative and advisory services, charging management fees 
for which the economic or commercial value is difficult to establish. 149  All these 
arrangements increase the deductible costs for the IOCs and consequently reduces the 
taxable profits. Thus, there is a higher transfer pricing risk is in respect of profit-based 
taxes, such as corporate income tax, excess profit tax as well as dividends from equity 
participation than on production-based levies, such as royalties.150  
While transfer pricing is singled out as one of the major sources of tax revenue leakage, 
several factors mitigate the impact of transfer pricing. 151 For instance, the machinery 
used by the IOC can be physically investigated. 152 In addition, the commodities produced 
can be weighed and measured. 153 Furthermore, price of commodities is visible through 
the international exchanges such the London Metal Exchange and the Petroleum Agency 
reporting prices.154 This implies that the transfer pricing risk is manageable provided that 
there legal and institutional mechanisms to audit and verify all transactions undertaken 
by the IOC.155 
3.2.3 Thin Capitalization 
Generally, profit-bases taxes, such as corporate income tax are only payable when there 
is profit.156 Since profit is calculated as the difference between revenues and deductible 
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costs, interests on debts qualify as one of the deductible costs.The fact that interest 
expenses increases tax deductions and thus lowering the profits, incentivizes IOCs to rely 
heavily on debt financing. 157  The excessive reliance on debt financing over equity 
financing is referred to as “thin capitalization”. 158 
In practice, the IOC may operate in a high-tax jurisdiction, but financed through loans 
from its subsidiary or parent company located in a low-tax jurisdiction.159 In this regard, 
the IOC does not borrow directly but uses intermediaries as conduits.160 In this lending 
arrangement, the intermediaries charge interests that are higher than the prevailing 
domestic lending rates. 161 Sometimes these interest rates are twice as much compared to 
domestic rates.162 The sole purpose is to benefit from deductibility of interests from 
profit-based taxes.163 Consequently, the IOCs will report higher deductible costs and thus 
reducing the taxable profits. This partly explains the reasons why despite the fact that oil 
and gas business generate enormous revenue, the IOCs pay less or no profit based taxes 
in countries where they operate.164 
3.2.4 Treaty Shopping 
Generally, the major objective of double tax treaties is to encourage investments across 
countries. However, some of the double tax treaties create loopholes for tax avoidance.165 
The IOCs usually shop around the tax treaty network in view to obtain undue tax 
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benefits.166  It entails the selection of the most favourable tax treaty for purposes of 
avoiding taxes.167 This form of abuse of tax treaty is referred to as “treaty shopping”.168 
This permits IOCs with little or no business connection with the country party to a double 
tax treaty to enjoy such benefits.169 Thus, tax benefits accrue to entities not intended by 
the double tax treaty. 170 For instance, the IOC from country A, forms a conduit company 
in country B to take advantage of the tax treaty between country B and C.171 Under normal 
circumstances, countries B and C did not anticipate country A to benefit from the 
provisions of their tax treaty.172 For this reason, bilateral tax treaties instead of being a 
treaty with one country, becomes “a treaty with the whole world”.173  
In addition, tax treaties may offer unitended benefits to the IOCs. 174 As discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs, the major aim of double tax treaties is to relieve the IOCs from 
double taxation. However, the existence of tax havens negates this objective. Since the 
tax havens already charge low or nil taxes to its residents, the IOCs are automatically 
relieved of the tax burden in the country of origin. 175 For this reason, there is no need to 
enter into a double tax treaty with a tax haven. However, some oil-rich countries have 
entered into double tax treaties with tax havens. This implies that taxable income escapes 
taxation under both the host country and the country of residence (“non-double 
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taxation”).176 Consequently, both the host country and the country of residence lose 
enormous sums of money from the would-be taxes. 177 In essence, the oil-rich country is 
one that loses enormous sums of the would-be taxes from tax treaty abuse.178 
3.3 Tax evasion 
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, one of the IOC’s major objective is profit 
maximization.179 The IOCs adopt several techniques to realize this objective. Apart from 
taking advantage of grey areas in the tax laws, the IOCs may engage in outright criminal 
activity for circumventing the liability to pay taxes.180 While taking advantage of the grey 
areas in the tax laws is referred to as tax avoidance, tax minimization through criminal 
means is referred to as tax “evasion”. 181 The element of criminality is the main distinction 
between tax avoidance and tax evasion. 182  Taxpayers may engage on tax evasion 
singlehandedly or in collusion with tax administrators. 183  The discussion of how 
taxpayers may engage in tax evasion follows. 
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3.3.1 Instigated by the International Oil Companies 
The IOCs may engage in tax evasion singlehandedly and without knowledge of the tax 
administrators. The IOCs may engage in conducts, such as non-filing of tax returns, non-
declaration or under-declaration of taxable income or falsification of transactions, parallel 
accounting abuse of fiscal incentives and general trade mispricing.184 The major intention 
of the taxpayer is to defraud the Government of its revenue.185  Tax evasion occurs 
because of the laxities in the tax system whereby the tax evasion is not easily 
detectable.186 This arises from the complexity of the industry, and the expertise of IOCs 
as compared to the tax administrators enables the IOCs to devise sophisticated techniques 
to evade taxes without easily being detected. 187  Sometimes even, where evasion is 
detected, the sanctions imposed are too lenient to enforce deterrence. 188 
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The probability of detection and the subsequent sanctions shape the taxpayers’ decision 
whether to engage in tax evasion.189 In practice, taxpayers usually calculate the likely 
consequences of their decisions - gains or losses.190 In doing so, the taxpayers weigh the 
benefits of evasion (such as value of money saved) against the risk of detection and 
punishment.191 For this reason, the lack of strong mechanisms for detection and lenient 
punitive measures perpetuates tax evasion. 192  Consequently, taxable income goes 
untaxed and thus the Government losses enormous sums of tax revenues.193 This, in turn, 
implies failure of the Government to provide social services. 194 
3.3.2 Collusion between IOCs and Tax Administrators 
It is notable that collusion occurs where the taxpayer and the tax administrators are driven 
by “narrow self-interests”.195 The taxpayers are interested in profit maximization while 
the colluding tax administrators are motivated by the desire for self-enrichment. In this 
arrangement, the taxpayers weigh the value of money saved through evasion against the 
risk of detection and punishment. 196 Similarly, tax administrators weigh the gains from 
corruption (compared to their emoluments), against the probability of detection and 
ensuing sanctions.197 While the possibility of higher rates of detection and severity of 
penalties have the potential to curb tax evasion, in most developing countries, including 
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Tanzania, there is sheer lack of capacity and political will to detect and punish tax 
evasion. 198 
In practice, some of the conduct of taxpayers cannot take place without assistance of tax 
administrators. In collusion with the IOCs, the tax administrators may charge taxes below 
the rate prescribed by law, grant untitled tax relief or exemptions or not charging taxes at 
all.199 The overall intention is to defraud the Government and accordingly reduce the tax 
liability.200 Although corruption and tax evasion are mutually exclusive, is clear that 
corruption facilitates tax evasion.201 Consequently, only a portion of taxes due to the 
Government is collected. 202 It means the Governments lose the much-needed revenues to 
finance their developmental projects. 
3.4 Fiscal Corruption 
Simply defined, corruption is the use of public power or position by a public official to 
gain private benefits.203 It involves the exchange of favours between the public official 
and the giver of the bribe or favour.204 In this arrangement, the giver of a bribe obtains an 
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advantage or benefit, which it is not otherwise entitled to receive. 205  Similarly, the 
receiver of a bribe obtains, to the detriment of the Government, an “artificial benefit” 
from the giver of a bribe.206 For instance, IOCs pays taxes at lower rate than the one 
provided for in the tax law and the Government official obtains illicit money from this 
transaction.207 In this context, fiscal corruption occurs when public officials break the law 
or abuse their position to obtain an advantage from the IOC in exchange for favourable 
tax treatment.208 It also entails diversion or misuse of collected tax revenues.209 The next 
section discusses the main types of fiscal corruption. 
3.4.1 Policy Corruption  
As discussed in the preceding chapters the oil and gas fiscal system entails both rule 
making and enforcement of tax laws. As regards to rule making, the law usually vest 
politicians and techno-bureaucrats with powers to formulate fiscal policies affecting the 
oil and gas industry. These policies may be of general applications or on a project-to-
project basis. To obtain favourable tax treatment, the IOCs usually influence policy and 
law making. 210 While policy influence is sometime done through legitimate lobbying, 
quite often IOCs create close ties with policy makers or legislators in exchange for bribes 
or kickbacks.211  
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The lack of transparency exposes the tax system to maneuvers by politicians and techno-
bureaucrats who are consequently captured by the IOCs. 212  Because of corruption, 
corrupt policy makers may formulate tax policies that favour certain oil companies213 The 
most affected aspects of the industry include foreign investment policies, tax exemptions 
or holidays, price controls, award of exclusive rights, special accounting procedures and 
special industry incentives.214 Since the policies and laws establish the basis for charging 
taxes and other levies, a lopsided fiscal system will not produce the desired outcome. 
3.4.2 Administrative Corruption 
Generally, tax administrators offer a variety of services to taxpayers, assess and collect 
taxes and enforce the tax laws.215 Similarly, the law vests Ministers with powers to grant 
concessions and tax exemptions.216 Both tax administrators and Ministers may extort 
bribes from the IOCs on the promise of a grant of favourable tax treatment.217 Similarly, 
the tax administrators may collude with the IOCs to defraud the Government by short 
levying taxes payable, granting undeserving reliefs or exemptions or writing off tax 
debts.218 Collusion may also involve underreporting of production volumes, overstating 
operating costs, under-invoicing the value of sales or use inappropriate pricing 
benchmark in contracts.219 In addition, tax collectors may steal or divert the collected 
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revenues from the treasury for personal uses.220 In doing so, the tax collectors may falsify 
tax receipts or create their own tax collecting receipts.221 This demonstrates a one-to-one 
correspondence between corruption and revenue leakage.222  
These types of conduct by tax administrators and politicians demonstrate the relationship 
between tax evasion and corruption in the tax administration.223 Because of corruption, 
most developing countries lose enormous sums of the would-be tax revenues to private 
hands.224 For this reason, corruption erodes the tax base, by reducing the amount of 
Government revenues, and thus impedes the effective provision of services. 225 
Consequently, corruption is considered as one of the major hindrances to the endeavours 
to achieve socio-economic development.226 
4 Conclusion 
The general observation throughout this study is that African countries, such as Tanzania 
have fiscal regimes which are similar in many ways to those of their counterparts in 
developed countries. However, despite these similarities, only a fraction of potential tax 
revenues accrue to the Government in oil-rich countries in Africa. In view of these tax-
related challenges, this chapter has highlighted the channels that are likely to cause tax 
revenue leakage in the oil and gas industry. In doing so, the chapter discussed the different 
actors and techniques used to avoid or evade taxes. Because of these factors only a 
fraction of potential taxes may accrue to the Government. The chapter also highlighted 
the different techniques used by the IOCs to evade and avoid taxes. In addition, it 
highlighted the deliberate Government policy to give tax incentives which erode the tax 
base. The chapter also argue that the benefits arising from tax incentives are often 
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exaggerated while their costs are grossly overestimated. The challenges ensuing from 
these factors need special remedial measures. In this regard, the next chapter further 
unpacks the concept of tax revenue leakage with the view to identify the appropriate 






CHAPTER FOUR: MEASURES ADDRESSING TAX 
REVENUE LEAKAGE: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYSIS 
1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter highlighted the challenges developing countries, such as Tanzania, 
face when imposing taxes in the oil and gas industry. These challenges include the 
different techniques used by the IOCs to avoid or evade taxes, fiscal corruption as well 
as the lack of prudence in granting tax incentives. Moreover, the discussion revealed how 
these factors cause tax revenue leakage. In view of these challenges, this Chapter adopts 
the theoretical framework discussed under Chapter 3 to examine the different options, 
methods and measures available to counteract tax revenue leakage. This discussion is 
relevant as it highlights the nature of the problem and informs how best the Government 
can protect its revenue base from tax revenue leakage. The next section dissects the nature 
of the problem of tax revenue leakage. The understanding of the nature of the problem is 
useful in identifying the appropriate remedial measures as well as creating the proper 
environment for such remedial measures to function properly. 
2 Nature of the Problem 
The major negative consequence of tax revenue leakage is that the Government fails to 
collect tax revenue commensurate with the extracted oil and gas.1 The failure to collect 
an adequate share of revenues has devastating impacts on developing countries, such as 
Tanzania. It implies that the Government loses the much-needed revenue required to fund 
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social goods and infrastructure.2 This may partly be the reason why, despite the ongoing 
extraction of oil and gas in most African countries, these countries remain poor.3 For this 
reason, the failure to collect the potential taxes perpetuates poor development, poverty 
and slow economic growth. 4 It also implies that tax evaders enjoy the protection of the 
State without contributing to the fiscus and do so at the expense of honest taxpayers. 5 
This is contrary to the principle of equity, which requires taxpayers in similar economic 
position to pay the same amount of tax.6  
The previous Chapter identified four channels of tax revenue leakage, namely exorbitant 
tax incentives, tax avoidance, tax evasion and fiscal corruption. These channels 
demonstrate how the Government loses tax revenues from the oil and gas industry. In 
principle, tax revenue leakage occurs because there are factors that motivates both the 
IOC and tax administrators to act they way they do. In addition, it is possible for the IOCs 
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and tax administrators to do away with Government’s tax revenue due to existence of 
gaps and loopholes in the tax system. The next section discusses these elements in detail.  
2.1 Motivating factors 
Generally, tax administration involves two actors, namely the taxpayers (the IOCs) and 
the tax administrators.7 Both cases involve a human element which creates a risk of 
“dishonesty and malpractice” in the assessment and collection of taxes.8 The risk is 
aggravated by the fact that both taxpayers and colluding tax administrators have divergent 
interests from those of the Government.9 For one, the colluding tax administrators are 
motivated by their self-interests and thus want to divert collected taxes to their account.10 
In fact, such tax administrators are enticed by the get-money-quick syndrome and the 
benefits accruing from corrupt transactions.11 In doing so they exort bribes or collude 
with IOCs to short-levy taxes or grant tax incentives to unqualified entities. It is notable, 
however, that before engaging in corrupt practices, the unscrupulous tax administrators 
weigh the level of personal gains against the probability of detection and the severity of 
the penalty.12 According to this view, corruption thrives where there is low probability of 
detection, prosecution and weak penalties.13 
Similarly, the sole objective of companies is maximization of profits. 14 For this reason, 
taxes are considered as a cost of investment that should be reduced every time there is an 
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opportunity. 15 In the same regard, company officials and directors want to reduce the 
company’s operating costs so that they can obtain bonuses or promotions. The bottomline 
is that the IOC will utilize any available opportunity to lower or eliminate a tax liability. 
2.2 Structural Gaps in the Tax System 
The discussion of channels of tax revenue leakage also identifies the structures within 
which the tax system operates. 16 These structures include the whole tax system from 
legislative drafting to the procedures for assessment, collection and payment of taxes.17 
The structures also take into account the global economy, which influence the way oil 
companies operate. 18 The most important aspect in the global economy relates to the 
company’s general mission of profit making.19 The discussion also reveals the gaps in the 
tax system through which tax revenue leaks. The discussion these gaps follow. 
2.2.1 Window of Opportunity for Corrupt Practices 
The law vests certain administrative powers to techno-bureaucrats and politicians, such 
as granting licenses, negotiating contracts, granting fiscal incentives, assessing and 
collecting taxes. 20  In the discharge of their functions, these techno-bureaucrats and 
politicians interact with the taxpayers (IOCs). 21 While the holders of public powers are 
expected to discharge their obligations according to the law, deviations from the law may 
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occur.22 The deviations from the law occur because certain officials representing the 
Government have their own-self-interests, which diverge from that of the Government.23 
One of the commonest forms of deviation is corruption.24 
While the decision to engage in or refrain from corrupt practices is a matter of individual’s 
choice, there are certain factors that open windows of opportunity for corrupt practices.25 
Where this window of opportunity does not exist, even corrupt Government officials are 
automatically restrained from engaging in any corrupt transactions.26 Three factors create 
a window of opportunity for corruption in the oil and gas industry.27 First, while the law 
bestows discretionary powers on techno-bureaucrats and politicians to make tax-related 
decisions, there are weak mechanisms of checks and balance on exercise such powers.28 
Usually, few techno-bureaucrats and politicians monopolize the decision-making process 
and implementation of Government policies and laws. 29 Since there are no effective 
systems of monitoring of the exercise of powers, such as the anti-corruption bureau or 
internal mechanisms, it means that the holders of powers act the way they please.30  
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Second, the law does not specify eligibility criteria to guide the tax officials (or 
politicians) in the grant of tax incentives 31 In addition, there is no requirement to report 
on the impelementation of tax exemptions. 32  All these shortcomings leave the door open 
for unscrupulous Government officials to accept bribes and short-levy taxes or divert 
Government revenues on their own account.33 
Third, there is sheer lack of transparency in the administrative procedures for grant of 
licenses as well as the grant of tax incentives. 34 Usually, the concession agreements are 
not available in the public domain. 35 In addition, there is no requirement to publicize the 
process for grant of such tax exemptions. Even when these tax exemptions are granted, 
there is no requirement report how the recipient of such tax incentives comply with the 
law.36 Consequently, the lack of transparency facilitates diversion or embezzlement of 
collected revenues by tax administrators to their personal accounts.37  
2.2.2 Gaps and Loopholes in the Tax System 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the IOCs may devise different techniques to reduce 
or eliminate their tax liabilities. These techniques usually entail taking advantage of the 
gaps and loopholes in the law to minimize or eliminate tax liability.38 This is possible 
because in many developing countries, for example, there are deficiencies in the rules on 
treatment capital gains in developing countries.39 One of the extreme cases is where the 
law is silent on the indirect transfer of shares occurring abroad.40 Even where the law 
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provides for capital gains, the actual collection of capital gains has been center of 
controversy between the Government and the IOCs.41 Because of these gaps, sometimes-
large amounts of gains obtained from transfers of petroleum right go untaxed. 42 
In addition, double tax treaties may create gaps that permit even companies from States 
not parties to the treaties to benefit. 43  The tax treaties with tax havens may result into 
non-double taxation.44 In addition, insufficient rules on transfer pricing makes it easy for 
the IOCs to use their subsidiary companies to shift profits among from high-tax 
jurisdiction to low tax-jurisdiction.45  The existence of tax havens also facilitates tax 
avoidance.46 The low tax rates in tax havens incentivize the IOC to shift their incomes 
                                                 
General, Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal at Dar Es Salaam Income Tax Appeal No. 17 of 2013 
(Unreported). In Peru the acquisition of shares in oil Company Petrotech Peruana the law was silent on the 
imposition of capital gains, and therefore the transaction was untaxed. Similarly, the case of Vodafone Int’l 
Holdings B.V. vs Union of India, [2012] 341 ITR 1 (SC), Indian Revenue authority could not collect capital 
gains tax become the Income Tax Act did not impose such tax on indirect transfer of shares. In Uganda, 
the Ugandan Revenue Authority could not collect capital gains tax on indirect transfer of shares because 
the tax treaty gave an exclusive right to the Netherlands impose taxes on such transactions. See the 
discussions in IMF Discussion draft The Taxation of Offshore Indirect Transfers—A Toolkit (2017) 26-28 
available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/689091501488467178/pdf/117797-REVISED-
Consultation-Draft-Indirect-Offshore-Transfers-July28-003.pdf (accessed on 04 August 2017). 
41 This has become a major concern as large gains were achieved by sellers in transactions in exploration 
projects, for example, in Ghana, Mozambique and Uganda. See Burns et al “Taxing gains on transfer of 
interest” (2017) 160. 
42 Usually no capital gains tax is paid to the oil-rich host country for these transactions .A good example is 
Mauritanian gold project, sold in Bahamas at $ 4 billion, no CGT was paid See Keen, M and Mullins, P 
“International corporate taxation and the extractive industries Principles, practice, problems” in Daniel, P 
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and profits from high-tax jurisdictions to the tax havens. 47  In addition, the strict 
confidentiality observed by tax havens impedes the initiative among nations to cooperate 
in tax matters.48 Consequently, it becomes difficult, due to lack of information, to tax 
cross-border transactions. 49  
2.2.3 Asymmetry of Information 
Generally, the oil and gas industry is complex. Its complexity ranges from geological 
features to volatility of commodity prices.50 While for the Government, this complexity 
makes oversight and regulation of the industry difficult, it makes easy for the IOCs to 
manipulate tax rules.51 This is because the IOCs are well equipped with skilled work 
force, expertise and experienced than the Government.52 Moreover, the IOCs operate all 
over the world and have capacity to hire the best experts and professional firms compared 
to the Government. 53  
Information asymmetry usually has big impacts to the new entrants, such as Tanzania, 
which do not have any prior experience in the industry. 54 In practice, the IOCs usually 
take advantage of this knowledge gap to avoid taxes without being detected or punished.55 
Using this knowledge gap, the IOCs also pressurize developing countries to grant tax 
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incentives. The arguments put forward include the lack of infrastructure, political risks 
and poor markets. 56 The costs of tax incentives are not well understood. 57 
2.2.4 Weak Mechanisms for Prevention, Detection and Punishment 
The IOCs deploy different techniques to avoid taxes, such as transfer pricing, thin 
capitalization, treaty shopping, and corporate re-organization.58 Alternatively, the IOCs 
may engage in outright criminal conducts, such as concealment of income or under-
declaration of taxable income, false invoicing and underreporting production.59 Under 
both tax avoidance and tax evasion, the IOCs may act alone or in collusion with tax 
administrators. The lack of effective administrative mechanisms to detect, prevent and 
punish tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes, implies that the IOCs can act in a manner 
they please without easily being detected or punished.60 
As regards to the Government officials, they may extort or accept bribes in the exchange 
for short levying of taxes due or granting exemptions to non-qualifying IOCs. These 
Government officials may also divert the collected tax revenues to their own account. 61 
In this regard, the lack of anti-corruption strategy facilitates corruption.62  There are 
usually weak mechanisms for detection, prosecution and punishment of corruption. 63 
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Sometimes this is a result of opaque and cumbersome administrative procedures for 
penalizing public officials. 64 
3 Distilling Remedial Measures 
The recurrent theme in the above discussions is that tax revenue leakage results from 
corrupt practices by the Government officials and non-compliance of tax laws by the 
IOCs. The discussions also indicate that corruption arises because there are factors that 
open windows of opportunity for corrupt practices.65 When the window of opportunity is 
open, the Government officials are enticed to engage in corruption due to low probability 
of detection or low punishment and the potential gains from corruption.66 In light of these 
factors facilitating the occurrence of fiscal corruption, the anti-corruption strategy must 
address the factors that leave the door open for corrupt practices as well as the factors that 
induce or motivate Government officials to engage in corrupt practices. 
Similarly, the IOCs are motivated by the need to maximize profits. In doing so, the IOCs 
devise a variety of techniques to reduce or eliminated their tax obligations. In addition, 
the IOCs may engage in outright criminal activities, such as forgery to reduce their tax 
liability. The conducts of the IOCs are influenced by the existence of gaps and loopholes 
in the tax system, as well as the asymmetry of information between the Government and 
the IOCs.67 In view of these techniques, the remedial measures must aim to control and 
manage the conducts of the IOCs to ensure compliance with tax laws. The next section 
identifies the remedial measures and analyses them one by one. 
3.1 Closing Window of Opportunity for Corrupt Practices 
Generally, fiscal corruption occurs partly because there are factors that create a window 
of opportunity of such corrupt practices. These factors may include secrecy in 
Government affairs and the lack of oversight mechanisms in the exercise of public power. 
For this reason, it is not the individual Government officials, but rather the governance 
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system that encourages corruption.68 Flowing from this analysis, the appropriate remedy 
is to close the windows of opportunity for corrupt practices. Therefore, anti-corruption 
strategy must address the way decisions are made. 69 
Under governance schemes, Government officials are given discretion to make certain 
decisions. While discretion intends to enhance efficiency and efficacy, in absence of 
oversight mechanisms, such discretion may be abused.70 To prevent abuse of discretion, 
the governance systems must ensure that Government officials act within the confines of 
the law.71 This is all about accountability. 
The concept of accountability, coined from the field of accountancy, entails the external 
constraints on the exercise of public powers.72 The constraints relate to the procedures 
(such as consultation or publication) to be followed when making decisions. 73  The 
constraints also aim to ensure the substance of the decision complies with the letter of the 
law.74 These constraints when properly exercised have the potential to limit or minimize 
opportunities for corrupt practices.75 The next section provides a discussion of these 
mechanisms of constraint on the exercise of public power.  
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Transparency refers to openness in decision making by the Government and access to 
information relating to such decisions by the citizens. 76  It entails the openness of 
information, dissemination of information or such is easily accessible to the public.77 
Transparency places an obligation on the Government to collect, maintain, and 
disseminate information related with oil and gas extraction to the people it represents.78 
A similar duty is imposed on IOCs to keep records and where necessary transmit the same 
to the Government.79 This enhances disclosure of the nature and structure of oil and gas 
operations. 80 
Several methods may be used to disseminate information to the public, such as 
publication in a website or newspapers or depository. However, certain information may 
be excluded from being publicized. 81  In this case, the law specifies the criteria for 
classifying certain information, such as commercial information, as a confidential.82 The 
availability and accessibility of information, such as the oil and gas concessions, tax 
incentives and revenues collected helps citizens monitor the conduct of IOCs and 
Government officials.83 In doing so, transparency enhances the right to information and 
                                                 
76 Veit, PG. and Excell, C “Access to Information and Transparency Provisions in Petroleum Laws in 
Africa: A Comparative Analysis” in Grant, JA, Nadège Compaoré, W.R., and Mitchell, M. I. (ed) New 
Approaches to the Governance of Natural Resources: Insights from Africa (New York, Palgrave Macmillan 
2015) 70. See also Oliver, RW What Is Transparency? (New York, McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004) 3 
77 It means active disclosure of information by the the Government. See Oliver, RW What Is Transparency? 
(New York, McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004) 3; UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002 Transnational 
Corporations and Export Competitiveness (Geneva, UNCTAD, 2002) 46. 
78 The type of information include the licenses granted, tax incentives, beneficial ownership, and revenue 
collected Veit et al “Access to Information and Transparency Provisions in Petroleum Laws in Africa: A 
Comparative Analysis” (2015) 86; Schedler, A “Conceptualizing Accountability” in Schedler A, Diamond, 
L & Plattner, M The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in new Democracies (Colorado, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers,1999) 13-27 at 14. national security protection and privacy 
79  Veit et al “Access to Information and Transparency Provisions in Petroleum Laws in Africa: A 
Comparative Analysis” (2015) 70 
80 Ault and Arnold “Protecting the tax base of developing countries: an overview” (2015) 22. 
81  Veit et al “Access to Information and Transparency Provisions in Petroleum Laws in Africa: A 
Comparative Analysis” (2015) 70. 
82 Veit et al “Access to Information and Transparency Provisions in Petroleum Laws in Africa: A 
Comparative Analysis” (2015) 86. 
83 Africa Progress Panel Africa Progress Report: Equity in Extractives Stewarding Africa’s natural 
resources for all (2013) 54 African Development Bank Oil and Gas in Africa (2009) 112-13. Tanzi 
“Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures” (1998) 575 




empowers the citizens to hold their leaders to account.84 All these facts indicate that 
transparency negates the conditions conducive for corruption to flourish. In doing so, 
transparency reveals mismanagement of resources and corruption and thus enhances 
accountability.85 Similarly, transparency makes it difficult for the IOCs to circumspect 
the loopholes in the law or take undue advantage of tax exemptions. 86  Therefore, 
transparency is proactive in preventing the occurrence of corruption.87 By contrast, other 
measures, such as sanctions, which come after the fact, and thus reactive.88 
The transparency initiatives emerged as a response sheer corruption in the oil and gas 
industries. Several NGOs argued that transparency had the potential to fight corruption, 
enhance prudent management of resource revenues and eradicate poverty.89 For example, 
the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched in 2002, calls for the 
member countries to verify the revenue received by the Governments against taxes paid 
IOCs.90 In addition, the reconciliation exercise and dissemination of findings is conducted 
by representatives from the Government, companies and civil society.91 
Although transparency has the potential to limit or minimize corrupt activities, it has its 
limitations. For instance, the publication of revenue collected shows how much is 
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collected and does not indicate the revenue that ought to be collected. Furthermore, 
disclosure of information alone does not guarantee accountability. Instead, success 
depends on whether the citizens are able to understand the information and act 
accordingly. 92 It also depends on the existence of political environment to demand for 
accountability. 93 There are instances where the publication and disclosure of revenues 
has not created any accountability.94 
Similarly, the disclosure of corrupt transactions does not guarantee punishment of the 
corrupt officials. 95  The punishment of offenders depends on the existence of laws 
criminalizing corruption and the corresponding anti-corruption agencies. It also requires 
a political will and commitment to prosecute corrupt officials especially those engaged in 
grand corruption. For these reasons, transparency must be complemented with institutions 
of restraints, such as anti-corruption agencies and the judiciary. These challenges also 
imply that transparency is not a standalone solution in the fight against corruption in the 
oil and gas industry.96 
3.1.2 Oversight and Control over the Exercise of Public Power 
The oil and gas endowment usually creates a desire for Government officials to divert as 
much as possible revenues to their personal accounts.97 These Government officials are 
able to divert these revenues because there is lack of oversight mechanisms on the 
exercise of public powers. To minimize chances for corrupt practices, the law must ensure 
diversification power, such as multiple authorizations in the grant of oil and gas rights or 
tax exemptions.98 
                                                 
92 McPherson “National Oil Companies: Ensuring Benefits and Avoiding Systemic Risks” (2013)152. 
93 Corrigan, CC “Breaking the resource curse: Transparency in the natural resource sector and the extractive 
industries transparency initiative” (2013) Resources Policy at 4. McPherson “National Oil Companies: 
Ensuring Benefits and Avoiding Systemic Risks” (2013)152. 
94 McPherson “National Oil Companies: Ensuring Benefits and Avoiding Systemic Risks” (2013)152; 
Lehmann V, “Natural Resources, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and Global 
Governance” (2015) 9  
95 Standing, A “Corruption and the extractive industries in Africa Can combatting corruption cure the 
resource curse?” (2007) 17. 
96 See Chapter 1 section 3. 
97 Bauer, A and Quiroz, JC “Resource Governance” in Andreas Goldthau (ed) The Handbook of Global 
Energy Policy (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Ebook 2013)247-248. 
98 Stiglitz “Dealing with Oil Corporations: What Is the Role of the State?” (2007) 26. 




One of the oversight mechanisms in the oil and gas industry is the creation of watchdog 
institutions, such as the office of the Controller and Auditor General and anti-corruption 
bureau.99 The function of these watchdog institutions is to ensure that those vested with 
public power act according to the mandate given.100 In other instances, any agreements 
granting rights to exploit natural resources may require parliamentary ratification by the 
parliament. 101  Similarly, delegation of tax law-making powers must be limited to 
administrative issues only while the basic concepts of taxes like tax base and tax rate 
remain the prerogative of the legislature.102 This limit the negotiations of fiscal terms to 
only within certain limited parameters.103  
3.2 Removing Incentives for Corruption 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, several factors, such as low probability of 
detection, low or no penalties for corruption and non-prosecution of corruption cases 
induce or motivate Government officials to engage in corrupt practices.104 Since the 
unscrupulous Government officials usually weigh the benefits from corruption against 
the risks of arrest and prosecution, imposition of strong penalties deters potential 
offenders.105 Therefore, higher probability of detection and ultimate imposition of severe 
penalties, is a disincentive to corrupt Government officials. 106 The penalties may include 
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administrative measures, such as job dismissal or criminal prosecution (fines, 
imprisonment or both).107 The implementation of these penal sanctions depends on the 
institutional frameworks for sanctioning any deviation from public duties, such as the 
police, anti-corruption bureau, prosecuting authorities and courts.108  
While penalties have the potential to deter potential offenders, their major weakness is 
that they come into play where damage has already occurred. For this reason, it is not a 
preventive measure. Rather a reaction to law breaking. The best option is to close the 
windows of opportunity for corrupt practices. When the door is closed, Government 
officials though may have the motive to engage in corruption, they will not find the 
opportunity to do so.109 
3.3 Closing Gaps and Loopholes in the Tax System 
The IOCs usually devise a variety of techniques to minimize or reduce their tax 
liability.110 In doing so, IOCs arrange their transactions in such a way that they are able 
to obtain tax advantages, benefit or reduction not intended by the law.111 This happens 
because tax statutes, like any other statutes, are open to multiple interpretations.112 The 
multiple interpretations provide an opportunity for the IOCs to shop around the best 
interpretation. 113  
Since tax avoidance is a global issue, there are several international initiatives to curb tax 
avoidance on cross border transactions. The most common international response to tax 
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avoidance is cooperation in taxation matters.114  This cooperation entails information 
sharing agreements contained in the Tax Information Exchange agreements (TIEAs). The 
TIEA seeks to crack down secrecy rules and set a standard for effective exchange of 
information.115 Tax cooperation also involves the provision of mutual assistance, whether 
for purposes of sharing information or for reasons related to double taxation.116  
In addition, there other international measures counteracting transfer pricing, such as the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and UN Transfer pricing manual.117 Similarly, the 
G20-OECD base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project 2015 addresses treaty abuse, 
such as the limitation on benefit rule. 118 Finally, there are also international initiatives to 
blacklist tax havens. The banishing of tax havens means that countries will deny treaty 
benefits companies, which are associated with tax havens. However, all these 
international initiatives are beyond the scope of this study. For this reason, the following 
discussions highlight the different measures at domestic level, which is the focus of this 
study. 
3.3.1 Anti-tax Avoidance Legislation 
Since the IOCs usually take advantage of the ambiguities or lacuna in the tax statutes to 
obtain benefits not intended by the legislature, the legislative measures aim to close such 
gaps. In closing these gaps and loopholes, the legislative measures have been the 
enactment of general anti-abuse rules (GAAR) and specific anti-abuse rules (SAAR).119 
While the SAAR deal with known techniques of tax avoidance, the GAAR entail general 
blanket provisions that aim to cover every attempt to circumspect tax law.120 The GAAR 
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is based on an assumption that it is impossible for the legislature to foresee each and every 
technique for tax avoidance likely to be adopted by the IOCs in the future.121  
The GAAR is applicable in situations where the law is silent on a specific transaction. 
For instance, the GAAR is invoked where a taxpayer enters into artificial transactions 
whose sole intention is to obtain tax benefits. 122 The tax authority has powers to cancel 
tax benefits and proceed to issue a new assessment that increases tax liability.123 One of 
the major weaknesses of GAAR is that is not self-executing and thus, its efficacy depends 
on administrative capacity of the tax authority to detect undue tax benefits and invoke the 
GAAR. 124 
Moreover, the fact that GAAR is catchall provisions, leads to uncertainty and thus 
contrary to the rule of law, which requires that the law should be predictable.125  In 
addition, the tenets of good taxation also require that taxpayer should understand the 
applicable law in advance so that they can arrange their affairs accordingly. 126  The 
GAARs, apart from creating uncertainties, may lead to denying benefits, which are 
otherwise clearly stipulated in the law.127 Despite its shortcomings, the GAAR is a step 
forward in curbing tax avoidance.  
Since the techniques used by the IOCs to avoid taxes, such as transfer pricing, thin 
capitalization, treaty shopping, and corporate re-organization are already known, the 
SAAR address these specific techniques.128 The SAAR take several forms. First, the 
response against transfer pricing has been the imposition of the arm’s length principle.129 
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The arm’s length principle requires that all transactions between or among constituent 
entities of the IOCs must reflect the market value.130 The arm’s length principle in essence 
aims at creating neutrality between the IOCs and its related parties.131 It also aims at 
establishing a fair basis upon which countries can exercise their taxing rights.132 
There are five ways to determine the whether a transaction is at arm’s length or not. The 
first one compares the price used by the IOCs and the prevailing market price for the 
same item in an open market.133 The second method considers the price of that may be 
obtained if the same item was sold to an unrelated party. The third method adds the costs 
incurred by the supplier to establish whether the transaction had any economic substance. 
The fourth method compares the profit margins that would have arisen if the transaction 
were between unrelated parties. The fifth methods combines the profits earned by related 
parties and divide between them as if it was a transaction between unrelated parties.134 
At an international level, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are applicable in more than 
100 countries.135 Similarly, the UN created its own Transfer Pricing Manual for non-
OECD countries. The UN Manual gives a special attention to developing countries, which 
are importers of capital.136 At the national level, the law imposes a burden on the IOCs to 
prove whether a transaction involves a transfer pricing arrangement.137 In addition, the 
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Government may impose approval requirements for all advanced pricing agreements 
(APAs). 138  
Second, to limit thin capitalization, the law places a ceiling on the level of debt-financing 
(“debt-to-equity-ratio”).139 IOC that exceeds the debt-equity ratio will not be entitled to 
deductions. Similarly, there may be a requirement that interests charged on loans from 
foreign lenders should not exceed the domestic lending rates. 140 Another option is the 
imposition of earning stripping rule, which restricts the deductions of interests, to a 
certain percentage of the IOC’s total income in every financial year. 141 For example, 
interests deductions in a given financial year may be limited to a ratio of 30 percent or 50 
percent of the gross revenues before tax earned. 142 By limiting these deductions, it means 
that there will be taxable income for the respective financial years and thus the IOC be 
liable to profit based taxes. The earning stripping rule may provide a cover when debt-
equity ratio fails. 143 
Third, to curb treaty shopping, the law introduces a “limitation on benefit” (LOB) 
provision. The “limitation on benefit” (LOB) provision aims at ensuring that the benefits 
of tax treaty apply to only entities owned by the resident of the other treaty country. 144 
Residence must be established in both form and substance. 145 For this reason, it must be 
proved that the entity has substantive presence in the country of residence, such as 
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engagement in active business. 146 It must also be proved that the entity is owned by 
persons who are residents in the country party to the double tax treaty (beneficial 
ownership). 147 The “limitation on benefit” (LOB) also denies benefits under the treaty 
companies that already benefiting from a tax haven or those not taxed in country of 
residence. 148 It is notable that these rules are self-executing. The efficacy of these rules 
depends on the administrative capacity to detect and prevent treaty shopping. 149 
Fourth, to limit the abuse of consolidated books of account, the Government imposes 
ring-fencing rules. The ring fencing rules treat each block (where the IOC operates more 
than one blocks) as separate and independent of each other for tax purposes.150 The aim 
for this restriction is to limit profit-making projects from being used to offset tax liability 
of loss-making projects.151  
Fifth, to tax indirect transfer it is assumed that the shares value of the IOC is equal to the 
value of the petroleum rights it holds. 152 For this reason, the IOC is deemed to have made 
a transfer when its underlying ownership changes by certain prescribed percentages.153 
Similarly, the shareholders of the IOC are deemed to have made a gain when they sell 
their shares. 154  In addition, where the transaction occurs abroad and between non-
residents, the IOC is treated as an agent of such non-resident persons. 155 If the IOC, as 
an agent of the non-resident persons, fails to collect the capital gains tax, it will be liable 
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to pay the same. 156  Likewise, the Petroleum law may provide for cancellation or 
withdrawal of petroleum right if no capital gains tax is paid (revocation of license).157 To 
ensure that the Government controls the transfer of rights, the Petroleum law obliges the 
IOC to notify the Minister for petroleum and obtain an approval before any transfer is 
effected.158 
Sixth, to ensure that the loss-making IOCs also contribute to the Government’s 
expenditure, Governments have introduced alternative minimum tax (AMT). The AMT 
is usually imposed on companies declaring perpetual losses within a specified period. The 
AMT is charged based on a turnover or book earnings of the IOCs and thus easy to 
administer. Currently, AMT has been adopted in more than 30 countries including 
Tanzania. 159 Finally, the law may also set a cap for management service relative to the 
total operating costs or total revenues. 160  In addition, the income tax code imposes 
withholding taxes for all outbound payments. 161 
3.3.2 Judicial Measures 
Generally, tax statues are capable of multiple interpretations. As discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs, the challenge arises from the fact that the legislature cannot foresee 
all the tax avoidance schemes. 162  Consequently, the tax statutes may have gaps or 
loopholes, which permit taxpayers to obtain tax advantages not intended by the 
legislature. 163 The question what does the court do when confronted with a situation 
where there is an ambiguity in the law or the law silent on certain tax avoidance scheme? 
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Largely, the interpretation of tax statutes ought to be aligned to the general schemes of 
statutory interpretation.164 However, there are certain aspects, which may complicate the 
interpretation of tax statutes.165 The first hurdle arises from the principle of legality, 
which requires that taxes to be imposed by clear words of a statute.166 This implies that 
taxpayers have the right to arrange their transactions so as the pay as minimum tax as 
possible.167  Therefore, under the principle of legality the court cannot read into tax 
statutes words creating an obligation to pay taxes.168 In the cases of Levene v I.R.C169 IRC 
v. Duke of Westminster 170  and Gregory v. Helvering 171  the courts adopted a literal 
approach and thus held that the taxpayer is entitled to take advantage of the provisions of 
the law so as to pay a minimal tax as possible. Similarly, the Court of Tanzania in 
Commissioner General TRA v Pan African Energy Tanzania Ltd172 held that since the 
law did not impose withholding taxes on services rendered outside Tanzania by a non-
resident; the Court too, could not create that obligation. The Court further held that 
although this gap may create room or leeway for tax avoidance, it was not for the Court 
to fill that gap, but rather the solution is to amend the law. 173 
The danger of literal interpretation is that most taxpayer would engage in pre-ordained 
transactions that are meant to avoid taxes.174 This defeats and militates against the very 
core of taxation.175 In addition, equity in taxation would dictate that taxpayers in equal 
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circumstances should pay same taxes.176 It aims at ensuring consistency in interpretation 
of tax statutes. This rule also rejects the purposeful approach. Because of this controversy, 
it is left to the court to decide the style and approach to statutory interpretation. 177 
Although the courts under the doctrine of separation of powers do not have the mandate 
to legislate, the question is what the courts should do when words of tax statutes have 
gaps and loopholes that permit certain taxable transactions to go untaxed. Can the courts 
fill the gaps in the law? In practice courts have intervened, to limits certain interpretations 
or transactions, from abusing the provisions of the law. 178 A good example involves the 
US, which does not have the general anti-avoidance provision.179 The US has developed 
judicial doctrines, which are applicable alongside the SAAR. 180  
In practice, the courts, especially in the UK, have in number of instances stripped off tax 
avoidance schemes through purposeful interpretation 181 In doing so, the court may reject 
any transaction that does not serve a business purpose or the one that is not commercially 
justifiable (“business purpose doctrine”). 182 For example, the case of W.T. Ramsay Ltd. 
v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, the court looked at overall effect of the transactions 
rather than individual transactions, thus denied a tax-planning scheme.183 In addition, the 
court may concentrate on the economic or social reality of the transaction rather than the 
literal wording of the statute (“substance over form doctrine”).184 For example, in Furniss 
v. Dawson185 the court based its decision on whether the series of transactions (which 
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looked like one) had any commercial or business purpose other than avoiding taxes.186 
The court may use this approach to strip off sham transactions, re-characterize 
transactions, and regard a series of transactions as one or a single transaction as several 
ones.187 Furthermore, the court may pierce the corporate veil in instances where corporate 
structure has been used for “illegal, improper or fraudulent purposes”.188 
3.4 Criminalization of Tax Evasion 
Tax evasion is conscious decision by taxpayers to minimize tax liability and maximize 
profits. 189 Tax evasion may involve conducts, such as submission of false accounts or 
documents, parallel accounting, misreporting or non- reporting of taxable income, false 
invoicing. 190  Since these conducts involve the breaking the law, they are criminal 
offences per se.191 These offences may be provided in tax code itself or in the general 
penal code. 
Tax evasion is equated to gambling, if successful enormous gains are made, and if not 
huge penalties are imposed.192 For this reason, tax evaders weigh the benefits of tax 
evasion against the risk of audits, detection and punishment.193 It also implies that tax 
evasion flourishes where there is low probability of detection or low penalties. 194 
According to this view, the higher probability of detection and the threat of severe 
penalties have the potential to deter tax evasion. 195 
The law creates several offences, such as defective returns, destruction of records, 
perjury, interfering with tax investigation. 196  It also entails commission of inchoate 
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offences, such as conspiracy to commit tax evasion. There other offences related to books 
of accounts and records keeping, such as false or deceptive entry of data or an omission 
to enter certain data. These offences are prosecuted in conventional courts like any other 
offences. The penalties include administrative penalties, such as fines, forfeiture of 
income, double payment of the evaded or cancellation of tax incentives. 197  The other 
penalties include imprisonment, fines or confiscation of property acquired through tax 
evasion. Generally, penalties are used as the measure to deter undesired behavior.198  
3.5 Abolition of Discretionary Tax Incentives 
While tax incentives are a necessary component in the attraction of new investments and 
maintenance of the existing ones, they are only temporary measures. 199  These tax 
incentives do not address the real bottlenecks to investment.200 Thus, instead of granting 
tax incentives, the Government should strive to improve the investment climate by 
removing all obstacles to investment, such as provision of adequate physical 
infrastructure and enhance administrative capacity. 201 
Where the Government considers it necessary to grant tax incentives, needs to put 
safeguards. For one, the law should abolish all discretionary tax incentives, instead all 
types of tax incentives should be provided in the law. 202 Specifically, the eligibility 
criteria, types of tax incentives and procedures for grant of such tax incentives must be 
clearly spelt out in the law.203 In addition, the procedures for grant of tax incentives must 
                                                 
197 Kirchler The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour (2007) 22. 
198 Kirchler The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour (2007) 105. 
199 Holland and Vann “Income Tax Incentives for Investments” (1996) 987. 
200 Failed to rectify the bootlenecks nor overcome systemic problems, such as poor physical infrastructure 
Holland and Vann “Income Tax Incentives for Investments” (1996) 987-988; Cleeve “How Effective Are 
Fiscal Incentives to Attract FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa?” (2008) 138-39; Zee et al “Tax Incentives for 
Business Investment: A Primer for Tax Policy Makers in Developing Countries” (2002) 1498. 
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(Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2013) vi; Holland and Vann “Income Tax Incentives for 
Investments” (1996) 987; Zee et al “Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Tax Policy 
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and Policy Implications (2013) vi; Calder, J Administering Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: A 
Handbook (2014) 18 
203 James Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications 
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be transparent by publicizing the list of applicants and ultimate recipient of tax 
incentives.204 There must be a further requirement for such recipients to report on how 
they have utilized such tax incentives. 205 Similarly, the parliament should intervene by 
requiring that tax incentives as part of the “tax expenditure budget”, presented to 
parliament, which indicate how much revenue is forgone through incentives. 206 
Finally, the law should provide for retrospective withdrawal of benefits under tax 
incentive once fraud is detected and require subsequent payment of the taxes avoided.207 
Similarly, the law should set a limit on the duration of tax incentives. 208 Tax incentives 
should only applicable for a specified period and in view to address certain externalities. 
Therefore, such tax incentives should cease to apply once such externalities are addressed. 
3.6 Mechanisms for Prevention, Detection and Punishment of Tax 
Avoidance and Tax Evasion 
Several administrative measures can be used to prevent, detect and punish tax avoidance 
and tax evasion. First, the law may vest tax authority or other Government agencies with 
authority to investigate and audit IOCs transactions.209 These audits and investigation 
help the tax authority to establish whether there are attempts to avoid or evade taxes. In 
addition, information collected during the audits form the basis for the tax authority to 
invoke the general anti-avoidance rules (GAAR). 
Second, the law may impose an obligation on the IOCs to obtain approvals from the tax 
authority before making certain transactions. The transactions requiring approval include 
indirect transfer of rights, corporate re-organization and transfer of money abroad. 
Similarly, the law may impose an obligation of the IOCs to report certain transactions, 
                                                 
204 James Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications 
(2013) 40. 
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206 Zolt “Tax incentives: protecting the tax base” (2015) 480-81. 
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209 IMF Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation (2014) 36. 




especially those involving related parties. These approvals make it easy for the tax 
authority to detect and prevent any tax avoidance scheme before it materializes. 
Third, the law may impose administrative penalties for non-compliance with tax laws. 
These penalties include reassessment of additional taxes, imposition of a penalty or 
interests for late payment, fine for non-filing of tax returns. 210 The implication of these 
administrative sanctions is that non-compliance attracts additional costs to the IOCs. 
Sharing of information between or among countries. 211  Countries usually enter into 
specific Tax Information Exchange Agreements. 212  These agreements facilitates the 
exchange of information.213  The strengthening of public institutions, like the justice 
system and oversight bodies, to enforce these rules.214  
4 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed the social context within which tax revenue leakage occurs. The 
analysis identified four elements namely the actors in the tax system, structural gaps in 
the tax system, conduct of the identified actors and impact of tax revenue leakage. It is in 
view of these elements, the suggested remedial measures have been developed. The 
remedial measures include, closing the windows of opportunity for corrupt practices, 
removing incentives for corruption, closing the gaps and loopholes in the tax system, 
criminalization of tax evasion and enhancement of administrative capacity to detect, 
prevent and punish tax avoidance and tax evasion. However, the implementation of these 
issues depends on the existence of the laws and institutional mechanisms to enforce them. 
For this reason, before deploying these remedial measures it is important to have an 
understanding of the Tanzania tax system. In that regard, the next chapter describes the 
tax system for upstream oil and gas sector in Tanzania. In addition, next chapter applies 
                                                 
210 Hannesson Petroleum Economics: Issues and Strategies of Oil and Natural Gas Production (Praeger 
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the principles of taxation discussed in chapter 2, to examine how the Government balance 





PART II: ADDRESSING TAX REVENUE LEAKAGE 
IN THE UPSTREAM OIL AN GAS INDUSTRY IN 
TANZANIA: LAW AND PRACTICE 
Part I of this study examines and analyzes the concept of tax revenue leakage. The 
discussion shows that the extraction of oil and gas has the potential to create streams of 
Government revenue.1 However, the discussion also reveals that several factors impede 
the Government’s ability to collect taxes. These factors include exorbitant tax incentives, 
tax avoidance, tax evasion and fiscal corruption.2 Part I also identified remedial measures 
to counteract tax revenue leakage.3 
Part II uses the theoretical framework developed under Part I to examine and evaluate the 
Tanzanian upstream oil and gas tax regime. To contextualize the challenge of tax revenue 
leakage, this part starts with a general discussion of the Tanzanian oil and gas tax regime.4 
It covers issues, such as the legal framework for taxation that highlights legal assumptions 
underlying the ownership of the oil and gas in situ, the mechanism for grant of oil and 
gas rights, the fiscal terms and fiscal incentives. It also highlights tax administration 
covering issues, such as the procedure for assessment, collection and recovery of taxes, 
the administrative powers, management and control of non-compliance as well as the 
transmission of revenues. Finally, this part examines the measures adopted in Tanzania 




                                                 
1 See Chapter 2, section 4. 
2 See Chapter 3, section 2. 
3 See Chapter 4, section 3. 
4 See Chapter 5, section 2. 




CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS OF THE TANZANIAN 
UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS TAX SYSTEM 
1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the oil and gas fiscal regime in Tanzania.1 It applies the broad 
conceptual framework identified under chapters 2, 3 and 4 to analyse the concept of 
production sharing agreement (PSA) as a mechanism of creating Government revenue in 
Tanzania.2 The aim is to analyse how Tanzania addresses the problem of tax revenue 
leakage. In doing so, the chapter highlights a variety of fiscal and non-fiscal instruments 
used by the Government of Tanzania to collect revenues from the upstream oil and gas 
industry. Additionally, the chapter highlights ownership of oil and gas in situ, the 
procedures and methods for grant of rights and competent authorities mandated to 
implement Government policies, their roles and functions. The chapter further analyses 
the legal and institutional framework for tax assessment, tax audits, tax collection and 
management.3 The interpretation and enforcement of tax laws and contractual provisions 
is of paramount importance as it ensures that taxes are assessed and paid “timely, 
consistently and appropriately”.4 The next section explores the legal framework for oil 
and gas exploration and production in Tanzania. 
2 Legal Framework for Taxation 
The legal basis for taxation in Tanzania is engrained in the Constitution. The Constitution 
provides explicitly that taxes can only be levied pursuant to a statute enacted by the 
Parliament or any other legally established mechanism.5 This aims at ensuring that taxes 
are only levied for purposes of supporting Government’s expenditures, nothing more 
                                                 
1 PSA is used alongside the general taxation system. Throughout this chapter the use of term ‘taxation’ 
refers to both tax and non-tax instruments under the PSA system 
2 The general discussion on PSAs is provided under Chapter 2, Section 5. 
3 Tax administration entails the enforcement of tax laws – the interpretation of laws to assess tax payable, 
auditing tax returns and collecting taxes. See Calder, J Administering Fiscal Regimes for Extractive 
Industries:A Handbook (Washington DC, International Monetary Fund, 2014) 37. 
4 Holland, D and. Vann,  RJ “Income Tax Incentives for Investments” in Victor Thuronyi (ed), Tax Law 
Design and Drafting Volume 1 (Washington DC, International Monetary Fund 1996) 988. 
5 Article 138 (1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 (2005 version) 




nothing less.6 Pursuant to this constitutional requirement, there are three organs vested 
with powers to impose taxes and levies in the oil and gas industry. First, the Union 
Parliament, which has authority over all union matters in Tanzania and over all non-union 
matters concerning Mainland Tanzania.7 Currently, all matters pertaining to mineral and 
oil resources, income tax, custom duty and excise duty fall under the ambit of the Union 
Parliament.8 In addition, the Union Parliament enacts laws that charge rental fees, license 
fees, and bonuses.9 Second, the House of Representatives has authority to enact laws 
imposing taxes in Zanzibar in respect of non-union matters and any ancillary matters in 
its mandate. 10  The taxes and levies falling under the authority of the House of 
Representatives include Value Added Tax (VAT), stamp duties, port service charges, 
trade licenses and property tax.11 Third, local Government authorities have a mandate to 
raise revenue imposition of levies and other charges within their local jurisdictions.12  
The primary policy objective for oil and gas taxation is to enable the Government to 
capture an appropriate share of the rents while simultaneously ensuring investors recover 
their costs of investments and the return thereof.13 To this end, the Government aims at 
creating an appropriate fiscal regime, which does not depart from the best oil and gas 
industry practices. 14 In doing so, the policy requires the fiscal regime to be predictable to 
                                                 
6 Lencho, T “The Ethiopian Tax System: Excesses and Gaps” (2012) 20(2) Michigan State International 
Law Review at 335; Nakhle, C Petroleum Taxation Sharing the Oil Wealth: A study of petroleum taxation 
yesterday, today and tomorrow (New York, Routledge, 2008).10; Bunbury, H “Control of Public 
Expenditure in Great Britain” (1948) 26 Taxes at 726. 
7 Articles 4(3) and 34(1) of Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 (2005 version). 
8 These are among the list of 22 union matters enumerated in the First Schedule to the Constitution. Articles 
4 &64(1) of the Constitution vest the National Assembly with legislative powers to all Union Matters and 
non-union matters for Tanzania mainland. 
9 Petroleum Act 2015. 
10 Article 138 (2) of the Constitution, gives Zanzibar House of Representative mandate to impose taxes on 
non-union matters in Zanzibar. Section 3 of Zanzibar Revenue Board Act 1996, Act No. 7 of 1996, (Revised 
Edition of 2013) see also http://www.zanrevenue.org/index.php/about-us/profile ( Accessed on 04 April 
2015) Article 4(3)- Exercise of authority in the United Republic, article 34(1) executive powers, 
11 Section 5(1) of the ZRB Act, the schedule lists downs seven types of taxes VAT, stamp duty, hotel levy, 
port charges, property tax, trade licenses and petroleum levy. 
12  Article 145 & 146 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 establishes local 
Government authorities and stipulate their functions, article 154 of the Constitution delegates power to the 
authority to impose taxes. Section 18 of the Local Government Financial Act, Cap 290 (R.E 2002), permits 
Local Government Authorities to charge 0.3% levy on the turnover of all companies operating in their 
jurisdiction. 
13 Ministry of Energy and Minerals The National Petroleum Policy of Tanzania (draft – 2, April 2014) 23 
Available at http://www.tpdc-tz.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/National-Petroleum-Policy.pdf (10 
February 2017) 
14 The National Petroleum Policy of Tanzania (2014) 24  




enable investors to arrange their affairs and predict the corresponding tax obligations. 15 
It is a further policy requirement that all fiscal terms must be contained in the law except 
where the law permits certain terms to be negotiated. 16  Finally, the policy aims at 
enhancing capacity and competence of the tax revenue authority in the interpretation and 
collection of taxes as well as counteractive measures against tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. 17 
In light of these policy objectives, the Petroleum Act 2015, as a general framework law, 
defines “petroleum” as any naturally occurring hydrocarbon or mixture of more 
hydrocarbons in gaseous, liquid or solid form.18 By this definition, the Petroleum Act 
2015 excludes from its purview all those hydrocarbons that do not occur naturally in the 
reservoir (“unconventional petroleum”).19 In addition, the Petroleum Act 2015 defines 
crude oil as hydrocarbon in liquid form and natural gas as hydrocarbons in a gaseous state 
at wellhead.20 Natural gas found in Tanzania is the one that occurs independent of crude 
oil (“non-associated natural gas”).21  Although the Petroleum Act 2015 regulates the 
upstream, midstream, downstream sectors, the Act treats each sector as a separate 
business for tax purposes. 22 The next section examines factors that influence the design 




                                                 
15 The National Petroleum Policy of Tanzania (2014) 24. 
16 The National Petroleum Policy of Tanzania (2014) 24. 
17 The National Petroleum Policy of Tanzania (2014) 24 This is in alignment with international best 
practices which require the fiscal regime must address deductible costs, transfer of rights and counteracting 
tax avoidance and tax evasion. See Le Leuch, H “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: 
Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal Issues” in Goldthau, A (ed) The Handbook of Global Energy Policy 
(John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Ebook 2013)140. 
18 Section 3 of the Petroleum Act, 2015 (Act No.21 of 2015)  
19 See Chapter 2 section 2. 
20 Section.3 of the Petroleum Act, 2015. 
21 Contrasted with natural gas that occurs together and in contact with crude oil in the reservoir (“associated 
gas”). See Chapter 2 section 2.1. 
22 Section 2 (a)&(b) of the Petroleum Act, 2015. 




2.1 Ownership of Oil and Gas in situ 
The Petroleum Act 2015 provides that “the entire property in and control over petroleum 
in any land to which this Act applies are vested in the United Republic of Tanzania”.23 
Historically, the vesting of ownership of oil and gas resources in Government in Tanzania 
is a legacy of German24 and British25 colonialism.26 As regards ownership of oil and gas 
resources in the seabed, the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1989 
domesticates the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.27 The Act 
vests Tanzania with sovereign rights to regulate the exploration for, exploitation and 
management of natural resources found in the seabed of the territorial sea, continental 
shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ).28  
                                                 
23 Section 4(1) Petroleum Act 2015. Similarly, section 4(1) of the repealed Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Act 1980 (Act No. 27 of 1980) vested the “entire property in and control over petroleum” in 
the United republic of Tanzania.  
24 After Berlin Conference, Tanganyika (now Mainland Tanzania together with Rwanda and Burundi) was 
placed under German colonial rule forming the German East Africa (German: Deutsch Ostafrica) from 
1895-1919. See Coulson, A Tanzania: A Political Economy (2nd edn) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2013) 12, 62-65. The German Imperial Decree 1895 declared all land in German East Africa as crown land 
whose ownership, vested in the German Empire. In addition, Imperial Ordinance for the African and South 
Seas Possession with Exception of German South West Africa 1891 Section 1, Decree No.64 of 1891 
debarred landholders from engaging in any prospecting, extraction or utilization of minerals except by 
express authorization from the Governor.  
25 After the WWI Tanganyika was placed under the British rule as a mandate territory. Rwanda and Burundi 
were held under the French. The British ruled from 1920-1961. Article 8(1) &(3) of The Tanganyika Order 
in Council 1920  and later section 2 (section 3) Land Ordinance 1923 26th January 1923, declared all land, 
whether occupied or unoccupied, to be public lands, whose title vested in the Governor. In addition, 
workings of mines required permission from the Governor. This position has been maintained to date. In a 
similar fashion, section 4(1) of the Land Act 1999, declares all lands in Tanzania are public lands, and title 
to public lands vests in the President as a trustee of the people of Tanzania. Interestingly, while only the 
President who grants the rights to occupy and use land, such grants by the President under section 2 & 
22(2) does not confer to holders “any rights to mines, minerals, or gas”. Moreover, the Mineral Oil Mining 
Ordinance 1922 (No. 14 of 1922 of 14th July 1922) and later Section 3  of the Mining (Mineral Oil) 
Ordinance) 1958(No. 12 Of 1958) 23rd May 1958) read “entire property in and control of all minerals oil 
in their natural condition,” whether on public or private land, vested in the in Governor in trust for the 
Crown. 
26 This marked the new beginning whereby “property and sovereignty merged into one entity” and creation 
of a “landlord state”. See Shivji, IG. Where is Uhuru: Reflections on the Struggle for Democracy in Africa 
(Dar es Salaam, Pambazuka Press, 2009) 106. See also Emel, et al “Extracting Sovereignty: Capital, 
Territory, and Gold Mining in Tanzania” (2011) 30 Political Geography at74. 
27 Chapter 238 (Act No. 3 of 1989). The Convetion was signed on December 10 1982 and ratified on 
September 30 1985 
28 The Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act defines the EEZ as a marine zone not exceeding 
200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial water is measured (section 7), 
the EEZ is similar to the ‘continental shelf’ under the Petroleum Act 2015 (section 3).  




In property law context, vesting of the title in the State is not ownership per se.29 Instead; 
the Government holds the title to the resources on behalf and in trust for the people of 
Tanzanian.30 For example, the Privy Council in Attorney General (Quebec) v Attorney 
General (Canada)31, interpreted the term “vest in public” to mean that a public body is 
conferred powers to control and manage interests in land, to facilitate or enable it to 
discharge its public functions efficiently.32 Therefore, statutory vesting of the title is 
merely “a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that the 
State has power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource”.33 It 
also implies that title to the resources vests in State to enable the oil and gas resources to 
be utilized for the benefit of the whole nation.34 
In the Tanzanian context therefore, the State, as an agent of the people it represents, is 
duty bound to ensure that the extraction of oil and gas resources is undertaken for the 
benefit of current and future generations.35 This duty echoes the constitutional obligation 
of the Government to utilize national resources for eradication of poverty, illiteracy and 
diseases.36 Therefore, it is the Government’s duty to ensure not only optimal exploitation 
                                                 
29 See Chapter 2 section 3.1. 
30 Section 4(1) of the Petroleum Act 2015 and sections 4(2) and 5(3) of the Natural Wealth and Resources 
(Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017. See also Idubor et al “Appraising Taxation and the Nigerian Oil 
Industry” (2015) 37 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization at 189. and Veit, PG and Larsen, G 
Overlapping Land and Natural Resource Property Rights: A Comparative Analysis from Africa 
(Washington DC, World Resources Institute, 2013) 2. 
31 [1921] 1 AC 401, 409 
32  Secher, U and Amankwah, HA “Native Title, Crown Property and Resources: Post-Mabo Judicial 
Interpretations of Statutory Declarations and Statutory Vesting Provisions” (2003) 9 James Cook University 
Law Review 110-226 at 160-161; Secher, U “Implications of the crown's radical title for statutory regimes 
regulating the alienation of land: ‘crown land’ v ‘property of the crown’ post-mabo” (2008) 34(1) Monash 
University Law Review 9-52 at 12. 
33 Secher and Amankwah “Native Title, Crown Property and Resources: Post-Mabo Judicial Interpretations 
of Statutory Declarations and Statutory Vesting Provisions” (2003) 168 See Secher “Implications of the 
crown's radical title for statutory regimes regulating the alienation of land: ‘crown land’ v ‘property of the 
crown’ post-mabo” (2008) 12. 
34 Secher “Implications of the crown's radical title for statutory regimes regulating the alienation of land: 
‘crown land’ v ‘property of the crown’ post-mabo” (2008) 13. 
35 Section 251(b) Petroleum Act 2015; Section 6(1) of the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent 
Sovereignty) Act 2017, (Act No.6 of 2017) 
36 Article 9(c) and (i) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977. See also section 6 of 
the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017. 




of the resources, but also to ensure that it receives adequate economic benefits (through 
royalties, taxation and Government participation) from their exploitation.37 
2.2 Tax-related Implications of State Ownership of Oil and Gas in situ 
From the taxation perspective, the vesting of the title in State has several legal 
implications. 38  For one, the Government has the right and discretion to exploit the 
resources itself or to grant rights to extractive companies. 39 However, given the lack of 
capital and technology the Government enters into partnership with the IOCs.40 In this 
regard, the Petroleum Act 2015 identifies the entities to which licenses may be granted 
and sets up the terms and conditions such operations may be undertaken.41  
Moreover, the Government monitors, supervises and regulate the field operations 
undertaken by the IOCs.42 In view of these regulatory functions, the Petroleum Act 2015 
identifies the Minister of Energy and Minerals as a general overseer of the oil and gas 
industry.43 The Minister monitors policy formulation and implementation, granting of 
licenses to explore and produce oil and gas, and enters into PSAs on behalf of the 
Government.44 Similarly, the Petroleum Act 2015 designates the Tanzania Petroleum 
Development Corporation (TPDC) as the National Oil Company.45 TPDC deals with 
technical and commercial aspects, such as participation in the industry, holding 
                                                 
37 Inkpen, A and Moffett, MH The Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance 
(Tulsa, PennWell Corporation, 2011) 41. See sections 113, 116 &218 of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
38 See Chapter 2 section 3.1. 
39 Section 4(2) Petroleum Act 2015. See the discussions by Inkpen and Moffett The Global Oil and Gas 
Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance (2011) 51. 
40 Section 5(4) of the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017. 
41 Section 45 of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
42 Section 5(4) of the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017 
Inkpen and Moffett The Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance (2011) 50; 
Onorato, WT and Park, J ‘World Petroleum Legislation: Frameworks that Foster Oil and Gas Development’ 
39 Alta. L. Rev. 70 (2001-2002) 76. 
43 Section 5 Petroleum Act 2015. 
44 Section 5(1)(a)-(c) Petroleum Act 2015. The Minister is assisted by the Commissioner for Petroleum 
Affairs, who is a chief advisor on all policy, regulatory, planning and routine administrative matters in the 
oil and gas sector. see Section 6 of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
45 Section 8(1) Petroleum Act 2015. The Government’s share in the TPDC at all times must be at least fifty-
one percent (section 8(2)). TPDC is established under the Tanzania Petroleum Corporation (Establishment) 
Order (GN No. 140 of 1969). Its functions under this Order include the promotion and monitoring of oil 
and gas exploration, development and production of oil and gas, trading in petroleum products and advising 
the Government on petroleum production data. 




Government interests in all the oil and gas agreements, research and development as well 
as marketing Government oil.46 The TPDC also serves a commercial player, promoter of 
national capacity and fiscal agent through equity participation and representative of 
Government in PSAs.47 
Another institution is the Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority (PURA) that 
regulates and monitors the oil and gas upstream sector for Mainland Tanzania.48 Its other 
functions include advising the Minister on the grant, suspension or cancelation of rights 
as well as negotiations of PSAs (or similar arrangements).49 PURA also audits, approves 
and keeps records of costs incurred by the IOC. 50  In addition, the Petroleum Act 
designates the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) as the 
regulator of midstream and downstream oil and gas sectors.51 The EWURA has power to 
grant, suspend or revoke licenses as well as determining and enforces tariffs and rates 
applicable in the midstream or downstream-regulated activities.52 In addition, EWURA 
determines and enforce tarrifs, rates, charges and fees payable by a licensee in respect of 
regulated activity.53 
Another noteworthy aspect is that the State acts as both the owner and the sovereign.54 
The State-as-sovereign exercises its power by imposing taxes on all persons within its 
territorial boundaries.55 The State-as-owner of the resource is entitled to payment of rent 
akin to the absentee property owner from tenants.56 The dual role of the State – as owner 
                                                 
46 Section 8(1) 9(1)(b) Petroleum Act 2015. Generally, the roles of the NOC include a commercial player, 
fiscal agent, promoter of national capacity and development agency. See McPherson, C “National Oil 
Companies: Ensuring Benefits and Avoiding Systemic Risks” in Goldthau, A (ed) The Handbook of Global 
Energy Policy (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Ebook 2013) 147-150. 
47 McPherson, C “National Oil Companies: Ensuring Benefits and Avoiding Systemic Risks” (2013) 147-
150. 
48 Section 11(1) Petroleum Act 2015. 
49 Section 12(1)(a)(i)-(iii) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
50 Section 12(2)(c) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
51 Section 29(1) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
52 Section 29(2) (a) & (b) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
53 Section 29(2) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
54 Section 4(1) of the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017 proclaims of 
sovereignty over natural resources while section 5(1) provides that resources are inalienable and remain the 
property of the people of Tanzania. 
55 See Chapter 2 section 3.1 
56 Johnston, D International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing Contract Tulsa, Oklahoma 
PennWell Books (1994) 5-6. 




and sovereign – provides the justification for combination of taxes and non- tax 
instruments in the oil and gas industry.57 Tanzania uses the production sharing system as 
a method of obtaining tax revenues.58 The next sections highlight and evaluate the tax 
and non-tax instruments used in Tanzanian PSA system. 
2.3 Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) System 
The Petroleum Act 2015 clearly stipulates the Minister can only grant extraction license 
to the TPDC.59 In turn, TPDC looks for partners with whom to enter into a PSA.60 Then, 
the Minister enters into a PSA with TPDC and its partners.61 For this reason, the PSA is 
a tripartite contractual arrangement involving the Government (owner of the resource), 
TPDC (licensee) and Oil Company (contractor).62 The PSA serves as a mechanism for 
creation of Government revenues from the oil and gas industry.63 In its original form, the 
PSA resembles landowner-sharecropper relationship in agriculture where the 
sharecropper tills the land on promise to share the produce with the landowner, so does 
the PSA operate. 64  
Under the PSA, the IOCs undertake the exploration and extraction of the oil and gas at 
their costs and expense on promise that if petroleum is discovered will be entitled to 
recover the exploration costs and a share of the oil produced.65 The IOCs also undertake 
to make certain payments to the Government, such as bonuses, rental fees, royalties, 
                                                 
57 See Chapter 2 section 4. 
58 See Chapter 2 section 5. 
59 Sections 43(1)&(2) and 44(1) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
60 Section 44(4) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
61 Sections 47(1)&(2), 44(4) and 45 (a)& (b) of the Petroleum Act 2015 and section 5(4) of the Natural 
Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017. 
62 Model PSA 2013: See also TPDC website at http://www.tpdc-tz.com/tpdc/legal_fiscal.php  
63 It also works as a mechanism of licensing, a partnership between the IOC and the Government and serves 
other Government objectives, such as knowledge transfer, local procurement of goods.It also delinates the 
rights and obligations of the parties. See Ogunleye, T A “A Legal Analysis of Production Sharing Contract 
Arrangements in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry” (2015) 8(5) Journal of Energy Technologies and Policy 
at 1. Le Leuch, H “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and 
Legal Issues” (2013) 127. 
64 The nature of PSA as adopted originally in Peru and modified in Indonesia is discussed under Chapter 2 
Section 5.2. See also Johnston International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing Contracts 
(1994) 22. 
65 Johnston International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing Contracts (1994) 22. 




production sharing income tax and special petroleum tax.66 These elements make the 
PSAs resemble and replicate the normal tax system.67 Currently, there are 24 PSAs signed 
in Tanzania as indicated in table 1.1 below of which two are at production stage and one 
at the development stage.  
Table 1.1: List of existing Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) 
S/N Year Name of Contractor Country of 
Origin 
License Area Location Activity Level 
1 1997 Antrim Resources Canada Pemba & Zanzibar Onshore Force Majeure 
2 2001 PanAfrica Energy United Kingdom Songosongo Onshore production 
3 2004 Maurel et Prom   France Mkuranga Onshore Exploration 
4 2004 Maurel et Prom France Mnazi Bay  Onshore Production 
5 2005 Ndovu Resources Australia Ruvuma Onshore Exploration 
6 2005 Brtitish Gas United Kingdom Block 1 Offshore Development 
7 2006 Petrodel United Kingdom Kimbiji & Latham Onshore Exploration 
8 2006 Afren  United Kingdom Tanga Onshore Exploration 
9 2006 Ophir Energy South Africa East Pande Lindi Onshore Exploration 
10 2006 Brtitish Gas United Kingdom Block 3 Offshore Exploration 
11 2006 Brtitish Gas United Kingdom Block 4 Offshore Exploration 
12 2007 Dominion Oil & Gas United Kingdom Block 7 Offshore Exploration 
13 2007 Statoil Norway Block 2 Offshore Exploration 
14 2007 Dodsal Resources   United Arab 
Emirates 
Ruvu/Bagamoyo Onshore Exploration 
15 2008 HydroTanz India North Mnazi Bay Onshore Exploration 
16 2008 Beach Petroleum Australia South Lake Tgyk Onshore Exploration 
17 2011 Motherland Home India Malagarasi Onshore Exploration 
18 2011 Heritage Oil Plc United Kingdom North Lake Rukwa Onshore Exploration 
19 2011 Heritage Oil Plc United Kingdom Kyela Onshore Exploration 
20 2012 Swala Energy Australia Pangani Onshore Exploration 
21 2012 Swala Energy Australia Kilosa & Kilombero  Exploration 
22 2012 Petrobras Brazil Block 8 Onshore Exploration 
23 2012 Ndovu Resources Australia Nyuni-New PSA Onshore Exploration 
24 2012 Jacka Resources Australia Ruhuhu Onshore Exploration 
Source: TPDC 2016 
                                                 
66. Chapter 2, Section 5.2. 
67 Ogunleye “A Legal Analysis of Production Sharing Contract Arrangements in the Nigerian Petroleum 
Industry” (2015) 1.  




2.4 Contracting Procedures 
Since the State relies on private entities to extract its oil and gas resources, the licensing 
system plays an important role in the oil and gas value chain.68 In the process of granting 
extraction rights, the Government aims at, inter alia, obtaining an IOC with the requisite 
expertise, technology and capital to undertake the extraction. 69 In addition, and more 
importantly, agreeing on the mechanism for sharing economic benefits between the IOC 
and the Government.70  
In Tanzania, the pre-licensing stage commences with nomination of blocks to be licensed. 
This is followed by a preliminary assessment of nominated blocks with a view to ascertain 
the coordinates and preparing a checklist of records, data, maps and other relevant 
information.71 Then, PURA undertakes an evaluation of geological and geophysical data 
of blocks (acreage) to be licensed. 72  This evaluation helps PURA to rank blocks 
according to their prospectivity.73  At this stage, PURA also prepares data packages, 
which are used by the prospective investors to assess the prospectivity of the block under 
license.74 Thereafter, PURA prepares a model PSA, used as the basis for preparing the 
tender documents, spells out the rights and obligation of TPDC, Government and IOCs.75  
The model PSA contains technical, commercial, fiscal and legal aspects.76 It also contains 
negotiable terms, such as work program, bonuses and production sharing, as well as fixed 
                                                 
68 Sunnevag, KJ “Designing auctions for offshore petroleum lease allocation” (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3-16 at 3. 
69 Sunnevag “Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation” (2000) 3. 
70 Sunnevag “Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation” (2000) 3. 
71 Information from TPDC by one Kelvin Komba Director of the Upstream Sector 2016. 
72  Provide geological description, such as stratigraphy/structure plays; prospect maps from the 
interpretation, describe source rock structure, provide an estimate of potential volumes, conduct an 
econometric analysis based on the Model PSA. 
73 Most prospectivity with Chances of Success (COS) between 30% and 40%; Medium prospectivity with 
COS between 20% and 30%; Low prospectivity with COS between 10% and 20%. 
74  Tanzania National Audit Office Performance Audit on the Management of Process of Awarding 
Exploration and Development Contracts and Licences for Natural Gas (2016) 15-16 
http://www.nao.go.tz/?wpfb_dl=183 (accessed on 15 July 2016) 
75  Tanzania National Audit Office Performance Audit on the Management of Process of Awarding 
Exploration and Development Contracts and Licences for Natural Gas (2016) 15-16. 
76 For example, the terms of the Model PSA includes parties, operational aspects, royalties and taxation, 
environmental issues as well as commercial aspects. See the contents of Model PSA 2013 at 
http://www.tpdc-tz.com/psa_agreement.php (accessed 20 July 2017). 




terms, such as royalties and taxes. 77 Currently, the law requires that such Model PSA to 
be approved by the Cabinet. 78 However, the Model PSA has been in use since 1989 as a 
benchmark for negotiating the terms of PSAs.79 Since 1989, five prototypes of Model 
PSA have been developed in the years 1989, 1995, 2004, 2008 and 2013.80 Once the 
preparatory stages are complete, PURA invites potential investors in a bidding 
round.There are two ways of offering extraction rights to prospective companies: through 
direct negotiations and competitive tendering.81 
2.4.1 Competitive Tendering 
Once the pre-licensing stage is complete, PURA circulates a tender inviting all 
prospective investors in both local and international newspapers of wide circulation. 82 
This invitation for tender includes information, such as the block name, area and 
location.83 The tender also indicate the rules to be complied with by the bidders, the 
criteria used to evaluate bidders against each other and the applicable criteria for selecting 
the winner.84 In addition, bidders are required to pay non-refundable bidding fee of US$ 
50,000, mandatory purchase of bid round data package (BRDP) deep offshore blocks at 
US$ 750,000 per package and BRDP for offshore US$ 350,000 (non-refundable) and 
                                                 
77 Information provided by Mr. Simon Kenyeli a geologist at the Ministry of Energy and Minerals; See 
Table 1.2; IMF Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and Implementation (2012) 38 available 
at https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/081512.pdf (accessed on 20 March 2014) 
78  Section 47(3) &(4) of the Petroleum Act 2015. This was not a requirement under the Petroleum 
(Exploration and Production) Act 1980. 
79 Sehel, BMA “Tanzania” in Pereira EG & Talus, K African Upstream Oil and Gas: A Practical Guide to 
the Law and Regulations London: Globe Law Business (2015) 514. 
80 http://www.tpdc-tz.com/legalservice.php (20 July 2017) See also Sehel “Tanzania” (2015) 514. 
81 Sunnevag “Designing auctions for offshore petroleum lease allocation” (2000) 4; Fraser “Licensing 
resources tracts: A comparison of auction and discretionary systems” (1991) 271; Kretzer, UMH 
“Allocating oil leases: Overcapitalization in licensing systems based on size of work programme” (1993) 
19(4) Resource Policy 299-311 at 299; Kretzer, UMH “Exploration prior to oil lease allocation: A 
comparison of auction licensing and allocations based on size of work programme” (1994) 20(4) Resource 
Policy 211- 294 at 235. Le Leuch, H “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, 
Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal Issues”(2013)131. 
82 Section 48(1)& (2) of the Petroleum Act 2015, the Minister is required to make Regulations providing 
for guidelines on the conduct of the tendering process. 
83 See TPDC Invitation for Bids Tender No. PA/031/2013-14/PSA/01 for PSA Application Proposals For 
Hydrocarbon Exploration to Seven (7) Blocks in Tanzania Deep Offshore Basin and Lake Tanganyika 
North Block; see also IMF Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and Implementation (2012) 
38. 
84  Tanzania National Audit Office Performance Audit on the Management of Process of Awarding 
Exploration and Development Contracts and Licences for Natural Gas (2016) 15-16. 




mandatory 2D SPAN data at US$ 3.375 per package.85 Bidders are allowed to apply as 
individuals or consortium and for the all blocks, but only one block is awarded.86 Since 
2000, when TPDC adopted competitive bidding, four licensing rounds have been taken.87 
The major advantage of competitive tendering is that the IOCs to compete with each other 
and the Government just select the highest bidder. 88 
After the deadline for submission of tender application, the tender documents are opened 
in public in presence of all tenderers. Subsequently, the Government grading team 
evaluates the bidders to ascertain compliance with the terms of the tender and selecting 
the winner.89 The first level of evaluation, which involves a preliminary examination, 
aims at identifying bidders who complied with the instructions.90 The second level of 
evaluation comprises of a detailed examination of the bidders profile to establish the 
terms of the offer such as the work program, technical and financial capacity and fiscal 
terms.91 The winner of the tender, who meets the criteria specified in the tender document 
or the qualified bidder, is then invited for negotiations based on the latest Model PSA. 92 
2.4.2 Direct Negotiations 
There are two scenarios where the Government may dispense with requirement for 
tendering and thus engage in direct negotiations with the IOCs. The first, is when the 
                                                 
85 See TPDC Invitation for Bids Tender No. PA/031/2013-14/PSA/01. 
86 TPDC Invitation for Bids Tender No. PA/031/2013-14/PSA/01. 
87 Before that it used to be based on first-come-first served basis The first licensing round, which was 
conducted in June 2000 to April 2001 and involved 6 offshore blocks, attracted only one bid, which 
subsequently awarded one block. The second licensing round between June 2001 to July 2002 and involved 
11 offshore blocks and two bids were received. The third licensing round conducted between May 2004 to 
May 2005 involved 7 offshore blocks, attracted three bids all of which were accepted. The fourth licensing 
round conducted in October (June?) 2013 to May 2014  involved North Lake Tanganyika block (onshore) 
and 7 offshore blocks, attracted 21 bids but only 5 responded after evaluation.  See Tanzania National Audit 
Office Performance Audit on the Management of Process of Awarding Exploration and Development 
Contracts and Licences for Natural Gas (2016) 18-19. 
88  Johnston, D International Exploration Economics Risks & Contract Analysis (Tulsa, PennWell 
Corporation, 2003) 152. 
89 From the Ministery of Energy and Minerals and Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority (PURA) 
Section 49(2)&(3) Petroleum Act 2015 
90 See See Tanzania National Audit Office Performance Audit on the Management of Process of Awarding 
Exploration and Development Contracts and Licences for Natural Gas (2016) 18-19. 
91 Section 51 of the Petroleum Act 2015 provides the eligibility criteria to include minimum work and 
expenditure amount, financial resources available to them, technical and industrial competence and 
experience to carry the operation, proposals with respect to the training and employment of citizens of 
Tanzania Information from TPDC & MEM 
92 Section 49(2)&(3) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 




Minister, through a notice in the Government gazette, reserves certain blocks either for 
public interest or to be awarded directly to the NOC.93 The second is where the licensing 
rounds have failed to attract potential bidders.94 The greatest challenge with this closed-
door system is that it does not pre-define the criteria for the awarding of rights, nor make 
them known to the license applicants.95 This system also lacks transparency and limits 
competition among applicants.96 Moreover, the use of discretionary powers may create 
opportunities for corrupt practices.97  
2.4.3 Negotiations and Signing of PSA 
The Government Negotiating Team conducts the negotiation of a PSA. The law requires 
the Government Negotiating Team to be composed of members from different 
disciplines.98 The Model PSA serves as the basic document for negotiating terms for 
exploration and production of petroleum. The negotiating team has a mandate only to 
deal with terms, which are negotiable, such as work program, Government participation, 
bonuses and profit oil split.99 The other fiscal terms, such as corporate income tax and 
royalties, are not subject to negotiations.100  
Once the terms are agreed, the TPDC applies for exploration license from the Minister 
30 days before the PSA is signed and is attached as an annexure to the license.101 When 
granted, the exploration license, grants exclusive right to the IOC to explore for oil and 
gas in the licensed block. 102 The exploration license covers forty blocks (and can extend 
                                                 
93 Section 50 of the Petroleum Act 2015. One block has already been reserved. See Petroleum (Reservation 
of Block 4/1B and 4/1c for the National Oil Company) Notice 2016 GN No 184/2016 
94 Section 48(3) the Petroleum Act 2015. 
95 Le Leuch, H “Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal 
Issues” (2013) 131. 
96 Tordo, Johnston and Johnston Petroleum Exploration and Production Rights Allocation Strategies and 
Design Issues (2009) 14. 
97 Tordo, Johnston and Johnston Petroleum Exploration and Production Rights Allocation Strategies and 
Design Issues (2009) 14. 
98 Section 37(2) of Public Procurement Act 2011 & Section 49(2)&(3) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
99 See section 2.5 below. 
100 See section 2.5 below. 
101See Tanzania National Audit Office Performance Audit on the Management of Process of Awarding 
Exploration and Development Contracts and Licences for Natural Gas (2016) 17. 
102 Section 51(2)(b) & 51(3) Section 55(1)&(2) This is contrasted with the reconnaissance permits are non-
exclusive, may be issued to different persons on the same area, and are valid for three years (section 34(4)) 
Petroleum Act. 




to eighty blocks),103 valid for four years (and can be extended for a further period of five 
years).104 
After successful negotiations, TPDC forward a draft-negotiated document for approval 
processes to Government where the Minister will then sign the Agreement. The signing 
of PSA paves way for exploration operations to commence. If exploration is successful, 
the registered holder of an exploration license (TPDC) may request for the development 
license to the Minister.105 The development license, valid for 25 years, is subject to 
extension of a further period of 20 years,106 entitles the holder to carry out development 
operations, and the recovery of oil and gas from the reservoir. 107  However, before 
commencing any production operations, the holder of a development license must obtain 
an annual production permit from the Minister.108 The next section discusses the fiscal 
instruments contained in the PSAs. 
2.5 Fiscal Terms 
In Tanzania, upstream and downstream sectors are treated as separate operations for tax 
purposes.109 As regards to the upstream sector, which is the focus of this study, the 
Tanzanian fiscal system adopts a typical PSA system under which the IOC bears all the 
costs and risks of exploration and development.110 In this regard, the fiscal elements 
constitute terms meant to generate Government revenue, as well as compensating the 
IOCs for risk taken and capital invested.111  
                                                 
103 Section 51(2)(b) & 51(3) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
104 Section 56(a)&(b) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
105 Section 66 of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
106 Section 73 of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
107 Section 72 of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
108 Section 76 (1) (a) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
109 Section 65 K(4) Income Tax Act 2004. See also Kellas, G “Natural gas Experience and issues” in Daniel, 
P Keen, M, McPherson C (eds) The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals Principles, Problems and 
Practice, (London, Taylor & Francis, 2010) 169. 
110 Bindemann, K Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis (Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies ,1999)1.  
111 Salih, MS and Salih, RS “Strategy of Oil Contract Negotiation” (2015) 9 (6) International Journal of 
Business and Social Science) 168-175.169, 171 and Kellas, G “Natural gas Experience and issues” in 
Daniel, P Keen, M, McPherson C (eds) The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals Principles, Problems and 
Practice, (London, Taylor & Francis, 2010) 169. Nakhle, C “Petroleum fiscal regimes: Evolution and 
challenges” (2010) 99-101; Bindemann Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis (1999) 1; 




Under the Tanzanian PSA system, the apportionment of revenues between the 
Government and the IOCs entails a five-layer process as summarized under Table 1.2 
below.112 First, immediately after the commencement of production the Government 
charges royalty on gross production from the contract area.113 Second, the contractor 
receives a share of production for costs recovery.114 The partion of the produce given to 
the contractor as reimbursement for costs incurred during the exploration, development 
and production stage is referred to as “cost oil or gas”.115 The cost oil or gas resembles 
and replicates the deductions under conventional income tax system.116 Third, the balance 
portion of oil or gas after deduction of royalties and cost recovery referred to as “profit 
oil/gas” is split between the Government and IOCs at a pre-specified ratio.117 Fourth, the 
IOC pays corporate income tax on its share of profit oil in accordance with the income 
tax laws.118 Fifth, if the share of profit oil exceeds a certain pre-determined threshold, it 
will be subjected to additional profit tax (APT).119  
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1 PSA 1 5% 70% Oil 30-60% 
Gas 30-50% 
30% Max. 20% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
2 PSA 2 12.5% 60% Oil 35-55% 
Gas 55-80% 
30% Negotiable No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
                                                 
Khan, K.I.F “Petroleum Taxation and Contracts in the Third World-A Law and Policy Perspective” (1988) 
22 (1) Journal of World Trade 67–88 at 83. 
112 This is a typical feature of the PSA in its original form as applied in Indonesia. See Chapter 2 section 
5.2.However, this approach excludes the indirect taxes, such as import duties, local Government rates, and 
stamp duties as well as dividends from equity participation. These fiscal terms are also discussed under 
item 2.5.5, 2.5.6 and 2.5.7 of this Chapter. 
113 Section 113(1) of the Petroleum Act 2015. This is also reflected under Articles 12(e) and 16(c) of the 
Model PSA 2013   
114 Article 12 (a) of Model PSA 2013; Bindemann Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis 
(1999)1. 
115 Article 12 (a) of the Model PSA 2013. 
116 See Chapter 2 section 4.2.1. See also Ogunleye “A Legal Analysis of Production Sharing Contract 
Arrangements in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry” (2015) 1 and Khan, K.I.F “Petroleum Taxation and 
Contracts in the Third World-A Law and Policy Perspective” (1988) 22 (1) Journal of World Trade 67–88 
at 83. 
117 Article 12 (g)(i)(a) of the Model PSA 2013 Bindemann Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic 
Analysis (1999) 1. 
118 Sections 116(1) and 224(2) of the Petroleum Act 2015.  
119 Article 17 of Model PSA 2013, A detailed discussion on these fiscal instruments is provided for under 
section 2.5.4.4 of this Chapter. 





3 PSA 3 12.5% 60% Oil 35-55% 
Gas 50-75% 
30% Negotiable No  No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
Stabilization clause 
4 PSA 4 12.5% 50% Oil 50-62% 
Gas 50-62% 
30% Max. 20% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
5 PSA 5 12.5% 65% Oil 50-70% 30% Negotiable Yes No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
6 PSA 6 5% 65% Oil 40-70% 30% Max. 15% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
Stabilization clause 
7 PSA 7 12.5% 60% Oil 40-60% 
Gas 37-60% 
30% Max. 15% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
Stabilization clause 
8 PSA 8 5% 75 Oil 40-65 30% Max. 50% Yes No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
9 PSA 9 12.5% 50% 55-75 
45-70 
30% Max. 25% 
for oil  
Max. 20% 
for gas 
No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
- Stabilization clause 
10 PSA 10 12.5% 60% 40-65 
45-70 
30% Max. 20%  No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
- Stabilization clause 
11 PSA 11 12.5% 50% 40-60% 30% Max. 15% Yes No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
- Stabilization clause 
12 PSA 12 5% 72.5
% 
42.5-62.5% 30% Max. 15% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
- Stabilization clause 
13 PSA 13 5% 72.5
% 
42.5-62.5% 30% Max. 15% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
- Stabilization clause 
14 PSA 14 5% 70% 40-60% 30% Max. 12% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
- Stabilization clause 
15 PSA 15 5% 70% 25-62.5% 30% Max. 20% Yes No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
- Stabilization clause 
16 PSA 16 12.5% 50% 35-65% 30% Max. 15% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
- Stabilization clause 
17 PSA 17 12.5% 50% 35-65% 30% Max. 15% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
- Stabilization clause 
18 PSA 18 5% 75% 42.5-65% 30% Max. 50% Yes  No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
19 PSA 19 5% 70% 30-52.5% 30% Max. 10% No No - Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
 No taxes on transfer of 
rights 
- stabilization c 
20 PSA 20 TPDC 
pays 
royalty 
75% 45-75% 30% Max. 20% Yes No - No ring fencing 
- No WHT on dividends 
- Capital goods 
exempted from taxes 
21 PSA 21 12.5% 60% 50-70% 30% Max. 20% Yes No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
22 PSA 22 12.5% 50% 50-70% 
45-70% 
30% Max. 20% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 




23 PSA 23 12.5% 50% 45-70% 30% Max. 20% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
24 PSA 24 12.5% 50% 45-70% 30% Max. 20% No No Capital goods exempted 
from taxes 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the 24 PSAs availed to him on condition that the real identities of 
IOCs should not be disclosed. 
Table 1.2 above provides a summary of the fiscal terms as contained in each individual 
PSA. However, this summary does not contain the details of each fiscal term and leaves 
out other indirect taxes. The next section highlights and examines one by one these fiscal 
elements as well as other indirect taxes function.  
2.5.1 Royalties 
The license holder (TPDC) and the contractor are obliged to pay royalties to the 
Government in respect of gross volume of oil and gas produced at the delivery point.120 
This is also known as gross revenue royalty (“ad-valorem royalty”).121 Royalties are 
calculated based on gross revenues prior to any deductions available to the IOCs.122 The 
rate of royalty for onshore projects is 12.5 percent and 7.5 percent for offshore of the total 
crude oil or gas produced.123 It is notable that before the enactment of the Petroleum Act 
2015 royalties were negotiable and for that reason royalty for offshore projects was 5 
percent.124 The reason for this distinction is that exploration and development cost and 
risks in the deep sea are much higher compared to onshore and shallow waters.125 In 
addition, the payment of royalty can be either by cash or in kind as specified in the 
                                                 
120 Section 113(1) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
121 The other common forms of royalties are volume of production (per unit royalty) or a sliding scale tied 
to commodity price. See Nakhle, C “Petroleum fiscal regimes: Evolution and challenges” (2010) 95; 
Agalliu, I Fiscal sytem comparative Assessment of the federal oil and gas fiscal systems report U.S 
Department of Interior, Bureau of Ocean Management (2011) 48 available at 
https://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=d174971c-4682-4d96-b194-
a85fa2b86774 (accessed on 05 May 2015). 
122 Section 113 (1) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
123 Section 113(2) read together with the Second Schedule to the Petroleum Act 2015. This remedies a 
mischief under Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 1980 under section 81 which did not provide 
for the method of calculating royalty 
124 See Table 1.2. 
125 Agalliu Fiscal sytem comparative Assessment of the federal oil and gas fiscal systems report (2011) 48. 




PSAs.126 Failure to pay royalties attracts sanctions, such as prohibition of removal of 
petroleum produced or dealing in any petroleum from the development area.127 
Royalty payments have a number of advantages to the Government. For one, royalties are 
simple to administer because their base is gross production,128 which is easy to calculate, 
collect and monitor the royalty payable.129 Moreover, the fact that the royalty is attached 
to gross production makes it simple to estimate the amount payable.130 This also implies 
that royalties are not susceptible to tax avoidance as compared to profit-based taxes.131 
Additionally, the royalty payment, as opposed to profit-based taxes, provides early 
revenue to Government because it is chargeable as soon as the production starts.132 
Despite these advantages, charging royalties may be undesirable in certain circumstances. 
For instance, charging royalties for marginal project, where the operating costs are equal 
to the revenues, may lead to premature closure of such projects.133 Furthermore, until 
June 2017 royalties paid were tax-deductible, implying that the payment are just an 
advance payment of corporate tax. 134  However, with the most recent amendments, 
royalties are no longer deductible for tax purposes.135 While this new enactment has the 
potential to widen the tax base, it will not be applicable to existing PSAs due to stability 
clauses. 
2.5.2 Cost Oil or Gas 
The PSA has clauses that provide that after the deduction of royalties from the gross 
production, the contractors and TPDC (in case of joint operations),136 are entitled to 
                                                 
126 Section 113(2) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
127 Section 113(3) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
128 Nakhle “Petroleum fiscal regimes: Evolution and challenges” (2010) 95. 
129 Tordo Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons Design Issues (2007) 37. 
130 However, this is not always the case, due to the volatility of petroleum prices in the world market. Tordo 
Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons Design Issues (2007) 37. 
131 See Chapter 3 sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
132 Tordo Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons Design Issues (2007) 37. 
133 Tordo Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons Design Issues (2007) 38; Nakhle “Petroleum Fiscal Regimes: 
Evolution and Challenges” (2010) 95, 
134 Section 65N of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
135  Section 65N (1) of the Income Tax Act 2004 as amended by section 36 of the Written Laws 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2017 
136 Joint operations means the Petroleum operations in respect of which TPDC has elected to contribute 
expenses or carried interests- MPSA interpretation. 




recover operating expenses from the remaining portion of oil and gas (“cost oil or 
gas”).137 As indicated under table 1.2 above, the PSAs place a ceiling on cost recovery 
between 50 and 75 percent of the gross revenue less royalties. In addition, the PSAs 
contain rules on treatment of unrecoverable costs, 138  recoverable costs 139  and 
classification of unrecoverable costs.140 While the cost oil or gas resembles the deductions 
under income tax system, the Income Tax Act 2004 has its own rules of deductibility of 
capital and operational costs.141 The non-alignment of the cost recovery rules under the 
PSA and those under the Income Tax Act 2004 creates parallel rules.142 However, in cases 
of variance or inconsistency between the rules under PSA and those under the Income 
Tax Act 2004, the provisions of the law prevail.143 
2.5.3 Profit Oil or Gas 
In terms of Model PSAs, after deducting royalties and cost oil from the gross production, 
the remainder production (referred to as profit oil) is shared between the contractor and 
TPDC on predetermined rates.144 In practice, the rates of share of profit oil are subject to 
negotiations and this explains the reasons why each PSA may have its own rate of 
production sharing.145 During the bidding process, the Government sets the threshold 
                                                 
137 Article 12 (a), Model PSA 2013 Bindemann Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis 
(1999)1. 
138 Carried forward until fully recovered or after termination of the PSA, article 12(b) & (e) (iv) Model PSA 
2013. 
139 Exploration costs: These are all expenses related to the process of search for oil and gas in the contract 
area (section 2.1 (a)-(g) Model PSA). Section 2.2(a)- (f); development expenses: These are costs incurred 
in the process of analyzing the productivity of the reservoir and creating the infrastructure for production. 
Section 2.3; operating expenses: These are expenses incurred during the commercial production phase. 
Section 2.4 service costs These are costs incurred to support, directly or indirectly, the oil and gas operations 
Section 2.5(a); general and administrative costs These included expenditures related to main office, field 
office and general administrative activities, such as supervisory, accounting and employee relations 
services. 
140, such as annual charges, costs of arbitration, fines and penalties; costs incurred because of willful 
misconduct or negligence; signature bonus and production bonus; Article  12 (b) and Section 3.2 of the 
ANNEX “D” to the Model PSA 2013. 
141 Khan “Petroleum Taxation and Contracts in the Third World-A Law and Policy Perspective” (1988) 83. 
142 See Chapter 6 section 6.5. 
143 See also Tullow Uganda Ltd & Another v. Uganda Revenue Authority TAT Application No. 4 of 2011, 
Uganda Tax Appeals Tribunal at 68 (Unreported), where it was held that “[a] contract cannot override a 
statute”. See also the decision of the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal in Geita Gold Mine v the Commissioner 
General Appeal No. 4 of 2012 (unreported). 
144 Article 12 (g)(i)(a), Model PSA 2013. Section 3 of the Petroleum Act 2015 definition. 
145 See Table 1.2. 




parameters within which profit oil or gas can be shared in the Model PSA.146 Therefore, 
it is upon the contractor to bid either above or below the threshold set in the Model 
PSA.147 Currently, the PSAs use a sliding scale pegged on daily production tranches on 
the share of profit oil or gas. 148  The rates of shares differ depending on whether 
production is onshore or offshore and whether the produce is oil or gas. As indicated 
under Table 1.2 above, the lowest share of profit oil or gas the Government receives is 25 
percent while the highest is 80 percent. 
2.5.4 Income and Profit-based Taxes 
The license holder (TPDC), contractor (IOCs) and subcontractors are all obliged to pay 
taxes in accordance with the provisions of written laws. 149  The following section 
discusses different methods of charging income tax in Tanzania. 
2.5.4.1 Income and profit-based taxes 
In Tanzania, profits from companies are taxed both at the corporate level as well as in the 
hands of shareholders. 150  Thus, while the company pays corporate income tax, the 
dividends distributed to shareholders are subject to withholding taxes. 151  Similarly, 
income earned by a non-resident corporation with permanent establishment in Tanzania 
is liable to corporate income tax in the same way as that of a resident person.152 
Since corporate income tax is profit-based, it is payable only where the IOC has generated 
a profit. Under the Income Tax Act 2004, profit is calculated as the difference between 
gross revenues and the allowable deductions.153 Therefore, the first stage in establishing 
                                                 
146 Refer to section 2.4.3 above. See also Mgaya, RBT Petroleum Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Oil and 
Gas Fiscal Regime in Tanzania Msc dissertation Robert Godon University of Aberdeen (2014) 35. 
147 Refer to section 2.4.3 above. See also Mgaya, RBT Petroleum Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Oil and 
Gas Fiscal Regime in Tanzania (2014) 35. 
148 See Table 1.2. See also Article 12 (g) &(h) Model PSA 2013. 
149 Section 116(1) of the Petroleum Act 2015 and section 65K (1)(a) of the Income Tax Act 2004. however, 
in terms of the PSA signed with Pan African Energy signed in 2001, though the contractor has an obligation 
to pay corporate income tax, such tax when paid is refundable from the TPDC share of profit oil. See Table 
1.2. 
150 Section 53(1) of the Income Tax Act 2004. See also Schreiber, U International Company Taxation: An 
Introduction to the Legal and Economic Principles (Berlin, Springer, 2013) 1. 
151 Section 54(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
152 Section 4(1)(a)-(c) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
153 General discussion on corporate income tax under Chapter 2 section 4.2.1. See also Part III of the Income 
Tax Act 2006. (“cost recovery”). 




the tax payable is to calculate the gross revenues arising from oil and gas operations. In 
calculating gross revenues, each petroleum right is treated as a separate and independent 
business activity and thus ring fenced from other businesses or petroleum rights held by 
the IOC. 154  Also revenues from upstream activities are accounted separately from 
midstream and downstream activities.155 For this reason, the accounts and tax returns for 
each petroleum right (PSA) are prepared independent of other businesses.156  
The gross revenue in the upstream oil and gas industry is the aggregate of income from 
the disposition of petroleum obtained from the license area, sale of data or information, 
revenue from disposal of rights or interests as well as contractor’s share cost oil and profit 
oil/gas.157 It also includes other classes of revenues earned in the course of doing business, 
such as service fees, incomings for trading stock, gains from the realization of business 
assets or liabilities, revenue derived from realization of depreciation assets and amounts 
derived from the restrictive agreements to conduct business.158  
While the law requires the gross revenues to be calculated based on market value, in 
practice such calculation or declaration poses serious transfer pricing risks. 159 This is the 
case particularly for cross-border transactions.160 In fact, the price fluctuation of oil and 
gas commodities renders it difficult to monitor the pricing of commodities.161 Moreover, 
the IOCs may enter into agreements with related parties to sell products at a lower price 
than the market price. 162  To avert this transfer pricing risk, the law requires that 
arrangements between related parties must be at arm’s length.163  
                                                 
154 Sections 65K(4)(b) and 65K(a) Section 65K(4)(a) of the Income Tax Act 2004. Under section 65Q when 
realized before production treated as an investment assets and the rules for taxing income from investments 
apply accordingly 
155 Section 65K (4) (a)&(b) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
156 Section 65K (4)(b) of the Income Tax Act 2004. This a typical “ring fencing” provision. 
157 Section 65M (2) (2) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
158 Section 8 (2) (a)-(h) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
159 Section 65 Q (5)&(6) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
160 See Chapter 3 section 3.2.2. 
161 See Chapter 2 section 3.3. 
162 See Chapter 3 section 3.2.2. 
163 Section 65K (5) Income Tax Act 2004. 




As regards to cost recovery, there are two methods for the IOCs to recover their costs in 
Tanzania namely deductions and depreciation.164 First, expenditures giving benefits of 
less than twelve months to the taxpayers deducted in financial year incurred while 
expenditures giving benefits to the taxpayer of more than twelve months are recoverable 
based on either their useful life or the lifetime of the oil and gas well.165 The former are 
referred to as deductions while the latter are referred to as depreciation or amortization.166  
Generally, recoverable expenditures are only the ones incurred wholly and exclusively 
for the production of income. 167  For this reason, the law specifies that certain 
expenditures are not deductible. The non-deductibe expenditures include gifts to public 
or charitable organizations, depreciable allowance, bonuses paid, and excess costs on the 
decommissioning fund. 168 Furthermore, certain expenses, such as bribes and expenditure 
incurred in corrupt practices, fines and similar penalties are not deductible for tax 
purposes.169 Taking into account these restrictions, the deductible expenses are limited to 
royalties and annual fees paid, operating expenses, interests on debts as well as amounts 
set aside for decommissioning fund and unrelieved losses.170  
It is also notable that capital expenditure relating to oil and gas exploration and production 
are amortized at the rate of 20 percent straight line.171 This implies that these costs may 
be recovered within five years of commercial production. Similarly, the capital 
expenditures associated with other equipment, plants and machinery are depreciated at 
                                                 
164 Annual wear and tear allowance for depreciable assets owned and used by the IOC or amortization of 
intangible assets. Section 11 of Income Tax Act 2004 provides for general rules on deductibility of 
expenses. 
165 Section 11 (4) Income Tax Act 2004. Including those incurred in respect of natural resource prospecting, 
exploration and development 
166 See Chapter 3 section 3.2.2. 
167 Section 11(2) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
168 Section 12(1) (a)&(b) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
169 Section 11(4) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
170 Section 65N (1) (a)-(c) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
171 Section 17 of the Income Tax Act, read together with the Third Schedule to the Act- Class 4 “ natural 
resource exploration and production rights and assets in respect of natural resource prospecting, exploration 
and development expenditure”- Straight line means. 




the rate of 37.5 percent,172 25 per cent173 and 12.5 per cent,174 depending on how the 
depreciable assets are classed.  
Generally, cost recovery is of paramount importance to the IOCs and the Government 
alike. To the IOCs, it determines the timing for recovering investment and operating 
expenses while to the Government it determines the time when profit-based taxes are 
payable.175 It is for this reason that tax is considered as a cost to investment as it impedes 
on capacity to recover the costs.176 Contextually, the IOCs devise different techniques 
that increase the deductible expenditures, such as borrowing from related parties at a very 
high interest than the prevailing market rates.177 This practice, in turn, increases the 
deductible expenditures and thus lowers the taxable profits.178  
In addition, deductibility of costs encourages “gold plating” of expenditure or excessive 
expenditures by the IOCs knowing that would be recoverable.179 The common techniques 
used include the use of intellectual property rights from related parties, usually located in 
low-tax jurisdictions, and pay high royalties. 180  It may also involve the payment of 
exorbitant management fees to parent companies.181 All these factors indicate how it is 
important for the Government to control and manage the costs incurred by the IOCs.182 
                                                 
172 Section 17 of the Income Tax Act 2004, read together with the Third Schedule to the Act. 
173 Section 17 of the Income Tax Act 2004, read together with the Third Schedule to the Act. 
174 Section 17 of the Income Tax Act 2004, read together with the Third Schedule to the Act-Including 
assets not included in other classes. 
175 Since CIT is profit based, and that the higher the costs the lower the profits, and consequently low or no 
corporate tax payableflow of tax revenue Blindermann Production Sharing Agreement (1999) 14. Ashong, 
M Cost Recovery In Production Sharing Contracts: Opportunity For Striking It Rich Or Just Another Risk 
Not Worth Bearing? 7-11 available at http://docshare01.docshare.tips/files/26761/267613664.pdf 
(accessed on 28 July 2014). 
176 Sikkaa et al “The dark side of transfer pricing: Its role in tax avoidance and wealth retentiveness” (2010) 
344. 
177 See Chapter 3 section 3.2.3 . See also Huizinga J, Laeven L, and Nicodème G Thin Capitalization Rules 
and Multinational Firm Capital Structure (Washington DC, International Monetary Fund 2014) 3: OECD 
Thin Capitalisation Legislation  A Background Paper For Country Tax Administrations (2012) 3. See 
178 OECD Thin Capitalisation Legislation A Background Paper For Country Tax Administrations (2012) 
3; Huizinga et al Thin Capitalization Rules and Multinational Firm Capital Structure (2014) 3. 
179 See Chapter 3 section 3.2.3. 
180 Ostwal, T.P and Vijayaraghavan, V “Anti-avoidance Measures” (2010) 22(2) National law School of 
India review at 90.Baunsgaard, T Primer on mineral taxation (2001)21. 
181 Ostwal and Vijayaraghavan “Anti-avoidance Measures” (2010) 90. Baunsgaard Primer on mineral 
taxation (2001) 21. 
182 Readhead Preventing Tax Base Erosion in Africa: a Regional Study of Transfer Pricing Challenges in 
the Mining Sector (2016) 8. 




Once the profit has been established, taxes are paid at two levels. First, the IOC pays 
corporate tax, at the rate of 30 per cent of net profits obtained from the upstream oil and 
gas operations. 183 Second, dividends distributed to shareholders are taxed, in the form of 
withholding tax, at the rate of 10 percent.184 Conversely, where the IOC operates a foreign 
branch with permanent establishment the repatriated income is subject to withholding tax 
at the rate of 10 percent.185 This tax is payable regardless of whether the income has been 
actually repatriated.186 
2.5.4.2 Alternative minimum tax (AMT) 
It is also noteworthy that strict adherence to the profitability as the basis for charging 
corporate income tax does not work in favor of the Government.187 For instance, given 
the capital intensity in the oil and gas industry, it takes a long time for the IOC to start 
earning a profit and pay corporate income tax.188 This implies that the IOC will have the 
protection of the State and use of social services without making its due contribution. To 
ensure that the extractive companies also contribute to the Governmental expenditures, 
Tanzania charges an alternative minimum tax (AMT).189 The AMT is payable by all 
companies that do not declare a profit for five consecutive years. 190  The AMT is 
calculated at 0.3 percent of gross revenues.191 
2.5.4.3 Withholding taxes 
Generally, in Tanzania non-residents pay income tax only in respect of income that has 
its source in Tanzania.192 Given that non-residents without permanent establishment in 
                                                 
183 Section 65K(1)&(2) of the Income Tax Act 2004 read together with paragraph 3(6) First Schedule to 
the Act. The only exception where a company is  listed on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE), where 
30 percent shares or more are issued to the public, are taxed at the rate of 25 percent see Sections 66 & 67 
read together with item 3 paragraph 2 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax. 
184 First Schedule to the Income Tax Act 2004.  
185 Sections 4(1)(b) &(6) and 72 (1) of the Income Tax Act read together with paragraph 3(3) of the First 
Schedule to the Act. The repatriated income is calculated by taking the net costs of PE (together with market 
value of capital contributed to the P.E by the owner) plus the net income minus costs (and unrelieved loss)  
186 Sections 4(1)(b) &(6) and 72 (1). of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
187 See Chapter 2 section 4.2.1. 
188 See Chapter 2 section 4.2.1. 
189 IMF Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation (2014) 36. 
190 Sections 3 & 4(1) (a) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
191 Sections 3 & 4(1)(a) read together with item 3(3) of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act 2004. 
192 Sections 6, 66 & 67 read together with item 3 paragraph 2 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax 2004. 




Tanzania cannot be compelled to file returns and account for their income, the only way 
to tax their income is through withholding tax.193 In addition, the charging of withholding 
tax aims to discourage payments to non-residents as a means of shifting profit to lower 
tax jurisdictions.194  
Dividends distributed by a resident corporation are taxed in the hands of the company’s 
shareholders in the form of a final withholding tax.195 In addition, withholding tax is 
chargeable on service fees payable to non-resident suppliers.196 Similarly, transmitting or 
delivering service in Tanzania irrespective of the place of performance is subject to 
withholding taxes. 197  In addition, financiers’ petroleum activities are considered as 
subcontractor and are therefore subject to withholding tax on the interest payment.198 The 
other payments subject to withholding tax are royalties for use of intellectual property, 
branch remittance and rental income.199 
In principle, withholding tax places an obligation on a resident person to retain a specified 
amount of tax when making payment to non-resident persons.200 It means the obligation 
to tax reporting and payment is shifted to the resident person.201 The basis for charging 
withholding tax on income earned by non-residents in Tanzania is the source principle. 
The source principle was cemented in Tullow Tanzania Bv v. Commissioner General,202 
where the Board held that payments made by a resident person to a non-resident person 
who has no permanent establishment in Tanzania are subject to withholding tax.203 The 
types of transactions subject to withholding tax and the corresponding tax rates are as 
follows: interests at 10 percent; dividends at 10 percent; rental income 10 percent; 
                                                 
193 Sections 6 (1) (b) of the Income Tax 2004. OECD Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013) 
33-34. 
194 OECD Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013) 33-34. 
195 Section 54(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
196 Section 83(1) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
197 Section 3 of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
198 Section 65 of the Petroleum Act 2004. 
199 First Schedule to the Income Tax Act 2004. 
200 TRA Withholding Tax available at http://www.tra.go.tz/index.php/withholding-tax (06 March 2015) 
201 ACCA http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-
students/2012/sa_apr11_f6sgp_withholding.pdf  
202 Tax Revenue Appeals Board, Income Tax Appeal Case No. 10 of 2011 
203 Sections 6 (1) (b), 69 (i) and 83 (1) (b) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 




royalties at 15 percent; technical services offered by non-residents at 15 percent and 
branch remittance at 10 percent.204 
2.5.4.4 Additional Profit Tax 
The Model PSA provides for payment of Additional Profit Tax (APT) calculated each 
calendar year depending on the real rate of return earned by the IOC on the net cash flow 
from the development area in question.205 The Act defines APT as a tax imposed on 
additional gains due to higher price or lower cost of production.206 APT is similar to 
Resource Rent Tax which is payable only when the contractor has recovered its costs and 
positive cash flows are generated at a specified threshold.207 Under the Model PSAs, 
where in any calendar year the First Accumulated Net Cash Position (FANCP) is positive, 
APT is charged at the rate of 25 percent. Similarly, where Second Accumulated Net Cash 
Position (SANCP) is positive, the APT is charged at the rate of 35 percent.208 With the 
exception of Model PSA 2004, APT is contained in the Model PSAs 1995, 2008 and 
2013.209 Where APT is due, it is payable in cash at such time and manner in which the 
Commissioner of Income Tax may require.210 Currently, only 7 of 24 PSAs have an 
obligation for the IOC to pay APT.211 The reason for this omission is that APT was not 
contained in any law and thus negotiable. 
2.5.4.5 Capital Gains Tax 
The Petroleum Act 2015 imposes an obligation on the IOCs to pay capital gains in respect 
of any profit made out of any direct or indirect assignment, transfer or any other disposal 
of rights under the PSAs regardless of the beneficiary type of transaction.212 The taxable 
gains entail the difference between the incomings from realization of petroleum right and 
the cost of acquisition of such right.213 The petroleum right is defined as an exploration 
                                                 
204 Extracted from the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act 2004. 
205 Article 17 Model PSA 2013. 
206 Section 3 of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
207 Article 17 Model PSA 2013. See also Chapter 2 section 4.1.4. 
208 Article 17 Model PSA 2013. 
209 Not covered under the Model PSA 2004. 
210 Article 17(e) Model PSA 2013. 
211 See Table 1.2 above.  
212 Section 116(2) & Section 224(1) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
213 Section 36(1) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 




licence or a development licence.214 It also includes the interest of a contractor under a 
PSA in respect of exploration or development license on a contract area 215 as well as data 
or information relating to petroleum operations.216  
Capital gains tax is payable where there is realization of petroleum right, which is deemed 
to a domestic asset.217 The gains from the realization of petroleum right are calculated as 
the difference between the incomings from realization of petroleum right and the cost of 
acquisition of such right.218 This implies that the IOC will be entitled to deductions of the 
cost incurred in the process of acquiring the petroleum. Once the gains are established, 
the applicable tax rate is 30 percent.219 For instance, in 2013 Ophir Energy Plc sold 20 
per cent of its shares in blocks 1, 2 and 3 at price of US$ 1.288 million.220 This transaction 
was treated as disposal of business assets (not investment assets), thus subject to corporate 
income tax.221 From this transaction, Ophir Energy Plc paid corporate tax at the rate of 
30% amounting to shillings 361 billion.222  
Capital gains tax is also payable on gains from indirect sale of shares. An indirect sale of 
shares is treated as a change of underlying ownership of the entity.223 The change of 
underlying ownership must be in respect of more than 50 percent of the company’s 
holding as compared with that ownership at any time during the three years.224 Similarly, 
in farm out arrangement the petroleum right is deemed an investment asset if realized 
                                                 
214 Section 3 of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
215 Section 3 (a)-(b) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
216 Section 3 (a)-(b) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
217 Sections 3 and 39 of the Income Tax Act, a domestic asset includes shares and security 
218 Section 36 (1)& 37 of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
219 Item 6 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act 2004. 
220 TEITI “Sixth Report of the Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative for the year ended 30 
June 2014” (2015) 15. 
221 Not involved in production yet. 
222 TEITI “Sixth Report of the Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative for the year ended 30 
June 2014” (2015) 16. 
223  Section 56 Income Tax Act. See also Bajungu, CE “Capital Gains Taxation and Indirect Sales: 
Experience, Challenges and Remedial Efforts In Tanzanian Perspective” UN Annual Tax Meeting 10th 
Sessions in Geneva (27/10/2014 - 31/10/2014) 3 available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/tenthsession/PresentationBajungu.pdf (accessed on 15 September 2016) 
224 Section 56(1) Income Tax Act 2004, see also E&Y Global oil and gas tax guide (2013) 511. 




before the commencement of production.225 Here capital gains tax is payable as a single 
instalment rate is 30 per cent at the time of realisation of the petroleum right or receipt of 
the proceeds of realisation.226 
The imposition of capital gains tax has always posed serious challenges to the TRA. For 
many years, the Income Tax Act 2004 did not have a provision imposing CGT on indirect 
transfer of interests in a petroleum right. Because of this anomaly, all attempts by TRA 
to impose taxes on gains accrued from transfer of shares were futile.227 The imposition of 
CGT was effected in 2012 when the definition of asset was extended to include shares.228 
In terms of section 56(1) of the Income Tax Act 2004, the transfer of shares, directly or 
indirectly, create taxable gains subject to capital gains tax. Even after the amendment of 
the Income Tax Act, still the payment of capital gains tax is far from being easy. This is 
because quite often the transactions take place abroad. 229 The challenge is how to enforce 
taxes on a transaction that occurred abroad, and that involves non-residents.230 The most 
recent example is the contested tax liability in the transaction that the Royal Dutch Shell 
acquired 60 percent stake in British Gas (BG) Group in a deal worth $ 55 billion.231 While 
the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) subjected this transaction to capital gains tax 
amounting to $ 502 million, BG group argues that no capital gains were realized.232  
                                                 
225 Section 65Q (2) Income Tax Act 2004. Under section 3 farm out arrangements is defined as a transfer 
of part of the right in return for consideration and includes an obligation on the transferee to meet future 
expenditure. 
226 Sections 90 and 65 Q of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
227 Afrika Mashariki Gold Mines Limited v. Commissioner General (2005] 3TTLR 1 and Afrika Mashariki 
Gold Mines Limited v. Commissioner General [2005]1 TTLR 37 it was held the gains obtained from 
transfer of shares abroad were not taxable in Tanzania JSC Atomredmetzoloto v Commissioner General. 
Tax Revenue Appeals Board at Dar es salam, Income Tax Appeals No. 26 & 27 of 2011 (unreported) It 
was held although the transaction had resulted into change of underlying ownership of Mantra (Tanzania) 
Limited, but the Income Tax Act 2004 did not include shares as an asset that attracts capital gains taxThe 
transaction took place in 2010 while the law was amended in 2012. 
228 Finance Act 2012 (Act No. 8 of 2012)  
229 Mafwenga, HM Mineral Tax Clinic: The Reflection of Old and New Fiscal Regimes for Effective Tax 
Auditing in Tanzania (2012) 135. 
230 The transaction took place in 2010 while the law was amended in 2012. 
231 Erick Kabendera Taxman freezes BG Group’s accounts in $500m tax row Posted Saturday, July 9 2016 
at 13:14This gives Shell 16 percent shares in the proposed LNG project. 
232 $ 850 million allocated to Tanzanian unit and already spent $ 1.5 billion. TRA issued a garnishee order 
to freeze the BG Group’s accounts. BG filed an application to TRAB challenging this garnishee order refer 
to BG Tanzania Ltd v the Commissioner General Application No. 21 of 2016. 




2.5.5 Bonuses, Rental fees and Service fees  
The contractor is obliged to pay to the NOC signature and production bonuses as may be 
agreed in the PSA.233 Bonuses are single (or installment-based) lump sum payments 
triggered by events, such as the signature of an exploration and production agreement or 
start of production.234 Currently, none of the 24 PSAs contains an obligation to pay 
bonuses because this requirement was only introduced by the Model PSA in 2013.235 The 
Model PSA 2013 provides for payment to the Government a signature bonus at the rate 
of 2.5 million US$ and a production bonus at 5 million US$.236 Given that bonuses are 
paid upfront before the project makes any profit, they increase the risk of escalating sunk 
costs (exploration and development costs).237 Furthermore, bonus payment is not tax-
deductible and not included in the cost of the petroleum right nor depreciated.238 To 
mitigate this risk, it is advisable that when charging bonuses, to levy lower royalties, 
taxes, share of the production or reduce Government equity in the project.239 However, 
as indicated under Table 1.2 above, none of the 24 PSAs imposes an obligation to pay 
bonuses. 
TPDC, as a license holder, is obliged to pay annual rental fees in respect of both 
exploration and development licenses.240 These surface fees aim is to discourage license 
holders from holding on to blocks without exploring them.241 The rates of rental fees until 
2013 have been US$ 4, US$ 8 and US$ 16 per square kilometer in respect of initial 
exploration period, first extension period and second extension period respectively. The 
current charges are US$ 50, US$ 100 and US$ 200 per square kilometer in respect of 
                                                 
233 Section 115(1) &(2) of the Petroleum Act. For purposes of this section- 
(a) “production bonuses” means bonus payable on commencement of production; and 
(b) "signature bonus" means a single non- recoverable lump sum payment by contractor to the Government 
upon signing of agreement or any other related agreement. 
234 IMF Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and Implementation (2012) 18. they can be set in 
legislation or negotiated, Tordo Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons Design Issues (2007) 42. 
235 It has been introduced by Model PSA 2013 and since then no PSA has been signed. 
236 Article 11 (c) Model PSA 2013. 
237 IMF Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and Implementation (2012) 18. Tordo Fiscal 
Systems for Hydrocarbons Design Issues (2007) 42. 
238 Section 65P of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
239 Tordo Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons Design Issues (2007) 42. 
240 Article 11 (a) MPSA 2013. Difference with royalties Section 3& 114(2)(a) Petroleum Act 2015; It 
includes the training and research fees (section 114(2)(b). 
241 Tordo Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons Design Issues (2007) 42. 




initial exploration period, first extension period and second extension period respectively. 
In practice, the IOCs reimburse TPDC for any rental fees paid. 
2.5.6 Local Government Taxes 
Local Government authorities have autonomy in their geographical jurisdiction to impose 
taxes, levies, fees and charges.242 These powers are exercisable through making by-laws 
prescribing those taxes or levies.243 Currently, all companies, including those in the oil 
and gas industry, are supposed to pay to the local Government authorities in which they 
operate a 0.3 percent levy of their business turnover.244 
2.5.7 Indirect Taxes 
Several indirect taxes apply to the upstream oil and gas industry. As regards import duties, 
Tanzania, as a member of the East African Customs Union, uses three-tariff bands to 
charge import duty:245 The zero percent rate applies to raw materials and capital goods, 
the 10 per cent rate applies to semi-finished goods and the 25 per cent rate applies to 
finished final consumer goods.246 Given that a typical oil and gas project involves a bulk 
of materials and equipment, which are imported,247 incentives are provided for the oil and 
gas industry. Currently, the East Africa Community Customs Management Act exempts 
from import duty all materials and equipment destined to oil and gas exploration and 
prospecting operations.248  
                                                 
242 Section 18 of the Local Government Finances Act Cap 290 (R.E 2002). 
243 The power to make by law can be traced under article 97(5) of the Constitution of Tanzania which 
permits the parliament to delegate its legislative powers to other bodies or Government agencies. 
244 Local Government authorities are established under article 154 of the Constitution which delegates 
power to the authority to impose taxes under the Local Government Finances Act, Cap 290 (R.E 2002)( 
see sections 6,7&8) and the Urban Authorities (Rating) Act, CAP 289, R.E 2002. 
245This is according to the Common External Tariff (CET) within the East African Community as provided 
for under the East African Community Customs Management Act, 2004 (Revised Edition 2009) section 
110 and the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market signed in 
November 2009. No export taxes. 
246 Section 110 East African Community Customs Management Act, 2004 (Revised Edition 2009), article 
12(1) of the Protocol of the Establishment of the East African Customs Union 2004. 
247 Tordo Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons Design Issues (2007) 41. 
248 Section 114 of the East African Community Customs Management Act, 2004 read together with item 
30 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act (As amended by Legal Notice No. EAC/9/2009). 




Every business entity that has a turnover of 100 million shillings is required to register 
for VAT.249 Generally, VAT is charged on domestic and imported goods and services at 
the rate of 18 percent and 0 percent for all exports and those listed under the first schedule 
to VAT Act.250 A VAT system is a credit invoice consumption tax implemented on a 
destination principle whereby a VAT registered trader pays VAT on taxable goods or 
services purchased (input tax) and charges VAT on taxable goods or services sold by her 
(output tax).251 The registered trader then pays to the revenue authority an excess of 
output tax over input tax or recovers the excess input tax over output tax from TRA.252 
Since natural gas equipment and products are VAT exempt, licensed companies for oil 
and gas exploration, prospecting and production are entitled to a refund of any VAT paid 
as input tax.253 
Excise duty is a specific tax designed to raise extra revenue, discourage consumption of 
some environmentally or socially detrimental goods and impose extra taxes on a selection 
of luxury goods.254 Excise duty is charged on the ex-factory price or the import price. Oil 
and gas companies at the production stage are liable to excise duty of 0.45 shillings per 
cubic feet of natural gas produced.255  
Similarly, stamp duty is charged for listed instruments, which are either executed in the 
Mainland Tanzanian or executed outside Mainland Tanzanian  but related to any property, 
matter or thing to be done in Mainland Tanzania. 256  These documents relate to 
conveyances, leases, share issues and transfers, and debentures. Stamp duties are charged 
at an ad valorem rate of up to 1 percent of the total amount of the transaction.257  
                                                 
249 Section 19(1) of the Value Added Tax Act 2015. 
250 It was introduced by section 23 of the Finance Act 2009 (Act No. 14 of 2009) the previous under section 
18 of Value Added Tax Act 1997 the rate was 20%. 
251 VAT is not a union tax; it means Zanzibar has its own VAT regime TRA 
252 This means that VAT is paid by the final consumer of taxable goods or services. 
253 Section 46 (b) of the Finance Act 2012 amends the Second Schedule to the Value Added Tax Act 
254  Ministry of Finance other taxes 
http://www.mof.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=42:other-tra-taxes&Itemid=57 
255 Section 124(1) read together with the First Schedule to the Excise (Management and Tariffs) Act, Cap. 
147 as amended by s.26 of the Finance Act 2014, Act No.6 of 2014. s. 15 of the FINANCE ACT 2016 (Act 
No.2 of 2016) amends the 4th schedule to the Excise (Management and Tarrif) Act Cap. 147 LNG and PNG 
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In addition, a skills and development levy is charged from every employer who has 
employed more than four employees and is set at the rate of 4.5% of the total gross 
monthly emoluments (wage bill).258The law requires that 2% to be remitted directly to 
the Vocational Education and Training Authority to enhance vocational skills to the 
workforce required by employers in Tanzania. 259 
2.5.8 Government Equity Participation 
The Government, through the TPDC, can obtain participating interest in a license or 
contract or in joint venture.260 In all partnership arrangements, TPDC is required to 
maintain a minimum of twenty-five percent participating interests. 261  However, the 
TPDC has authority to decide on a lesser or higher percentage.262 The TPDC share of 
contract expenses may be paid directly or the Contractor may advance, by way of loan, 
up to 100 per cent of unpaid amount of TPDC’s share of contract expenses.263 Such a 
loan, which bears interest at the rate of London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus one 
percent for the period it remains unpaid, is recoverable from TPDC’s cost oil.264 This 
means the Government avoids the requirement to make cash payments upfront, thus 
saving money for provision of social services, reducing risks and administrative 
complexities.265 It is notable however, that TPDC must exercise this option within 30 
days of discovery. It also means that TPDC may waive its right to acquire participating 
interests. Currently, TPDC has varying participating interests ranging between 10 and 50 
percent in both cash calls and carried interest as indicated under Table 1.2.266 This means 
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264 Article 10 (b)(iii) of the Model PSA. 
265 Khan “Petroleum Taxation and Contracts in the Third World-A Law and Policy Perspective” (1988) 85 
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the TPDC, in addition to its share as owner of the resource, is entitled to a share of profit 
oil obtained by the contractor on pro-rata basis.267  
3 Tax Incentives 
Investment in petroleum is arguably one of the riskiest ventures.268 For this reason, it is 
the Government’s policy to ensure that it attracts investments.269 In addition, Tanzania 
faces stiff competition from its neighbour Mozambique that has more than thrice the 
natural gas deposit as compared to Tanzania .270 In view of the need to mitigate these 
risks and create a competitive advantage, Tanzania offers several tax incentives. The next 
section discusses the different forms of tax incentives. 
3.1 Types of Tax Incentives  
Tax incentives granted in Tanzania take several forms. The first form is the accelerated 
cost recovery. While the exploration costs and the costs of the equipments are recovered 
based on their useful life or life cycle of the project, accelerated cost recovery is an 
exception to this rule.271 Currently, Tanzania capital expenditure relating to oil and gas 
exploration and production are depreciated at the rate of 20 percent straight line.272 This 
means that the investor is able to recover the costs within a period of five years.273 
Conversely, if conventional rules of accounting were applied, it would have taken fifteen 
to twenty years for the investor to recover such cost.274 While accelerated depreciation 
                                                 
267 Article 12 (i) MPSA 2013 
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has the potential to attract investments, for the Government it implies that the deductions 
are higher, thus low or no taxable income during this five-year period.275 It means the 
payment of profit-based taxes is deferred until such time when the investor has recovered 
a substantial amount of exploration and production costs. 
Second, investors in the oil and gas industry are exempted from import duty and VAT for 
equipment used in exploration of oil and gas.276 There is also an avenue for investors to 
apply to the Minister of Finance for an exemption from stamp duty.277 Although tax 
exemptions are meant to attract FDI and compensation for poor infrastructure, in practice 
these exemptions have the potential to erode the tax base. 278  It implies that the 
Government waives its right to collect the would-be-taxes. Moreover, it is argued that tax 
exemptions alone cannot be used to cover for poor investment climate.279 
Third, the investor at production stage can apply to the Minister of Energy and Minerals 
for an exemption to pay royalties.280 The Minister has powers, after advice by PURA 
followed by publication in the Gazette, to amend, vary or alter the rate of royalties 
payable.281 The aim for this remission is to mitigate the negative impact of a downswing 
of prices to the IOCs because royalties are production-based and thus regressive. 282 
However, the Petroleum Act does not specify the circumstances under which such 
exemption or waiver to pay royalties may be granted.283 In addition, the Act is silent as 
whether the royalty so deferred is supposed to be paid at a future date.284 These powers 
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are equivalent to powers to grant tax exemptions and in absence of restrictions; they may 
equally be abused.285 
Fourth, certain fiscal elements, such as bonuses, production sharing, and Government 
equity participation are subject to negotiation.286 The negotiability of these fiscal terms 
gives flexibility to the IOCs and it is thus possible to negotiate lower rates. While this 
negotiability of fiscal terms is advantageous to the IOCs, it creates loopholes for 
corruption and abuse of powers.287 
Fifth, Tanzania provides a guarantee to investors that any change of legislation, which 
materially affects fiscal benefits afforded to the contractor, be negotiated, and parties 
agree to amend the contract as near as practicable to such benefits as existed under the 
original agreement. 288  In fact the PSA once signed becomes binding upon the 
Government of Tanzania and will not be affected by future legislation.289 The fiscal 
incentives covered in the PSA will cease to have effect only when the time expires or the 
IOC decides to waive the right to benefit from such incentives. 290 Overall, the net effect 
of these stabilization clauses is to limit the legislative powers of parliament to amend or 
alter the fiscal terms pertaining to oil and gas projects under the PSA.291 Hence, the 
Government’s hands are tied and it cannot, even where market changes occur, effect any 
changes to the fiscal terms without mutual consent from the IOC. 
Sixth, Tanzania has signed double tax agreements (DTAs) with nine countries namely 
Sweden, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, India, Italy, Zambia and South Africa.292 
Since most of the treaties are old and signed in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, their 
relevance may have been overtaken by events.293 In the same connection, Tanzania is 
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currently negotiating nine new DTAs with the Netherlands, Mauritius, United Kingdom, 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iran and China.294 The terms of DTAs, which oblige 
Tanzania to exempt an income or a payment from tax or subject income or a payment to 
a reduced tax, prevail over the provisions of the Income Tax Act 2004.295 The DTAs in 
Tanzania address the relief from double taxation, the prevention of fiscal evasion and the 
reciprocal administrative assistance in tax enforcement. 296  
However, the major challenge of DTAs is that they may create a window of opportunity 
for unqualified firms to enjoy benefits under the treaty.297 In addition, some of the IOCs 
may abuse the terms of DTAs to avoid taxes. In view of these challenges, the benefits 
under DTAs are only applicable to an entity that qualifies, as per the terms of the 
agreement, resident of the other contracting State.298 In addition, the 50 percent or more 
of the underlying ownership of the entity must be held by entities or individuals who are 
residents of the other contracting State. 299  
3.2 Process and Procedure for grant of Tax Incentives 
In Tanzania, tax incentives are granted through three processes. First, tax incentuves may 
be granted at the time of signing the PSA and thus contained in the PSA as indicated 
under Table 1.2. These incentives will be effective once the PSA is registered in the 
Register of Tax Agreements.300 The second one is an automatic process whereby the 
incentives are inbuilt in the tax laws or Petroleum Act. The law usually specifies the type 
of investments that qualify and sets up the form of tax incentives used. 301 It includes 
terms, such as import duty reduction, and reliefs from VAT. However, the tax incentives 
do not have an automatic application. It requires the qualifying IOCs to apply to Minister 
of Finance who determines whether the IOC qualifies for grant of such tax incentives.302 
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This is arguably the best approach because it limits the use of discretionary powers by the 
Minister. 
The third process relates to discretionary tax exemptions. The Minister of Energy and 
Minerals has powers to reduce the rate of royalties or waive the obligation to pay 
royalties.303 Similarly, the Minister of Finance has powers to reduce, alter and waive an 
obligation to pay stamp duty, 304  excise duty305  and income tax.306  Likewise, before 
amendments, the Minister of Finance had powers to grant VAT and import duty 
exemptions.307  It is also notable that the Minister responsible for local Government 
authorities has powers to exempt any person from taxes payable to local Government 
authorities.308 
The trigger mechanism for this type of incentive is an application by the qualifying IOC 
to the respective Minister.309 Upon receipt of the application, the respective Minister has 
discretion to accept or reject the application. If the application is accepted, then the 
Minister will cause the acceptance and grant of specific tax exemption to be published in 
the Government gazette. 310 The major challenge of the discretionary tax exemptions is 
that they lack transparency, thus create a window of opportunity for corrupt practices.311 
In addition, most of these incentives are open-ended and no criteria given, and thus 
susceptible to corruption. 312  Table 1.3 below summarizes the various types of tax 
exemptions granted through Government Notices. 
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Table 1.3: Tax Exemptions granted through Government Notices 
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31 December 2013 
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Source: Compiled by the author from different Government Notices for the period between 1995 
and 2016. 
4 Tax Administration 
Generally, the level of Government’s revenue from the oil and gas industry depends on 
efficiency of the tax administration. Tax administration entails the system of assessment 
of tax payable, auditing tax returns and collecting taxes.313 Tax administration ensures 
that tax laws are properly enforced and the compliance is guaranteed.314 According to this 
view, an efficient tax system is the one that fights tax avoidance and limits opportunities 
for corruption or collusion by tax administrators and taxpayers.315 For this reason, an 
efficient tax administration ensures the Government obtains its rightful share of the 
revenues from oil and gas extraction.  
The upstream oil and gas fiscal regime in Tanzania involves a multiple tax and non-tax 
instruments.316 The multiplicity of these fiscal and non-fiscal instruments implies that 
multiple Government agencies are involved in the assessment and collection of 
Government revenue. For one, the administration of generally applicable taxes involves 
a three-tier framework namely the union Government taxes, non-union taxes in Zanzibar 
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and local Government taxes.317 In that regard, the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) is 
designated to assess, collect and account for all central (union) Government taxes,, such 
as corporate income tax, payroll taxes, withholding taxes, capital gains tax, value added 
tax (VAT), additional profit tax (APT), excise duties, stamp duties, custom duties, and 
skill and development levy.318 In addition, TRA collects, on behalf of local Government 
authorities and remits to them, the local Government service levy.319 As regards to non-
union taxes and duties in Zanzibar, the Zanzibar Revenue Board (ZRB) is designated 
assesses and collects taxes, such as Value Added Tax (VAT), stamp duties, port service 
charges, trade licenses and property tax.320  
In addition, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals assesses and collects different charges 
and rates payable under the Petroleum Act 2015, such as royalties, annual rental fees and 
signature and production bonuses. 321  Finally, the Tanzania Petroleum Development 
Corporation (TPDC), collects and remits to the Consolidated Fund, the Government’s 
share of profit oil and Government’s dividend from its participating interests in the oil 
and gas operations. 322  The next section discusses the procedures for assessment, 
collection and recovery of taxes. 
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4.1 Procedure for assessment, collection, payment and recovery of 
taxes 
In practice, tax administration involves the enforcement of tax laws to assess tax payable, 
auditing tax returns and collecting taxes.323 It entails the procedures for assessing tax or 
royalty payable, the manner and place of payment taxes due, the recovery of taxes due 
and transmission of the taxes collected.324 However, the fact that oil and gas taxation 
involves both tax and non-tax instruments, complicates tax administration. 325  For 
example, non-tax revenues, such as bonuses, rental fees and dividends are usually once-
off payments, thus do not follow the tax assessment procedures.326 Similarly, royalties 
and production sharing payments, though paid by installments, differ significantly from 
the procedures of tax payments.327 Furthermore, non-tax instruments do not only fall out 
of the purview of the general tax legislation but also administered by institutions that are 
not ordinarily tax authorities.328  
Despite these challenges, most of the non-tax instruments are easy to administer. This is 
because they either are once-off payments or based on productions, which are easily 
verifiable.329 By contrast, profit-based taxes, such as corporate income tax and additional 
profit tax (APT) which depend on other several factors, such as revenues and costs.330 
What is more is that most of these transactions occur abroad and thus out of control of 
the tax authority in the host country.331 For this reason, the following discussion is limited 
to tax instruments, such as corporate income tax, additional profit tax, VAT, withholding 
tax and capital gains tax.  
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4.1.1 Assessment of Tax 
All resident taxpayers have an obligation to register with TRA and be issued with 
Taxpayers Identification Number (TIN). 332  Similarly, these resident taxpayers are 
obliged to register for VAT when they attain a threshold of 100 million shillings on 
sales.333 The taxpayers are also obliged keep records of books of accounts according to 
international standards of accounting.334 Properly kept records assist the Commissioner 
General to make an assessment or to be filed in support of a tax return.335 
Generally, there are four modes of making a tax assessment. The first mode is self-
assessment, where taxpayers file their tax returns indicating their tax liabilities.336 The 
tax return must be accompanied with books of accounts, audited by an accredited 
accounting firm, containing income statement, cash flow and profit or loss account.337 
There are several risk factors at this stage, such as filing of incorrect or false 
documentation, under-declaring taxable income or the execution of a tax avoidance 
scheme. 
The taxpayer is obliged to file returns within six months after the end of the year of 
income.338 After receiving the returns, the Commissioner General for TRA may accept 
them or make adjustments.339 If the Commissioner accepts the return, the tax assessment 
becomes final and the assessed taxes are due and payable. 340  Alternatively, if the 
Commissioner General is of the view that the self-assessment is incorrect or contains 
inadequate information, the Commissioner General may issue an adjusted assessment.341 
Before issuing an adjusted assessment, the Commissioner General may call for more 
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information or conduct a special tax audit.342 The purpose of audit is to verify volumes, 
prices, capital expenditures and operating expenditures.343  
Moreover, in instances where the taxpayer fails to file a return within the prescribed time, 
the Commisssioner General has powers to use his best judgment, based on reasonably 
available information, to issue a jeopardy assessment.344 The jeopardy assessment may 
also be issued because of special tax audit. 345 The jeopardy assessment implies that tax 
is payable or has become payable regardless of whether that person is obliged to file a 
return.346 Furthermore, the Commissioner may also issue an additional assessment where 
taxes were short-levied because of incorrect information or an interpretation with which 
the Commissioner does not agree.347  
When the Commissioner General has made a final decision on the tax payable, the 
taxpayer is served with the notice of assessment.348 The notice of assessment indicates 
the name of the taxpayer and Taxpayer’s Identification Number (TIN), the 
Commissioner’s assessment of tax payable, reasons for the assessment, date taxes are 
due, and the procedure for objecting the assessment.349 Issuance of notice of assessment 
triggers the payment process. The next section discusses the payment and recovery 
procedures. 
4.1.2 Manner of Payment and Recovery of Tax 
Immediately after the issuance of notice of assessment, tax becomes due and payable. 
Under normal circumstances, the taxpayers have an obligation to file a statement of 
estimated income at the beginning of every financial year.350 Based on this estimated 
income, the taxpayer pays provisional taxes every three months referred to as advanced 
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payments. All payments of taxes and levies payable to the Government are required to be 
in international and freely convertible currency.351 
The final tax return is filed within six months after the end of the financial year. At this 
stage, the tax payable is only the difference between the provisional taxes already paid 
and the final tax liability. Payment of tax is required to be made according to the time 
prescribe in specific tax laws or as indicated in the notice of assessment.352 The taxes due 
are payable at any tax office or bank (cash or bank).353 This creates a risk of diversion of 
tax revenues, such as creation of special accounts owned by tax administrators and 
issuance of forged receipts. For instance, corrupt Government officials may willfully fail 
to collect taxes due, short levy taxes, grant undeserving tax incentives to the IOCs or 
divert revenues collected for their own account.354 
Where the taxpayer fails to make payment of taxes within the time limit prescribed by the 
notice of assessment or the specific tax law, such tax becomes a debt due to the 
Government and is recoverable in court of competent jurisdiction.355 Similarly, payments 
and levies prescribed in the Petroleum Act are debts due to the Government and are 
recoverable in accordance with any other written laws.356 The tax recovery measures 
include creating a charge over assets,357 sale of charged assets,358 and restraint of tax 
defaulters, 359  recovery from third parties, 360  and recovery from agents of non-
residents.361 All these measureas ensure that taxes due are collected. 
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4.1.3 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
In instances where the taxpayer is aggrieved by the notice of assessment issued by the 
Commissioner General, the taxpayer may object that assessment.362 The objection is filed 
with the Commissioner General. Starting at the departmental level has the advantage that 
certain anomalies and errors in the assessment can be rectified easily by the tax authority 
that issued the assessment.363 However, it also creates windows of opportunity for corrupt 
practices. The response to objection may be that no tax is payable. How does or should 
the fiscal authorities guard against abuse of power? The response by TRA has been the 
separation of officials making assessments and officials dealing with objections.364 
In the notice of objection, the taxpayer must indicate the grounds thereof.365 In addition, 
the objection must be supported with the payment of taxes not in dispute or one third of 
the assessed tax, whichever is greater.366 The requirement to make a tax deposit aims at 
preventing tax revenues to be tied up in litigation (which may be vexatious). 367 After 
receiving an objection, the Commissioner General may accept the grounds adduced by 
the taxpayer and amend the assessment accordingly or refuse to amend the assessment.368 
If the Commissioner accepts an objection, he serves a notice of final assessment to the 
objector.369 
Where the Commissioner General refuses to amend the assessment in accordance with 
the objection, the objector is served with a notice of refusal to amend the assessment.370 
If the taxpayer responds, the Commissioner will consider the response and give a decision 
whether to amend the assessment or maintain the previous position. Then, the 
                                                 
362 Section 12(1) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act Cap 408 R.E 2006; and section 51 (1) Tax Administration 
Act 2015. 
363 Gordon Law of Tax Administration and Procedure (1996) 105. 
364 Fjeldstad “Fighting Fiscal Corruption: Lessons from the Tanzania Revenue Authority” (2003) 169.  
365 Section 12(2) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act (Cap 408 R.E 2006.) 
366 Section 12(3) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act. 
367 Gordon Law of Tax Administration and Procedure (1996) 105. 
368 Section 13(1) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act; Section 52(1) of the Tax Administration Act 2015. 
369 Section 13(2) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act; Section 52(3) of the Tax Administration Act 2015. 
370 Section 13(3) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act. 




Commissioner serves the objector with a final assessment together with the notice of 
assessment.371 
A taxpayer aggrieved by the notice of tax assessment issued by the Commissioner 
General (after refusing to accept an objection), may appeal to the Tax Revenue Appeals 
Board (TRAB).372 The TRAB is a quasi-judicial body with jurisdiction to entertain all 
disputes of civil nature arising from the administration of all revenue laws by TRA.373 
The use of the Board avoids the backlog of cases in the conventional courts. The Board 
has its own rules of procedure. All appeals from the Board lie to the Tax Revenue Appeals 
Tribunal (TRAT).374 Similarly, appeals from the decisions of the Tribunal on the point of 
law lie to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania.375 At this stage, there are two corruption risks. 
First, who and how the decision to appeal incase where the TRAB rules in favour of the 
taxpayer is made. Second, there is a possibility of lawyers colluding with taxpayers to 
mishandle the case, such as deliberate failure to adduce strong evidence or call the right 
witnesses.376 
4.2 Administrative Powers 
Generally, the interpretation and enforcement of tax laws requires institutions with 
mandate to assess and collect taxes. 377  Tax administration ensures that tax laws are 
properly enforced and compliance is ensured. 378  To achieve these objectives, these 
institutions must be vested with powers to administer tax laws.  
4.2.1 Powers of the Commissioner General and other Tax Officers 
The law vests the Commissioner General with general powers to administer tax laws. 
These powers include the power to issue private or class rulings which set out the TRA’s 
                                                 
371 Section 13(6) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act Cap 408 R.E 2006;  
372 Other decisions that can be challenged include calculation of refunds, refusal to make any refunds s 
14(1) Tax Revenue Appeals Act Cap 408 R.E 2006; Section 53(1) Tax Administration Act 2015.  
373 Section 7 of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act Cap 408 R.E 2006. 
374 Section 16(4) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act Cap 408 R.E 2006. 
375 Section 25(1) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act Cap 408 R.E 2006. 
376 See Chapter 3 section 3.4.2. 
377 Calder Administering Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: A Handbook (2014) 37. 
378 Holland and Vinn “Income Tax Incentives for Investments” (1996) 988. 




interpretation of tax law affecting a transaction or arrangement sought to be entered by a 
specified private taxpayer or a class of taxpayers.379  The issued rulings, even when 
erroneous or wrong, are binding on the Commissioner. 380 There is the risk that private 
ruling may be in favour of certain taxpayers. This raises the question of the accountability 
of the exercise of the power to issue private tax rulings. 
Furthermore, the Commissioner General has the discretion to make certain decisions 
affecting the interpretation of tax laws. The discretionary powers are incidental to the 
powers to administer tax laws generally. These powers enable the Commissioner (TRA) 
to act without interference or approval from other organs of the State, such as the Ministry 
of Finance.381 For this reason, discretionary powers enable a quick and timely prevention 
of tax avoidance and tax evasion.382 In this regard, the Commissioner General uses best 
judgment or takes actions, which are necessary for the assessment or collection of taxes. 
For example, the Commissioner General has powers to adjust tax assessments,383 remit 
in whole or in part, penalties and interests,384 and to refund of taxes paid in excess.385 
Furthermore, the Commissioner decides which taxpayer should be audited or investigated 
and when such audits should take place.386 In addition, since the Commissioner has 
powers to decide all objections to the tax assessments, he has discretion to settle tax 
disputes amicably and decide the terms thereof. 387  Similarly, the Commissioner has 
discretion whether to litigate a tax dispute or settle it amicably. It is also notable that some 
of powers of the Commissioner General may be delegated to tax officers. 388  
                                                 
379 Section 11(1) of the Tax administration Act 2015; Section 131(1) Income Tax Act 2004. 
380 However, the binding nature of the ruling depends on full disclosure of all material facts by the taxpayer 
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The Commissioner may also compound the offences and order that taxpayer pay the 
money specified.389 The compounding of an offence cannot be done unless the taxpayer 
admits in writing to the offences.390 The law also permits the Commissioner to publicize 
the names of all tax offenders who failed to pay taxes, who are convicted of tax crimes 
and repeat offenders. 391  The publication should indicate their names and addresses, 
offence, time, amount involved or any fine or sentence meted.392  
The vesting of these powers in the Commissioner can be viewed as necessary for 
administration of tax laws. In vesting some powers there is a presumption that in the 
exercise of such powers the Commissioner cannot change or negate the effect of the tax 
laws intended by the legislature.393 However, this may not always be the case. For this 
reason, it is important for the law to provide for safeguards in the exercise of such 
powers.394 
4.2.2 Powers of the Minister to Grant Tax or Royalties Exemptions 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, in Tanzania the rate of royalties and taxes payable 
are fixed in the statutes, thus not subject to negotiations.395 In spite of fixing the rates for 
royalties and taxes in the statutes, different laws permit the Minister to modify or vary 
the tax rates for specific taxpayers.396 The major objective of these powers is to allow the 
Minister, where it seems to be in the interests of the nation, to alter or vary the tax rates, 
without necessarily going through the legislative process.397 
The modification of tax laws takes different forms. First, the Petroleum Act 2015 
delegates power to the Minister of Energy and Minerals, through an order published in 
                                                 
389 Section 92 (1) &16 of the (4) Tax Administration Act 2015. 
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the Gazzette, to amend, alter or vary the rates of royalties.398 Similarly, the Minister of 
Finance has the same discretionary powers under the Stamp Duty Act399 and excise 
duty.400 The effect of these discretionary powers is that the relevant Minister can reduce 
or vary the statutory tax rates. Thus, negating the effect of tax laws. 401 It also means that 
the relevant Minister has powers to to override an Act of Parliament or negate the effect 
of an Act of Parliament. This is referred to as negative delegated legislation.402 
Similarly, the Minister of Finance has power to remit any interests or penalty imposed by 
any law. 403 This power is exercised after consultation with the Commissioner General of 
TRA and the amount remitted cannot exceed 50 percent of the interest payable by that 
person.404 As the Warioba Commission reported, in some instances the Minister abused 
these discretionary powers.405 The case of Mramba & Yona v. R provides another vivid 
example of the abuse of Ministerial powers to grant tax exemptions.406  
The uncontrolled delegation of tax law making powers is problematic. For one, it weakens 
the rule of law as Minister varies laws enacted by the parliament.407 Furthermore, defeats 
the intention of the legislature to impose taxes. It also creates free riders in the society, 
those who enjoy public services at the expense of honest taxpayers. It shifts the burden 
of financing the Government to a section of taxpayers contrary to principle of equity in 
taxation, which requires that taxpayers in the same position should be treated equally.408 
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4.3 Managing Taxpayer’s Non-compliance  
Taxpayers have an obligation to file tax returns timely, reporting a correct tax liability 
and timely payment of taxes due. Failure to discharge these obligations means that 
taxpayers unnecessarily withhold Government’s revenue. For example, late payment of 
taxes implies un-authorized borrowing of Government money.409 To discourage this type 
of conduct and to ensure compliance, all deviations from tax laws, such as late payment, 
under-reporting of tax obligations or failure to file returns, are sanctioned by imposition 
of penalties and fines.410  
These sanctions take different forms. For one, they involve the imposition of 
administrative penalties, as opposed to criminal penalties. There are penalties for the 
failure to file returns within the prescribed time limit,411 failure to produce documents,412 
filing misleading or false statements,413 aiding or abetting tax evasion,414 and failure to 
pay royalties.415. These penalties aim at deterring non-compliant taxpayers as well as 
ensuring compliance. 416 
It also involves criminalization of certain conducts. There are offences, such as the failure 
to pay taxes, 417  using or making false and misleading statements, 418  impeding tax 
                                                 
409 Gordon “Law of Tax Administration and Procedure” (1996) 105. 
410 Sections 75 -80 of the Tax Administration Act 2015. 
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412 10 currency points section 77(2) Tax Administration Act 2015. 
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administration,419 and evading tax or recovering tax.420 The general rule is that where an 
offence is committed by a body corporate, unless where there is proof that there was a 
degree of care or due diligence had been exercised, the manager is deemed to have 
committed that offence.421 Similarly, it involves imposition of interests for understating 
the tax payable422 and the late payment of taxes assessed.423 The imposition of interests 
is aimed at discouraging taxpayers from withholding Government money unnecessarily. 
For this reason, interest rate is usually higher than the lending rates in the market. The 
imposition of high interest rates on unpaid taxes acts as a deterrent factor.424  
4.4 Transmission and Transfer of Revenues Collected 
Before the enactment of the Oil and Gas Revenue Management Act 2015, oil and gas 
revenues were handled like any other Government revenue and receipts.425 However, the 
Oil and Gas Revenue Management Act 2015 establishes the Oil and Gas Fund.426 The 
Fund aims at ensuring transparency and accountability in the collection, allocation and 
spending of oil and gas revenues. 427 It also aims to ensure the revenues are applied for 
sustainable development of the oil and gas industry and for the benefit of the present and 
future generations.428 The Fund is divided into the Revenue Holding Account and the 
Revenue Saving Account.429 The revenue streams flowing into the Revenue Holding 
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Account include royalties, Government profit share, taxes, dividends from NOC for 
Government’s equity interests, signature bonus, training fees, rental fees and any other 
revenue that may be specified by the Minister.430  
TPDC retains all the surface rentals, signature bonuses and training fees (under 
supervision by Treasury Registrar).431 The Act requires all the collection, deposit and 
disbursement of oil and gas revenues into the Fund to be done in a transparent and 
accountable way. 432 The records of oil and gas revenues and expenditure must be 
published by the Minister in the Gazette.433 Public information must also be published 
online on the website of the Government and Ministry of finance.434 The records of 
revenue and expenditure are subject to parliamentary scrutiny.435 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter evaluated the Tanzania oil and gas fiscal regime applicable to the upstream 
sector. The discussions demonstrate that the Tanzanian fiscal regime is line with the 
elements of PSA. 436  The fiscal instruments include royalties, profit-based taxes, 
production sharing arrangement, Government equity participation as well as the indirect 
taxes. The chapter also discussed the tax administration system as well as the tax 
incentives. The elements of tax administration highlighted include grant of rights, 
negotiation of fiscal terms, enforcement and revenue collection. The discussions in this 
chapter have also raised a number of issues in relation to tax revenue leakage. Several 
gaps exist in the Tanzania tax system that may permit leakage of tax revenues. The next 
chapter discusses, in line with remedial measure identified under chapter 4, the different 
mechanisms adopted by the Government of Tanzania to counteract tax revenue leakage. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CRITICAL EVALUATION AND 
ANALYSIS OF MECHANISMS ADDRESSING TAX 
REVENUE LEAKAGE IN TANZANIA 
 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted how Government revenue is created from the oil and 
gas industry in Tanzania. In doing so, the chapter has also identified the potential risks 
for leakage of tax revenues, such as tax evasion, tax incentives, tax avoidance and fiscal 
corruption. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are certain factors, such as discretionary 
powers and lack of oversight mechanisms that open the window of opportunity for corrupt 
practices.1 In the same vein, the low probability for detection, lenient punishment and 
potential benefits from corrupt transactions entice Government officials to engage in 
corrupt practices.2  
Moreover, the existence of loopholes and gaps in the tax system facilitates tax avoidance 
and tax evasion. 3  Furthermore, the knowledge gap between the International Oil 
Companies and the Government officials makes it easy for the IOCs to evade or avoid 
taxes without being detected or punished.4 In view of these factors facilitating tax revenue 
leakage, chapter 4 developed the remedial measures to include anti-corruption measures 
that close the windows of opportunity for corrupt practices and remove incentives for 
corruption.5 The other remedial measure entails anti-tax avoidance legislation that closes 
gaps and loopholes in the tax system, criminalizes tax evasion and enhances 
administrative capacity to detect, prevent and punish tax avoidance and tax evasion.6 This 
chapter applies the remedial measures developed under Chapter 4 as a benchmark to 
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examine and evaluate measures adopted by the Government of Tanzania to address and 
remedy tax revenue leakage. The next section examines the anti-corruption regime. 
2 Anti-corruption Regime 
In Tanzania, like any other developing country, corruption is not a new phenomenon.7 
This is not surprising because corruption itself is as old as human civilization.8 The first 
anti-corruption regime in Tanzania was instilled during the British colonial rule in 1930.9 
This structure was retained, with minor modifications, by the independent Government 
in 1961.10 Since its independence from the British colonial rule, Tanzania has had several 
anti-corruption measures. These measures include the enactment of the anti-corruption 
laws as well as establishment of the anti-corruption agency.11 Despite these initiatives, 
corruption continues to strive in the country.12  
In order to contain rampant corruption in the public sector, the Government of Tanzania 
formed a Presidential Commission of inquiry into corruption matters in 1996 (“Warioba 
Commission”).13 The Warioba Commission was tasked to identify the typologies, causes 
and sources of corruption and suggest the corresponding remedial measures.14  In its 
report, the Commission demonstrated how public servants and political leaders solicited 
and accepted bribes, received presents and commissions for brokering deals between the 
Government and their allies.15 The report further revealed that tax assessors solicited and 
accepted bribes during tax assessments, while officials in the Ministry of Finance granted 
                                                 
7 For example, the corruption perception index ranks Tanzania as number 116 out of the 176 countries in 
terms of perceived corrupt practices. See Corruption perception index 2016 available at 
www.transparency.org (accessed on 10 March 2017) 
8  Tanzi, V Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures (Washington 
International Monetary Fund 1998) 559. 
9  Prevention of Corruption Ordinance 1930 and amended in 1958. See 
http://www.pccb.go.tz/index.php/about-pccb/historical-background (accessed on 20 February 2017) 
10 PCCB “Historical background” (2017). 
11 See PCCB “Historical background” available at http://www.pccb.go.tz/index.php/about-pccb/historical-
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13 The United Republic of Tanzania the Presidential Commission of Inquiry against Corruption (referred 
to as the Warioba Commission) Report (1996) 78-79.  
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tax exemptions illegally and helped taxpayers to evade taxes.16 Similarly, the officials at 
the Ministry of Energy and Minerals accepted bribes before granting mineral rights or 
they underestimated the value of mineral exports.17 The report further revealed that the 
corrupt officials in the office of the Attorney General signed contracts against the national 
interests or gave legal opinion in favour of those giving bribes.18  
As regards to the causes of corruption, the Commission reported that pervasive corruption 
thrived in the country due unchecked discretionary powers, low probability for detection 
and lenient punishment for corrupt practices. 19  To address corruption, the Warioba 
Commission recommended the enhancement of checks on the exercise of public powers, 
criminalization of all corrupt practices as well as the enhancement of the institutions for 
prevention, detection and punishment of corrupt practices. 20 These recommendations 
culminated into the establishment of a Ministry of State for Good Governance in 1997, 
adoption of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP) in 1999 
and later the enactment of the Prevention of Combating of Corruption Act in 2007.21 One 
of the notable features of the Act is that it increased the number of offences from 5 to 
25.22 It also noteworthy that Tanzania has signed and ratified the UN Convention against 
Corruption,23 the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption24 and the 
SADC Protocol against Corruption.25 The next section examines how the anti-corruption 
measures, as suggested by the Warioba Commission, apply to the oil and gas industry. 
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2.1 Criminalizing and Sanctioning Corrupt Practices 
The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act is general anti-corruption framework 
law. 26  The Act aims at enhancing and promoting good governance and eliminating 
corruption. In doing so, the Act criminalizes corrupt transactions, such as soliciting, 
accepting or attempting to obtain any advantage as an inducement to discharge public 
duty.27 Similarly, a person who gives, or promises to give any advantage to a public 
official is liable for the offence of involvement in corrupt transaction.28 In addition, the 
Act makes it an offence for public officials to live above the lawful income or to own 
properties that are disproportionate to lawful income.29 In this regard, public servants are 
obliged to declare their status of wealth and debts every year.30  
There other laws, in addition to the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act, such 
as the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act imposes an obligation on public leaders to 
act with honesty, sobriety and uphold highest possible ethical standards.31 In doing so, 
the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act criminalizes misuse of public power for 
personal gains, misappropriation of public funds and negligence in discharge of public 
duties.32 Likewise, the Public Procurement Act criminalizes bribery. 33  
Furthermore, the Tax Administration Act 2015 makes it an offence for tax officers to ask 
for or take any payment in order to facilitate any act or thing that is meant to defraud the 
Government of any tax related benefit or payment of tax.34 This offence attracts a fine or 
imprisonment of not less than 1 year or 5 years or both.35 Likewise, the Petroleum Act 
2015 makes it an offence for all public officers in charge of the oil and gas industry to 
                                                 
26 Chapter 329 of the Laws of Tanzania (Revised Edition 2002); Preceded by the Prevention of Corruption 
Act (PCA) Cap 329 (RE 2002 
27 Section 15(1) (a) of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act. 
28 Section 15(1)(b) of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act. 
29 Section 27(1)(a)&(b) of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act. 
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31 Section 6(a), Under section 4 of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act (Cap 398), public leaders 
include the Commissioners for tax at the Tanzania Revenue Authority, Ministers, Directors of parastatals 
such as TPDC. 
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33 Section 83 of the Public Procurement Act 2011. 
34 Section 87(1) (a)&(b) of the Tax Administration Act 2015 200 currency points. 
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acquire an interest in a license for petroleum operations.36 It also prohibits acquiring 
economic interest, participating interests or shares in any entity carrying on operations in 
Tanzania or economic interests or participating interest in a body corporate that provide 
goods or services to a license holder.37 These offences are punishable by a fine of 50 
million shillings or 5 years imprisonment or both. 38 In addition, there is a duty on the 
IOC to adopt, according to the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act, anti-bribery 
and anti-corruption policies and measures in its corporate organization.39 These measures 
include prohibition of payments, gifts, promises or advantage to any public official, 
political parties and candidates for office.40 
The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), as its name suggest, is the 
lead institution in the prevention and combating of corruption in Tanzania.41 The major 
function of the PCCB is to prevent and combat corruption in public sector.42 In doing so, 
PCCB has power to investigate, and subject to approval from the Director of Public 
Prosecution (DPP), prosecute corruption-related offences. 43  In the discharge of its 
functions, PCCB has powers to request public officials to give account of their public 
property.44  
Moreover, the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act establishes the Ethics Secretariat.45 
The Secretariat has three duties namely receiving and verifying declarations made by 
public leaders, receiving complaints from the public regarding breach of the Code and 
making inquiries into suspected breach of the Code.46 Another notable development is 
the establishment of the Corruption and Economic Crimes Division of the High Court 
                                                 
36 Section 249 of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
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which is a clear indication of Government’s seriousness to deal with corruption.47 This 
special division has jurisdiction over corruption and economic offences where the value 
of money involved is more than one billion shillings.48 The offences covered include 
misappropriation of the proceeds of the ‘Oil and Gas Fund’, 49  refusal to produce 
documents or providing false information to PURA or the Tanzania Extractive Industries 
(Transparency and Accountability) Committee.50 It is expected that the court will be able 
to dispose of grand corruption cases expeditiously.51  
2.2 Transparency 
Generally, corruption thrives where secrecy is formalized in the conduct of public 
affairs.52 Secrecy or opacity makes it easy for unscrupulous officials to engage in corrupt 
practices without being detected or punished.53 For this reason, one of the measures to 
prevent and alleviate corruption is to enhance transparency in public sector. Transparency 
has the potential to limit abuse of power and corrupt practices as it empowers citizens to 
hold their Government to account and monitor the conduct of IOCs to ensure compliance 
with the law.54 Transparency also enhances the right to access to information.55 In this 
regard, the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act 2015 
deals with transparency in the extractive industry. 56  
                                                 
47 Section 3 of the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act, (Cap. 200) as amended by s 6 of the Written 
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48 Section 3(a)&(b)3(3) of the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act. 
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Organised Crime Control Act. 
51 Objectives of establishing the special division of the court. 
52 See Chapter 4 section 2.2.1. 
53 See Chapter 4 section 2.2.1. 
54 Veit, PG. and Excell, C “Access to Information and Transparency Provisions in Petroleum Laws in 
Africa: A Comparative Analysis” in Grant, JA, Nadège Compaoré, W.R., and Mitchell, M. I. (ed) New 
Approaches to the Governance of Natural Resources: Insights from Africa (New York, Palgrave Macmillan 
2015) 86. 
55 UDHR article 19, African Charter article 9 and The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
in Africa (Article IV[1]). 
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In addition, there is general obligation to ensure that all regulatory and taxation functions 
in the oil and gas industry are conducted in a transparent and accountable manner.57 This 
obligation applies also to the Minister of Energy and Minerals who has a duty to ensure 
the sustainability of transparency in the industry.58 Moreover, the Petroleum Act 2015 
requires that the process of entering into PSAs must be transparent and through a 
competitive tendering process.59 The invitations for tender must be published widely in 
Newspapers of wide circulation. 60  Similarly, the grant of tax incentives must be 
publicized in the Government gazette.61  
In addition, it imposes a duty on the Government to collect, maintain and disseminate 
information.62 A similar duty is imposed on IOCs to keep records and where necessary 
transmit the same to the Government.63 In this regard, PURA is obliged to establish and 
maintain a registry of all oil and gas agreements, licenses, permit authorization and their 
respective change in interests. 64  The registry is required to contain updated records 
pertaining to the PSA, such as status of applications for grant of rights, tax exemptions 
and incentives, transfers of rights, beneficial owners, work program and financial 
commitments.65  
In addition, it sets up the mechanisms for disclosure and dissemination of information. 
Specifically, under the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) 
Act 2015, all agreements, including PSAs signed in the past, are required to be 
disclosed.66  The first form of disclosure entails the publication, by the Minister, on 
                                                 
57 Section 5(1)(f)) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
58 Section 5(1)(f)) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
59 Sections 48(1), 84 & 91; This information includes details of all agreements, licenses and permits in their 
current form, exemptions, variations or suspension of conditions of license, the assignment and approved 
arrangement in respect of a license and permits. Section 91 (1)(a) (b)&(c) (d) Section 48(1), the Minister is 
required to make Regulations providing for guidelines on the conduct of the tendering process 
section.48(4). 
60 Section 48(2) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
61 Section 16 of the Stamp Duty Act, section 113(4) of the Petroleum Act 2015, section 128 of the Excise 
(Management and Tariff) Act (Cap 147) and section 10 of the Income Tax Act 
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63 Section 89 of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
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website or wide circulating media, all concessions, contracts and licenses relating to 
extractive industry companies.67 It may also contain information about individual names 
and shareholders who own interests in the extractive industry companies.68 The other 
form of disclosure entails information that is kept confidential but can be accessed by the 
citizens upon an application and payment of prescribed fees.69 Similarly, the Oil and Gas 
Fund, requires that all the records of oil and gas revenues (collection, deposit and 
disbursement of oil and gas revenues) 70  must be published simultaneously in the 
Government gazette71 as well as on the website of the Government and Ministry of 
finance. 72  The publication of the revenues accruing to the Government from the 
extraction of oil and gas resources, limits opportunities for corruption or collusion by tax 
administrators and the oil companies.73 Publication also makes it easier for the public to 
demand sustainable management and fair distribution of the revenues.74 
Moreover, the law establishes the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and 
Accountability) Committee (TEITI). 75  The major function of the Committee is to 
investigate, reconcile and publish of all tax payments made by the IOCs and the 
corresponding revenue receipts by Government entities. 76  The TEITI Committee is 
obliged to publish the independent reconciler report.77 The TEITI Committee has an 
obligation to liase with the Minister of Energy and Minerals to ensure the publication, in 
                                                 
67 Section 16(a) of the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act, 2015. 
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69 Section 91 (1) (2) of the Petroleum Act 2015.  
70 Section 18(1),(2)&(3) of the Oil and Gas Revenues Management the rules of Public Finance apply and 
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71 section 18(4) of the Oil and Gas Revenues Management Act, 2015. 
72 Section 18(5) of the Oil and Gas Revenues Management Act. 
73 African Development Bank Oil and Gas in Africa (2009) 112-13. 
74 African Development Bank Oil and Gas in Africa (2009) 112-13. 
75 Section 4(1) of the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act, 2015. 
76 Section 10(2) (e) (f) (h) of The Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act, 
2015. 
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a website or media with the widest circulation, all PSAs as well as the beneficial 
ownership of all extractive companies.78 
It is also notable that the Act classifies certain information as confidential, which can only 
be accessed after mutual consent; there is no criteria for such exclusion.79 The only 
exception is when the TEITI Committee decides that certain information, which is 
confidential, should not be disclosed.80  Furthermore, the Whistleblower and Witness 
Protection Act 2015 obliges the Government to protect whistleblowers and witnesses who 
disclose information for public good. 81  In addition, the Act requires the State to 
investigate and take measures to remedy any wrongdoing that has been reported.82 The 
Act creates a mechanism where good citizens may report any wrongdoing in the public 
sectors. The issues covered include where any public official has broken the law or likely 
to break the law83 or where in a public institution there is misappropriation, squander of 
public resource or abuse of office.84 Such disclosure may be made in orally, in writing or 
sign language.85 This enhances transparency and accountability. 
2.3 Oversight Mechanisms 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the fiscal regime establishes institutions mandated to deal with 
granting of licenses, participation in the industry, regulating the industry, and revenue 
collection and management. In the discharge of their functions, officials in these 
institutions have wide powers, such as granting extraction rights, negotiating PSAs, 
granting tax exemptions or waiving the payment of royalties, assessing and collecting 
taxes, remitting of penalties and interests.86 Moreover, these Government officials are 
obliged to enhance public scrutiny,87 make decisions according to the law, in the interests 
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80 Section 27(2) of the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act, 2015. 
81 Section 9 of the Whistleblower and Witness Protection Act, 2015. 
82 Section 8 of the Whistleblower and Witness Protection Act, 2015. 
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87 Section 6(b) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act (Chapter 398 Revised Edition 2002). 




of the public.88 However, there is no guarantee that these officials will adhere to the law. 
In fact, there are several instances where Government officials have deviated from the 
law. 89  For instance, the Warioba Commission indicated that there was abuse of 
ministerial powers to grant tax exemptions.90 The report noted that tax exemptions were 
granted illegally to non-qualifying firms or more items were tax-exempt than needed.91 
The exemptions granted were also not easily verifiable thus opening up a window for 
investors to misuse such exemptions. 92 The report concluded that although the aim of tax 
incentives was attracting investments, evidence showed that investors abused the 
privilege.93 In addition, the Mramba’s case is another example of abuse of power when 
granting tax exemptions.94 
To control the exercise of power, there are several mechanisms for checks and balance. 
Particularly, the Presidential Oil and Gas Advisory Bureau advise the Cabinet on all 
strategic matters pertaining to the management of an oil and gas economy. 95  In the 
discharge of his duties in respect of strategic investment decisions, the Minister for 
Energy and Minerals must seek guidance and directives from the Cabinet.96  
In addition, the Petroleum Act 2015, unlike its predecessor the Petroleum (Exploration 
and Production) Act 1980, curtails the discretionary powers of the Minister of Energy and 
Minerals to sign oil and gas agreements (PSAs). 97  Currently, all the oil and gas 
agreements are firstly negotiated by the Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority 
(PURA), approved by the cabinet before being signed by the Minister for Energy and 
Minerals.98 Furthermore, the most recent amendments to the Petroleum Act 2015, the 
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89 See the case of Mramba & Yona v R, High Court of Tanzania, Consolidated Criminal Appeals No. 96 & 
113 of 2015. 
90  The Warioba Commission Report (1996) 307 see also Florens Luoga “Taxation in the Advent of 
Democratisation and Transition to Free Market Economy in Tanzania and Concerns on the Rule of Law 
and Human Rights’ Law, Social Justice & GlobalDevelopment Journal (LGD) (1) (2002) at 19. 
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93 The Warioba Commission (1996) 307-308. 
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96 Section 5(2)& 5(3(a) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
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PSAs now require the approval of the National Assembly before becoming effective.99 
This new requirement is inline with the practice in other, such as Kenya and Ghana that 
require ratification of any contract or concession granting licence to explore natural 
resources.100 Moreover, the Petroleum Act sets the rate of royalties in the law unlike its 
predecessor, the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 1980, under which the rate 
of royalty was negotiable.101 
Similarly, the National Assembly has powers to review both existing and future PSAs.102 
In this regard, all newly signed PSAs must be reported to National Assembly within 6 
days of the next sitting.103 Further to that, where the National Assembly reviews the 
existing PSAs, and if finds them containing unconscionable terms may pass a resolution 
directing the Government to review such PSAs.104 Subsequently, the Government issues 
a 30 days’ notice to the IOC of intention to review the identified unconscionable terms.105 
The law requires such negotiations to be concluded within 90 days unless the Government 
grants a further extension. 106  In the event that no consensus is reached, such 
unconscionable terms will be expunged by operation of the law. 107  In addition, the 
Minister for Justice and Constitutional affairs has been give powers to make regulations 
prescribing the parameters of negotiations of PSA as well as the code of conduct for 
members of Government negotiation team.108 These regulations, once promulgated, will 
have the potential to curtail the discretionary powers of the members of the Government 
negotiation team and thus close down the window of opportunity for corrupt practices.109 
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101 Section 113(1) read together with the second schedule to the Petroleum Act 2015. See Table 1.2 shows 
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The Minister of Finance’s power to remit any interests or penalty imposed by any law, 
exercised after consultation with the Commissioner General of TRA and the amount 
remitted cannot exceed 50% of the interest payable by that person.110 Similarly, the 
Ministerial power to grant tax exemptions under section 10 or to vary an exemption to 
reduce person’s tax liability or remit tax under section 125 of the Income Tax, shall be 
exercise only with approval of the cabinet and for purposes of alleviating effects of an 
emergence.111 In this regard, the law is not only very particular on the criteria for grant of 
tax exemptions under the Income Tax Act 2004 but also requires approval of such 
exemptions by the cabinet. 
Similarly, the Value Added Tax Act 2014 has taken away the Ministerial powers to grant 
exemption from payment of VAT.112 Because of this enactment, the only exemptions 
available to the IOCs are the ones specified in VAT Act. 113 Moreover, the VAT Act 2014 
specifies that the Minister of Finance may only grant VAT exemptions only in respect of 
imports by the Government or the supply of goods to the Government used to provide 
reliefs to a community plagued by a natural calamity or disaster. 114 
The Minister of Minerals and Energy is required, in every financial year, to provide the 
National Assembly with a report on the implementation of activities under the Petroleum 
Act 2015.115 Similarly, the records of the revenue and expenditure of the oil and gas fund 
are subject to annual parliamentary scrutiny.116  In addition, the Petroleum Act 2015 
separates between regulatory and commercial functions. While the TPDC deals with 
commercial aspects, the PURA is a regulatory body. This prevents potential conflict of 
interests where the TPDC acted as both the regulator and the partner in oil and gas 
operations.117 
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The EITI Committee, was established with a mandate to reconcile the payments, made 
by the IOCs and received by the Government. In the discharge of its functions, the 
Committee has power to call for information and records from both the IOCs and the 
Government entities. 118  The Committee may contract an independent and reputable 
accounting firm to reconcile and verify payments made by extractive industry companies 
and revenues received by the Government. 119  In the event that discrepancies are 
discovered by the reconciler, the report is forwarded to the Controller and Auditor 
General who will conduct an investigation, before publishing the results.120 This prevents 
diversion of collected revenues by the Government officials. 
3 Anti-tax Avoidance Legislation 
Generally, IOCs main objective is profit making. This motivates IOCs to utilize every 
available opportunity to reduce or eliminate their tax liabilities. To achieve this objective, 
the IOCs devise different techniques, such as transfer pricing, thin capitalization, 
corporate reorganization, treaty shopping and controlled foreign corporations to avoid 
taxes.121  
The threat for tax avoidance in Tanzania is real. For one, there are several reported 
incidences of tax avoidance schemes in the extractive industry. 122  For instance in 
Commissioner General TRA v Pan African Energy Tz Ltd123 the Court of Appeal of 
Tanzania held that since the law is silent on the charging of withholding tax for services 
rendered outside Tanzania by non-resident, the court too, cannot create such a tax 
obligation.124 The Court further held that, even though this lacuna may create room or 
leeway for tax evasion, it is not for the Court to fill the gap; instead, the solution is to 
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amend the law.125 Because of this lacuna, the Government could not collect the taxes 
assessed amounting to 3.6 billion shillings.126  
Similarly, in African Barrick Gold Plc v. Commmissioner General TRA 127 , the tax 
Tribunal held that the Mining Company had engaged in tax avoidance scheme. The facts 
of this case showed that African Barrick Gold Plc, a company incorporated and has HQ 
in London, has three subsidiary companies conducting mining operations in Tanzania.128 
Although the tax returns of the three subsidiaries in Tanzania showed loss making, in 
Initial Public Offer (IPO) document in London indicated that ABG had generated from 
income from its Tanzanian subsidiaries and declared dividends to its shareholders back-
to-back for four years 2010,2011,2012 and 2014 amounting to U$D 818,431,285. The 
Tribunal held that African Barrick Gold Plc was liable to pay withholding taxes 
amounting to $41,250,426 in respect of dividends paid to shareholders abroad.  
Furthermore, in the most recent scenario, the Royal Dutch Shell acquired 60 percent stake 
in British Gas (BG) Group in a deal worth $ 55 billion. 129  The Tanzania Revenue 
Authority subjected this transaction to capital gains tax amounting to $ 502 million. 
However, BG group argues that no capital gains were realized.130 TRA issued a garnishee 
order to freeze the BG Group’s accounts.131 The BG Group is disputing this assessment 
and the case is now pending before the Tax Revenue Appeals Boards.132  
Another cause of concern is that, Mauritius, which is characterized as a tax haven, is the 
third country sending FDI to Tanzania.133 Further to that, IOCs in Tanzania, such as Ophir 
Energy Plc Group of Companies has 86 subsidiaries all over the world of which 22 are 
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127 Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal Appeal No. 16 of 2015. 
128 Bulyanhulu Gold, North Mara, Pangea Minerals Ltd ( Tulawaka and Buzwagi Gold Mines). 
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132 BG Tanzania Ltd v Commissioner General TRA, Tanzania Tax Revenue Appeals Board Application no. 
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incorporated in Jersey, 13 in British Virgin Island, 3 in Bermuda and 3 in Delaware.134 
This increases the possibility that some of the IOCs may use tax havens as conduit for tax 
avoidance.135 As indicated under Chapter 4 of this study one of the remedies for tax 
avoidance is, through legislation, closing the gaps and loopholes in the tax system.136 The 
next section examines the anti-tax avoidance legislation adopted in Tanzania. 
3.1 Specific Anti-Tax Avoidance Rules (SAAR) 
As the names suggests SAAR, unlike GAAR, addresses specific “known” schemes of tax 
avoidance. Therefore, the application of the rules are limited and the tax authority does 
not have discretionary powers.137 The following section highlights the SAAR provisions 
in the Tanzania oil and gas tax regime. 
3.1.1 Arm’s Length Principle (ALP) 
Tanzania has adopted the arm’s length principle as per standards set by the OECD and 
UN Model Tax Conventions.138 The general provision dealing with transfer pricing is 
section 33 of the Income Tax Act 2004 and is complemented by the Transfer pricing 
Regulations.139 In case of any gaps in the Regulations, then both the OECD and UN 
guidelines apply. Under section 33 of the Income Tax Act 2004 and the Transfer Pricing 
Regulations, all commercial or financial transaction between associated entities must take 
place on the same terms as if such transaction had taken place between independent 
persons.140 For this reason, the arrangements between separate petroleum rights including 
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2016-Web.pdf (accessed on 01 August 2017) 
135 See the detailed discussion on tax avoidance techniques under Chapter 3 section 3.2. 
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politika/assets/gaar-general-anti-avoidance-rule-en.pdf  
138 Msike, C and Mabula E “UN-ATAF Workshop on Transfer Pricing Madagascar Tanzania Case Study” 
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content/uploads/2016/11/2016TP_Tanzania_CountryPresentation-en.pdf (accessed on 15 September 2016) 
139 Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations, G.N 27 of 2014 
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as if such transaction had taken place between independent persons under comparable conditions and 
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the segments (Upstream, midstream or downstream) operated by an IOC as are treated as 
though are conducted by associated persons.141  
There is also a general obligation for taxpayers, when dealing with associated persons, to 
quantify, apportion and allocate amounts to be included or deducted in calculating income 
in accordance with the arm’s length principle.142 For example, intragroup transactions on 
intellectual property rights must demonstrate that they confer economic benefit or 
commercial value to the business and that the price charged is at arm’ length.143 Similarly, 
the charge for intra-group service must be justifiable and in accordance with arm’s length 
principle.144 In addition, where the IOC intends to enter an advanced price arrangement, 
such IOC must apply to the Commissioner to ascertain whether such arrangement 
complies with arm’s length principle.145 Moreover, the Petroleum Act 2015 requires the 
price of oil and gas products for purposes of establishing the royalties payable must be at 
arm’s length and in conformity with international best practices.146 
Where the Commissioner is of the view that a transaction between associate persons is 
not at arm’s length, adjustments can be made to reflect the arm’s length principle.147 
Similarly, contravening of the transfer pricing regulations is a criminal offence with a 
penalty of 100 percent penalty of the tax underpaid. 148  
3.1.2 Ring fencing Rules 
Given the capital-intense nature of the oil and gas industry, allowing expenditures from 
one contract area to be deducted against income from another contract area may lead to 
                                                 
141 Section 65K (5)(a)-(c) of the Income Tax Act ( Cap 332). 
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Tax (Transfer Pricing Regulations) 2014. 
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145 Regulation 12 of the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing Regulations) 2014. 
146 Section 165(1) of the Petroleum Act 2015. 
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tax base erosion.149 Therefore, ring fencing is the isolation of taxable operations owned 
by one entity for tax purposes.150 The ring-fencing rule restricts losses incurred in the 
loss-making contract area to be offset against the profit-making contract area.151 If one 
IOC owns two or more oil and gas operations, each of these operations is treated as 
separate and independent of each other.152 Therefore, for purposes of establishing the tax 
liability of the IOC, costs, income and loss from one operation (petroleum right) cannot 
be combined with those of other operations.153 In fact, under the Income Tax Act 2004, 
each petroleum right (exploration or development license) constitutes a separate 
petroleum operation.154 In that regard, each petroleum rights is treated as a business for 
exploration, development and delivery points identified in the PSA.155 
In addition, the Income Tax Act 2004 requires the license holder and contractor holding 
more than one license to ring fence the recoverable contract expenses.156 Expenses are 
recoverable from the revenues in so long as they relate to the contract areas from which 
such revenue has been derived.157 Costs incurred by the license holder and contractor 
(integrated project) in respect of construction and operation of midstream facilities 
(processing, liquefaction, storage and loading facilities) do not form part of recoverable 
expenses under the PSAs.158  
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3.1.3 Rules on Realization of Petroleum Right 
Generally, the transfer of rights, irrespective of the beneficiary type of transaction, is 
subject to capital gains tax.159 Section 56 of Income Tax Act 2004 provides where the 
underlying ownership of a resident company or permanent establishment changes by 
more than 50 percent is deemed to have realized an asset and subject to capital gains tax. 
For this reason, section 56 is an anti-tax avoidance provision targeting IOCs selling shares 
through holding companies abroad.160 It is also refered as a deeming provision under 
which a resident is deemed to have realized an asset immediately before change of control 
in the asset.161 Similarly, the Petroleum Act imposes an obligation on the IOC to pay 
capital gains in respect of any profit made out of any direct or indirect assignment, transfer 
or any other disposal of rights under the PSAs regardless of the beneficiary type of 
transaction.162 To ensure that capital gain tax is paid, any transfer of interest will only be 
valid if approved by the Minister (TPDC) and endorsed by the Commissioner for Income 
Tax certifying that tax has been paid or no tax is payable.163 
3.1.4 Anti-treaty Shopping Rules 
In Tanzania, an IOC wanting to enjoy the benefits of double taxation treaties to which 
Tanzania is a party, must fulfill three requirements.164 First, the IOC must qualify as a 
resident of the other contracting State.165 This requirement addresses those IOCs, which 
do not have any physical presence in the other contracting State, but want to benefit from 
the tax treaties. 166  Second, even where residence in the other contracting State is 
established, at least 50 percent of underlying ownership of the IOC must be held by 
individuals who are resident of the other contracting State.167 This provision aims at 
counteracting abusive application of the provision of double taxation treaties. For 
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instance, some of the IOCs just form a conduit company in the contracting State just for 
the sake of benefitting from the provisions of double taxation treaties.168 Third, the IOCs 
must not be benefitting from other forms of reliefs in the country of residence or in 
another tax haven.169 The enforcement of these rules is hindered by the existence of some 
tax havens, which are not willing to share tax-related information with other countries.170 
3.1.5 Limits on Debt Financing 
The financiers who provide financing for petroleum activities are considered as sub-
contractors, and are thus subject to payment of withholding taxes in respect of interests 
received on loans. 171 Furthermore, there is a requirement that loans from non-resident 
financier should not exceed the domestic lending rates.172 To ensure implementation of 
this rule, PURA reviews and approves the amount and percentage of loans to be used in 
oil and gas operations. In doing so, PURA determines the debt-equity ratio for financing 
any oil and gas project.173  
The debt-to-equity-ratio as proposed by PURA must be designed according to financing 
regulations and must be aligned to tax laws. 174  The concept of debt-to-equity-ratio, 
introduced in 2010, provides that the total amount of interest that an entity may deduct 
for the year of income should not exceed the sum of interest equivalent to debt-to-equity 
ratio of 7 to 3.175 Under this rule, the IOC’s debt should not exceed 70 percent of its 
operating capital. Any interest expense on the amount in excess of 70 percent is not tax-
deductible.176  
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Similarly, all arrangements for debt financing must be approved by PURA. 177  The 
approval requirement is mandatory, and where there is non-compliance all costs in respect 
of unapproved loans are not allowable or deductible expenses for tax purposes.178 In 
addition, where the loan comes from the related party, the IOC has the duty to prove that 
the interests charged are at arm’s length and the interests charged thereon does not exceed 
lowest domestic lending rates.179  Moreover, where the Commissioner General has a 
reason to believe that any rate of interests imposed is not at arm’s length, the 
Commissioner General may make adjustments by imputing the interest rate.180  
3.2 General Anti-Tax Avoidance Rules (GAAR) 
Where the Commissioner is of the view that there exists a scheme by the taxpayer that is 
intended solely for obtaining undue tax benefit, may subject that scheme to tax assessment 
as if no such scheme exists.181 The decision by the Commissioner is deemed to be an 
assessment as per the tax laws, and accordingly becomes payable immediately. 182 
Furthermore, the law vests the Commissioner with powers to adjust the company’s tax 
returns if he is satisfied (of the opinion) that the taxpayer has engaged in a tax avoidance 
scheme. If no adjustments are made, an enormous sum of money will be lost in the hands 
of a taxpayer. The Commissioner invokes these powers to counteract any tax avoidance 
or reduction. It restores the taxpayer to the original position as if no tax avoidance 
existed.183 This general anti-tax abuse provision under section 35 has been applied with 
approval of the Tribunal in the case of Tanzania Leaf Tobacco.184 
In addition, where the Commissioner is of the view that a transaction between associated 
persons is not at arm’s length, adjustments can be made to reflect the arm’s length 
principle. These adjustments may entail re-characterization of the source or type of any 
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income, loss, amount or payment, reapportionment and reallocation of claimed 
expenditures.185 Contravening of the transfer pricing regulations is a criminal offence 
with a penalty of 100 percent penalty of the tax underpaid. 186  Similarly, the 
Commissioner General for TRA, if he has a reason to believe that any price including the 
rate of interests imposed is not at arm’s length, the Commissioner General may make 
adjustments by imputing the interest rate or adjusting the price. 187  
4 Criminalization of Tax Evasion 
In addition, the IOCs may engage in outright criminal conduct, such as non-declaration 
of income, forgery, under-invoicing and double accounting. These types of conducts 
amount to tax evasion. Tax evasion is a criminal offence liable to criminal prosecution.188 
Tax evasion is classified under three heads. First, it relates to evasion of assessment. The 
evasion of assessment involves conducts that aim at defeating a tax assessment. It 
includes offenses, such as using or making false and misleading statements.189 It also 
covers the offence of aiding or abetting tax evasion.190 This covers professionals, such as 
lawyers, accountants and engineers who, in the course of their professional duties, may 
aid tax evasion. 191  There are also general offences under the Penal Code, such as 
forgery,192 conspiracy to commit an offence193 and cheating.194 The second head relates 
to evasion of payment, which entails offences, such as the failure to pay taxes.195 Third, 
                                                 
185 Sections 33 (2)(a)&(b) 71(2) of the Income Tax Act; Regulation 4(2) The Income Tax (Transfer Pricing 
Regulations) 2014, G.N 27 of 2014. 
186 Regulation 4(5) of the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing Regulations) 2014. 
187 Regulation 14 of the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing Regulations) 2014. 
188 Failure to comply with tax law provided for is an offence under section 82 of the Tax Administration 
Act 2015. 
189 if undetected leading to underpayment of tax, attracts a penalty of less than 50 currency points and not 
more than 200 currency points, 1 year or 2 years or both section 84 (3) (a-b) Tax Administration Act 2015. 
See also section 234 (b)  of the Petroleum Act 20m or 5 years or both 
190 Section 89 of the Tax Administration Act 2015. 
191 Section 89 of the Tax Administration Act 2015. 
192 Section 333 of the Penal Code (Cap.16 R.E 2002). 
193 Sections 384-386 of the Penal Code. 
194 Section 304 of the Penal Code. 
195 Attracts a fine (if the tax exceeds 50 currency points) , of not less than half the amount and not more 
than 100 currency points or imprisonment not less than 3 months not more than 6. Section 83 of the Tax 
Administration Act 2015 (Act No. 10 of 2015). 




evasion relates to impeding the tax administration,196  and evading tax or recovering 
tax.197 Generally, where an offence is committed by a body corporate, unless where there 
is proof that there was a degree of care or due diligence had been exercised, the manager 
is deemed to have committed that offence.198 
The Tanzania Revenue Authority has a special unit namely the Department of Tax 
Investigations. The Department deals with criminal tax investigation, gathering of 
evidence, in-depth tax audits to uncover tax evasion schemes. If the Department of Tax 
Investigations, is satisfied that a tax crime has been committed, it will recommend 
prosecution to the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP). In Tanzania, all public 
prosecutions are conducted by the office of the DPP.199 Since tax evasion is criminal 
offence, the prosecution is conducted in normal courts like any other criminal offences.200 
The Tax Administration Act criminalizes several types of taxpayer’s conduct, such as the 
fraudulent evasion of payment of tax; obtaining a remission, rebate or refund when not 
entitled to; making false statement or false representation to get any tax benefit; 
counterfeit or falsifies documents used for tax purposes; omission or failure to make 
declaration, return, accounts or documents that are true or correct or acquiring, keeping, 
possessing, concealing or dealing with any fiscal receipt or document which is false or 
incorrect.201Upon conviction, such person will be liable for payment of twice the amount 
of tax evaded or imprisonment to a term not exceeding three years.202 Arguably, this 
penalty is severe and thus has the potential to deter any potential tax evaders.203  
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5 Administrative Measures for Preventing, Detecting and 
Punishing Tax Avoidance 
The existence of effectiveness of anti-tax avoidance and evasion depends on the tax 
administration. An efficient tax administration is the one which has the capacity to detect, 
prevent and punish tax avoidance and tax evasion.204 For instance, through tax audits, the 
tax administrators may be able to detect undeclared or under-declared taxes. 205  In 
Tanzania, there are several institutions with mandate to enforce tax-related laws. 
First, the law imposes an obligation on the IOC to keep and maintain records. The IOC is 
obliged to keep proper and accurate records in relation to the drilling operations and the 
results thereof, quality and quantities of oil and gas in the reservoir. 206  It is also a 
requirement to keep records of quantities of oil and gas processed, pumped to field storage 
and refineries and that consumed in Tanzania.207 Similarly, the Tax Administration Act 
2015 imposes an obligation on the companies to disclose the identities of contractors and 
subcontractors as well as the work done.208 Failure to disclose attracts a fine of 25 percent 
of the quantum payable.209 Likewise, the Petroleum Act 2015 introduces an integrity 
pledge for all IOCs in Tanzania prohibiting them from undermining, prejudicing the 
country’s financial and monetary system or inhibiting economic objectives.210 This is 
taken as a general obligation against tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes. 
Second, EWURA prescribes, both domestic and exports, rates, tariffs, charges of oil or 
gas produced in Tanzania. 211 In addition, EWURA sets the terms and conditions for 
conducting the regulated activity. 212  Generally, the prices of oil and gas products 
throughout the supply chain are governed by market forces subject to EWURA Act and 
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the Fair Competition Act.213 The domestic natural gas price to be determined based on 
the strategic nature of the project to be undertaken by the Government.214 Such pricing of 
oil and gas products must conform to the methods prescribed by EWURA and in 
accordance with international best practices. 215  The process of determining tariffs is 
required to consider factors, such as cost recovery and return on capital.216 In doing so, 
EWURA may permit deviation from the tariffs, rates and charges prescribed in the Act.217 
The supply of gas to end-users and buyers shall be governed by negotiated commercial 
agreements.218 
Third, both PURA and TRA have power to audit the IOCs’ books of account. The 
Commissioner General of TRA has powers to audit or investigate the IOC’s tax affairs to 
ascertain compliance or non-compliance with tax laws or existence of tax payable.219 In 
doing so, the Commissioner has power to access any information, vessel, premises, or 
documents.220 Furthermore, the Commissioner General of TRA has powers to request 
information and details from the registrar of companies for purposes of carrying out a tax 
investigation. 221  Similarly, PURA has the mandate to audit all matters relating to 
assessment and collection of oil and gas revenues.222 In addition, PURA audits the costs 
on exploration, development, production, and sale of oil and gas.223 It also requires that 
petroleum produced measured according to the standard set by both the Weights and 
Measures Act.224 These audits ensure that the Government obtains an appropriate share 
of profit oil and royalties. In discharge of its regulatory function, PURA may visit and 
inspect any sites, plants, offices or warehouses connected with petroleum operations, 
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which directly or indirectly controlled by the IOC.225 Arguably, the existence of an audit 
provision means the Government controls and monitors the investor’s records on 
expenditures and profits.226  
Fourth, there are several measures to enhance administrative capacity in addressing tax 
avoidance and tax evasion. One of the notable measures is the establishment of an 
International Tax Unit (ITU) within Large Taxpayers Department of TRA in 2011.227 The 
ITU is dedicated to managing transfer pricing and double taxation agreements. In the 
same connection, TRA has subscribes to the transfer pricing database namely Orbis since 
2014.228 This pricing database is used for benchmarking prices, thus an effective tool to 
counteract transfer-pricing manipulation. 229 Moreover, Tanzania is a member of several 
global initiatives, such as the Multi-lateral Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in tax matters, OECD global forum on the exchange of information and 
transparency as well as African Tax Administrators Forum (ATAF). 230  All these 
measures enhance cooperation in tax matters. 
Fifth, there is a requirement that any transfer of rights or interests in respect of a license 
must be approved by the Minister of Energy and Minerals.231 An application for an 
approval of the transfer of an instrument made to the Minister must be endorsed by the 
Commissioner for Income Tax certifying that tax has been paid or no tax is payable.232 
The non-compliance with approval requirement renders the transfer invalid.233  Even 
where the transaction occurred abroad, the resident entity is deemed to have realized its 
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assets before the underlying ownership changes.234 For that reason, the tax assessment is 
served to the resident entity and the tax payable will be recovered accordingly.235 
6 Critical Evaluation of Measures Addressing Tax Revenue Leakage 
in Tanzania 
The preceding chapters have highlighted several measures adopted in Tanzania to combat 
tax revenue leakage. The discussions also revealed that despite these measures there are 
still incidences of corruption, tax avoidance and tax evasion being reported. This partly 
demonstrates that there are still flaws in the legal framework that create a window of 
opportunity for unscrupulous officials and taxpayer to evade taxes. The next section 
highlights the major pitfalls in the Tanzanian oil and gas fiscal regime that permit leakage 
of tax revenues. 
6.1 Negative Delegation of tax-law Making Powers 
The Minister of Finance has discretionary powers to amend, waive or vary a tax liability 
(grant tax exemptions), under the Stamp Duty Act236 and excise duty.237 In addition, the 
Minister of Energy and Minerals has powers to amend alter or waive royalties. 238 
Similarly, the Minister responsible for local Government authorities has powers to 
exempt any person from taxes payable to local Government authorities.239 The net effect 
of these discretionary powers – also known as negative legislative delegation – is to alter 
the intention of the legislature to impose taxes.240 The exercise of these discretionary 
powers remove the existing tax obligations or introduces new ones with less 
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obligations.241 Moreover, these discretionary tax exemptions subjects the taxing powers 
to lobbying and privileging.242 These exemptions may result into unjustified preferential 
treatment of certain taxpayers, which are contrary to the principle of equity in taxation.243 
The preferential treatment of certain taxpayers also ignores the principle of rule of law, 
which accords all people equal treatment before the law.244  
Despite the fact that the laws grant Ministerial powers to grant exemptions or waivers 
from payment of taxes and royalties, the law does not describe the circumstances under 
which the power may be exercised.245 In addition, the law does not set the limits of such 
exemptions in terms of the time and the amount of tax exempted. 246 The law also does 
not provide the criteria to be taken into account when granting such tax exemption, such 
as who qualifies, why, and for how long.247 Furthermore, there is no obligation to table 
the tax exemptions for parliamentary scrutiny. 248 
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Overall, the unregulated delegation of tax law-making powers may create revenue 
leakages and encourage corruption.249 These discretionary tax exemptions explain partly 
why Tanzania has the highest tax exemptions per GDP ratio in East Africa.250 Moreover, 
there are incidences of abuse of powers by the Minister when granting tax exemptions.251 
While the Constitution of Tanzania is silent of delegation of taxing power, 252  the 
Constitutions of Greece, for example, takes an extremist position that the legislature 
cannot delegate the power to impose taxes to the Executive.253 Similarly, the Constitution 
of Ghana take a median position by permitting delegation of administrative issues while 
the basic concepts of taxes like tax base and tax rate remain the prerogative of the 
legislature.254  
6.2 Unguided Exercise of Discretionary Powers 
Under the Tanzanian oil and gas fiscal regime certain levies, such as bonuses, production 
sharing and additional profit tax (APT) are subject to negotiations.255 Despite the fact that 
the law vests Government officials with considerable power and discretion to decide how 
much revenues the Government may obtain, the law does not provide guidance or 
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procedure on how to conduct negotiations.256 For instance, the Petroleum Act, 2015 does 
not identify the negotiators nor stipulate their mandate.257 However, recently the the 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs has been vested with powers to promulgate 
Regulations prescribing for the parameters of negotiations as well as the code of conduct 
for members of the the Government negotiation team.258 Thus, in the past, the law did not 
create any oversight mechanism to control the powers of negotiator. 259  
The negotiability of certain fiscal terms, though it ensures flexibility, gives too much 
discretionary powers to Government officials.260  In the absence of transparency and 
oversight mechanisms, these discretionary powers may be subject to abuse.261 Similarly, 
the fact that the Government deals with each IOC on individual basis creates inequality 
among the participants, and leads to a lack of uniformity and consistency in the fiscal 
regime.262 This makes it difficult for tax administrators to assess and collect taxes due.263 
In addition, the existence of stability clauses means that once agreed, the Government 
cannot alter these terms unilaterally.264 The unchecked negotiations of these fiscal terms 
also open up windows of opportunity for arbitrary and corrupt practices by Government 
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officials.265 Moreover, negotiations complicate tax administration as each project may 
have its own fiscal terms. 266  
It is also notable that there is lack of pre-defined criteria for grant of such incentives.267 
The law is silent on, whom and under what circumstances, qualifies for grant of such 
exemptions.268 The law also does not indicate the clearly the forms of tax incentives 
envisaged and how they are going to be granted. 269 Similarly, there is no clear policy on 
the objects for grant of tax incentives for example targeting new investments or enhancing 
specific sectors.270 All these anomalies not only make the tax incentives open-ended, but 
also subject to abuse. For instance in Basil P. Mramba & Daniel Yona v R271, the Minister 
of Finance had granted tax exemptions against the advice by the Government Negotiating 
Team (GNT) and TRA and without approval by Attorney General as required by the law.  
6.3 Limited Transparency 
While Tanzania has laws prescribing for transparency in the oil and gas industry, several 
deficiencies exist. For one, while the Ministers are obliged to publish the said exemptions 
in the Government gazette,272 the procedure and applications for grant of tax incentives 
are not publicize.273 For this reason, the public does not know about any impending 
applications for grant of tax incentives. In addition, unlike the normal newspapers and 
other media outlets, the Government gazette is not easily accessible to the public and thus 
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subject to wider public scrutiny.274 This lack of public scrutiny opens up windows of 
opportunity for corrupt practices. 275  
Although the law provides that certain information may be treated as confidential, there 
are no criteria to guide the Minister is making such classification.276 This has the potential 
to defeat the transparency intentions.277 Furthermore, the law does not provide a remedy 
where the disclosure of information is denied by the Government. This may pre-empt the 
intention of the legislature to have access to information relating to oil and gas operations. 
In other jurisdictions, citizens denied information have recourse to the courts of law.278 
In addition, the involvement of several institutions, such as TRA, TPDC, Ministry of 
Energy and Minerals as well as local Government authorities in revenue collection, has 
the potential to undermine transparency.279 It may facilitate diversion or embezzlement 
of collected revenues.280 Generally, a good tax administration requires a streamlined tax 
administration code with the procedures of assessments and filing of tax returns, payment 
and recovery of taxes, investigations and audits and dispute settlement mechanisms.281 
6.4 Existence of Gaps in the Tax System 
The discussions under above indicate that there are loopholes or gaps in the tax system 
that permit revenue leakage. For instance, due to stabilization clauses, the PSAs once 
signed and registered in the Register of Tax Agreements attain the status of a tax 
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agreement.282 These stabilization clauses limit the future legislative powers to amend the 
fiscal terms. 283 It means that it is difficult to rectify the unseen consequences, such as 
incentives granted based on poorly drafted laws. Similarly where the benefits are 
exorbitant in terms of both quantity and period.284  For this reason, even the recent 
amendments by the Petroleum Act 2015 and the Finance Act 2016 cannot have effect 
until when renegotiation has taken place.285 Consequently, this denies the Government 
the right additional revenues which would have otherwise been payable had these laws 
taken effect. 286 It is also notable that the courts have been reluctant to close gaps in tax 
laws and thus permits transactions to go untaxed. For instance, the Court in Commissioner 
General TRA v Pan African Energy Tz Ltd287 held that, even though there was a lacuna 
in the law, which might create room or leeway for tax evasion, it was not for the Court to 
fill the gap; instead, the solution is to amend the law.288  
Moreover, there are still grey areas relating to imposition of capital gains tax for indirect 
transfers of rights. Although section 56 of the Income Tax Act 2004 aims at capturing the 
indirect transfer of rights or shares, it is difficult to tax transactions taking place abroad 
and in countries not parties to tax treaties that Tanzania has signed.289 This difficulty 
arises due to lack of information about the transactions. Moreover, the rate of change of 
underlying ownership is too high. In practice, most restructuring does not go beyond 50 
percent. It also means that section 56 does not capture indirect transfers resulting to 
change of underlying ownership by 50 percent.290 Likewise, while “farm” in and “farm 
out” transactions are subject to capital gains tax in Tanzania, the Income Tax Act 2004 
does not provide for the mechanisms for the valuation of shares, deductibility of 
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expenditures and timing for payment of capital gains tax.291 This opens up windows for 
aggressive tax planning by the IOCs. 
Similarly, there are several challenges in managing transfer pricing in Tanzania. For one, 
the Tanzania’s anti-transfer pricing regime is still at its nascent stages.292 There is a need 
for qualified and competent personnel to enforce the arm’s length rule. In addition, since 
most of the transactions are cross-border, occurring in countries that do not have 
cooperation in exchange of tax information, determination of prices that is at arm’s length 
is difficult.293 Moreover, the choice of either OECD or UN Model in case of lacunae in 
the Transfer pricing Regulations creates a problem of inconsistency.294 Thus, it may open 
loopholes for tax avoidance. 
6.5 Parallel Fiscal Rules in the PSA and Tax Laws 
The analysis of PSAs under Table 1.2 indicates that the PSAs have clauses that contain 
own fiscal rules, which are inconsistent with the tax laws. In practice, the cost oil or gas 
resembles the deductible costs under the Income Tax Act 2004 and run parallel to each 
other.295 However, the concept of cost recovery, as provided for under the PSA, is not 
covered under either the Income Tax Act 2004 or Petroleum Act 2015.296 For instance, 
the PSA sets a ceiling for cost recovery at 50 percent and 70 percent of the total production 
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net of royalty for onshore and offshore projects respectively.297 This contravenes the rules 
of deductibility of expenditures under the Income Tax Act 2004, which do not set a ceiling 
for such deductions. Since the cost recovery ceiling is subject to negotiation, a conflict 
with the provision of Income Tax Act 2004 may ensue. However, the position of the law 
is very clear, as it was cemented in the case of Geita Gold Mine v the Commissioner 
General,298 the provisions of the law prevails over any agreement.299 Further to that, there 
is no charging provision for APT in both the Income Tax Act 2004 and Petroleum Act 
2015. It means that APT is purely a contractual, thus subject to negotiations. This is not 
only contravenes the article 138(1) of the Constitution but also complicates tax 
administration. For example, the role of TRA is to interpret tax laws and not 
agreements.300 Similarly, negotiability of APT may also create inconsistency and lack of 
uniformity in the imposition of taxes, contrary to the principle of equity in taxation.301 
It is also notable that there are clauses in the PSAs that purport to grant exemptions on 
VAT, import duty and withholding tax on dividends.302 This is contrary to the provisions 
of tax laws where only the Minister of Finance can grant tax exemptions.303 Furthermore, 
purporting grant tax exemptions in the PSA is contrary to the procedures, which require 
such exemptions to be published in the Government gazette. 304  This inconsistency 
between the PSA and the tax laws creates a legal quagmire. For instance, in Geita Gold 
Mining Limited v Commissioner General,305 it was held that although the Minister for 
Energy and Minerals had powers to enter into Mining Development Agreements (MDA) 
and to determine the terms thereof; such powers did not include granting fiscal reliefs to 
MDA holders.  
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The chapter examined the different measures adopted in Tanzania to counteract tax 
revenue leakage. These measures include the anti-corruption regime, anti-tax avoidance 
rules, criminalization of tax evasion and administrative measures. In essence, these 
measures aim to close the gaps and loopholes in the tax system, remove incentives for 
corruption, closing windows of opportunity for corruption as well as sanctioning tax 
evasion. The chapter has also highlighted, with examples, the challenges of administering 
the oil and gas tax regime. These challenges include the existence of gaps in the tax 
system, limited transparency, unregulated negotiations of fiscal terms, and negative 
delegation of tax law making powers parallel fiscal rules between the PSA and the tax 





PART III: CONCLUSION 
This part provides a conclusion. The conclusion specifically provides a summary on how 










The main aim of this study is to examine and analyze the legal framework for prevention 
of tax revenue leakage in the upstream oil and gas industry in Tanzania.1 In doing so, it 
scrutinizes the different concepts, methods and options available in a public trusteeship 
model of natural resource holding. Specifically, the analyses in chapters two, three and 
four provide a theoretical framework in which to understand tax revenue leakage. Those 
chapters also identify the causative factors for tax revenue leakage and the corresponding 
remedial measures. Chapter five and chapter six adopt the analytical tools developed 
under chapter four to evaluate and analyze the measures addressing tax revenue leakage 
in Tanzania.  
Generally, the findings of this study under chapter six indicate that Tanzania has adopted 
several measures to counteract tax revenue leakage. It implies that the level of 
Government’s tax revenue depends on how these remedial measures are enforced. 
However, there are numerous constraints on the applicability of such remedial measures. 
These constraints include negative delegation of tax-law making powers, existence of 
gaps in tax laws, limited transparency, unguided negotiation of fiscal terms, and parallel 
fiscal rules between PSA and tax laws. 2  In view of these discussions, this chapter 
summarizes the main ideas, provides a conclusion of main arguments and 
recommendations for policy makers and legislators. The next section collates all the 
major issues raised in this study. 
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2 Summary of Main Issues 
This study uses the resource curse theory to analyze and evaluate tax-related challenges 
in the Tanzanian upstream oil and gas industry. The resource curse study unravels the 
paradox of oil and gas wealth in Africa. 3  It explains the reasons why most oil-rich 
countries in Africa experience slower economic growth, corruption, abject poverty, 
political instability, and autocracy.4 Although there are many factors that contribute to 
the occurrence of the resource curse, this study argues that the “curse” is partly a result 
of systemic under-taxation.5 The analysis demonstrate that Tanzania’s fiscal regime has 
fiscal terms that match international best practices.6 The major assumption underlying 
this study is that several factors impede the Government’s ability to collect the potential 
taxes.7 For this reason, this study posits that the problem of under-taxation is not the result 
of inadequacy of the law, but rather the environment within which such laws are 
implemented.8  
This study identifies the factors that create loopholes for tax revenue leakage to include 
tax exemption, tax avoidance, tax evasion and fiscal corruption. 9  As it is argued 
throughout this study, in absence any counteractive measure, only a fraction of the 
potential taxes may be collected and remitted to the treasury.10 The leakage of these tax 
revenues implies the loss of much needed revenue required to finance Governmental 
projects.11 Thus, leakage impedes the Government’s capacity to provide social services 
and other developmental projects.12 To apply these findings to the context of Tanzania’s 
taxation regime, this study highlights the following main issues.  
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First, in Tanzania, the ownership oil and gas in situ vests in the State, regardless of 
whether these resources are situated in land, inland waters or the sea.13 However, this is 
not “ownership” in strict sense as understood in property law.14 Instead, the Government 
holds the resources in trust, to be managed on behalf of, and for the benefit of both current 
and future generations. 15  Therefore, it is the Government’s duty to ensure not only 
optimal exploitation of the resources, but also to ensure that it receives adequate economic 
benefits (through royalties, taxation and Government participation) from their 
exploitation.16  
While State ownership entitles the Government to undertake the exploration and 
extraction by itself, the Tanzanian state typically undertake extraction through a 
partnership between International Oil Companies (IOCs) and Tanzania Petroleum 
Development Corporation (TPDC). As owner of oil and gas in situ, the Government 
stands in the same position as a landlord to receive rent in form of fees, royalties and 
bonuses as compensation for allowing extraction of oil and gas.17 These special levies 
and charges apply alongside the generally applicable taxes, such as corporate income tax, 
value added tax (VAT), stamp duties, import duties, local Government taxes, withholding 
tax and capital gains tax.18 In addition, the law requires TPDC to acquire at least 25 
percent of equity interests in every oil and gas project.19 
Second, the Tanzanian oil and gas industry is in its early stages. Although the exploration 
for oil and gas in Tanzania commenced in 1952, and discoveries of natural gas were made 
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in 1974 and 1982, production commenced only in 2004 at Songo Songo and in 2006 at 
Mnazi Bay.20 Similarly, there are two PSAs at production stage namely Msimbati (Mnazi 
Bay with 5 tcf) and Songo Songo (with 2.7 tcf) and Kiliwani North-1 (with 13.1 tfc) at 
the development stage and expected to start production in 2020.21 Thus, the contribution 
of natural gas production to the GDP is still very low.22 However, with the completion of 
the 530-kilometre natural gas pipeline, the plans for construction of an LNG plant as well 
as the 1140 km Uganda-Tanzania oil pipeline, there are prospects that Tanzania is an 
emerging oil and gas economy in the near future.23  
Third, Tanzania uses the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) system as the mechanism 
for grant of exploration or extraction rights to IOCs.24 There are two ways of granting 
exploration or extraction rights to prospective IOCs, namely direct negotiations and 
competitive tendering.25 In the same vein, the PSA is used as a mechanism for creating 
Government tax revenues through imposition of taxes and charging royalties, bonuses, 
production sharing, state equity participation and rental fees.26 Some of these fiscal terms, 
such as royalties and taxes are fixed in the law while others, such as production sharing 
and bonuses are subject to negotiations. 
Fourth, in view of attracting new investments and maintaining the existing ones, the 
Government of Tanzania offers several tax incentives. 27 These tax incentives include 
accelerated cost recovery, capital goods exempted from import duty and VAT, 
stabilization of fiscal terms, relief from double taxation.28 Another notable incentive is 
that certain fiscal elements, such as bonuses, production sharing, and Government equity 
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participation, are subject to negotiation. 29 There are also other general incentives, such 
as the guarantee against expropriation of property and the use of neutral mechanisms for 
dispute settlement. 30  There are three methods of granting tax incentives, namely 
incentives fixed in the law, discretionary incentives through Government notices, and 
incentives granted at the time of signing the PSAs. 31 In addition, Tanzania provides for 
fiscal stabilization, thus giving guarantees to the IOCs that the fiscal terms will not change 
within a specified period. 32 
Fifth, while the extraction of natural gas has the potential to create massive tax revenues, 
several factors may undermine the Government’s ability to collect taxes. In that regard, 
this study has identified several factors that are likely to cause tax revenue leakage.33 
These factors include tax incentives, such as tax exemptions, lowering tax rates and 
special tax treatment, which result into non-payment of taxes that would have otherwise 
been payable. In addition, the IOCs adopt a variety of techniques, such as transfer pricing, 
thin capitalization, corporate re-organization and treaty shopping to minimize, reduce or 
eliminate their tax obligations. Similarly, the IOCs may engage in outright criminal 
conducts, such as non-declaration of income, forgery, under-invoicing and double 
accounting. Likewise, some Government officials - motivated by their own interests - 
engage in corrupt transactions to defraud the Government tax revenues. For instance, 
corrupt Government officials may willfully fail to collect taxes due, short levy taxes, grant 
undeserving tax incentives to the IOCs or divert revenues collected for their own account. 
All these factors demonstrate the close connection between under-taxation, corruption, 
tax avoidance and tax evasion.  
Sixth, several factors make it possible for the IOCs to avoid or evade taxes without being 
detected or punished. 34 These factors include the existence of gaps and loopholes in the 
tax system, information asymmetry between the tax administrators and the IOCs as well 
as the weak mechanisms of detecting, preventing and punishing tax avoidance and tax 
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evasion.35 For example, there are weak anti-avoidance measures, such as the lack of an 
effective GAAR, thin capitalization rules, anti-treaty shopping and existence of tax 
havens.36 In the same connection, fiscal corruption thrives, because as long as there are 
factors that motivate Government officials to engage in corrupt practices, the window of 
opportunity for corrupt practices remains widely open. 37  The lapses in the legal system 
that create a window of opportunity for corrupt practices include lack of oversight 
mechanisms on the exercise of power and uncontrolled discretion vested on Government 
officials. 38  
Seventh, in response to the problem of tax revenue leakage, the Government adopts 
several counteractive measures. 39  One of these measures is anti-tax avoidance 
legislation, which aims at closing the gaps and loopholes in the tax system.40 It includes 
the general anti-tax abuse rules (GAAR) deals with unforeseen tax avoidance schemes, 
the specific anti-tax abuse rules (SAAR) addresses specific tax avoidance techniques. The 
specific anti-tax abuse rules (SAAR) include the arm’s length principle, ring fencing of 
costs and revenues, rules on realization of petroleum rights, anti-tax treaty shopping rules 
and restrictions on debt financing. 
In addition, there are several administrative measures for the prevention, detection and 
punishment of tax avoidance and tax evasion. 41 These measures include an obligation on 
the IOCs to keep and maintain records as well as Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) and 
Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority (PURA) powers to audit the IOC’s books of 
account and transactions. Moreover, the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority 
(EWURA) prescribes oil and gas prices. In the same vein, transfer of petroleum rights 
must be endorsed by the Commissioner General for TRA and approved by the Minister 
of Energy and Minerals. As regards administrative capacity the TRA has established a 
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special unit, namely International Tax Unit (ITU), that deals with transfer pricing and 
double taxation agreements.  
The other counteractive measures relate to criminalization of tax evasion.42 Criminalized 
conducts include using or making false and misleading statements, aiding or abetting tax 
evasion, forgery, conspiracy to commit an offence and cheating, failure to pay taxes and 
impeding tax administration.  
As regards fiscal corruption, the anti-corruption regime targets closing the windows of 
opportunity for corrupt practices as well as removing the incentives for Government 
officials to engage in corrupt transactions. 43 In doing so, it aims to eradicate certain types 
of conduct, such as giving or receiving bribes, facilitating tax evasion, public officials 
living above their lawful income, misuse of public power for personal gains, 
misappropriation of public funds and negligence in the discharge of public duties. The 
punishment meted out for these offences include imprisonment, fines as well as forfeiture 
of proceeds of crime. The law also establishes the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Bureau (PCCB) as the central anti-corruption agency in the country. There 
are also measures to enhance transparency in the country, such as an obligation on the 
Government to keep, maintain and disseminate information relating to the granting of 
rights, contracts, revenue collection and management. It also includes the establishment 
of EITI Committee, which reconciles the payments made by the IOCs and those received 
by the Government. There are several limits on the Ministerial discretionary powers to 
sign PSAs. There are, moreover, restrictions on Ministerial powers to grant exemption, 
remit any interests or penalty imposed by any tax law. These limits aim to control the 
procedures for decision-making and the substantive decision itself.  
Although these remedial measures do not guarantee complete closing of loopholes in the 
tax system, their deployment has the potential to mitigate the impact of tax revenue 
leakage. 44 Furthermore, these remedial measures form the basis for further research in 
the oil and gas industry. 
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3 Concluding Recommendations 
This study has established that Tanzania, like many other African countries, experiences 
several tax-related challenges in the upstream oil and gas sector.45 In response to these 
challenges, Tanzania has adopted several measures to counteract tax revenue leakage. 
However, as discussions in Chapter 6 have demonstrated, there are numerous 
shortcomings in the measure counteracting tax revenue leakage. These shortcomings 
include negative delegation of tax-law making powers, existence of gaps in tax laws, 
limited transparency, unguided negotiation of fiscal terms, and parallel fiscal rules 
between PSA and tax laws.46 In the light of these shortcomings, this study concludes that 
although Tanzania has several measures to counteract tax revenue leakage, the level of 
Government’s tax revenue nevertheless depends on the manner in which these 
counteractive measures are enforced. The next section provides recommendations on how 
to improve the measures counteracting tax revenue leakage. 
Despite the remedial measures Tanzania has adopted to prevent tax revenue leakage, 
several shortcomings need reform. These shortcomings include discretionary tax and 
royalties exemptions, open-ended fiscal incentives, low penalties for tax evasion and 
insufficient anti-avoidance rules. Consistent with the analytical framework developed 
under chapter 4, this section provides recommendations on how to address the identified 
shortcomings.  
First, instead of relying on tax incentives as a method of attracting investments in the oil 
and gas industry, the Government should strive to improve the environment for doing 
business in the country. Where it is necessary to grant tax exemptions, the law should 
provide the mechanisms to analyze and evaluate the costs and benefits of granting such 
tax incentives. 47 Moreover, to tighten the loopholes in the tax incentives regime, all tax 
laws should have a “sunset” provision, which limits the applicability of incentives within 
a specified period or externalities. 48  Once such period expires or externalities are 
addressed, such incentives cease to apply. In the same vein, law should prescribe the 
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criteria to be considered when granting such tax exemption. These criteria could 
determine who qualifies, why, how much and for how long. The procedure for grant of 
tax incentives should be publicized in the newspapers of wide circulation, and once 
granted, the names of such beneficiaries must also be published. 49 Similarly, all the 
recipients of tax incentives must be required to report annually on how much they have 
received and how they utilized such exemptions. Finally, all the discretionary powers to 
grant tax exemptions under the Income Tax Act 2004, Stamp Duty Act, and Excise Tariff 
Act should be abolished. Instead, like in the Value Added Tax Act 2014, all exemptions 
must be provided for in the law itself. 
Second, as regards gaps in the tax system, it is recommended that the Model PSA should 
be part of the Regulations to ensure that the fiscal terms contained therein match those 
provided for in the legislation. Moreover, the Income Tax Act 2004 should be amended 
to include a provision for charging Additional Profit Tax (APT). In addition, the Income 
Tax Act 2004 should be amended to improve the imposition of capital gains tax for 
indirect transfers of petroleum rights. The amendment should entail the procedure for 
assessing realized assets, calculating gain at the time of realization and apportioning 
shares involved in the transfer. Furthermore, to enhance transparency in the collection of 
tax revenues, the tax administration should be streamlined (form a single agency for 
assessment and collection of taxes). In addition, to discourage thin capitalization, the 
Income Tax Act 2004 should be amended to incorporate an earning stripping rule 
whereby the deduction of interest should be limited to 30 percent of gross revenues before 
any deductions. 50 
Third, section 31 of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act and section 96 the 
Penal Code should be amended to include, as part of the penalties, an obligation to 
indemnify the Government for loss caused as a result of corruption. Similarly, the Tax 
Administration Act should be amended to ensure that all professionals who aid or abet 
tax evasion are expelled from professional bodies as well as cancellation of all fiscal 
incentives for the IOCs evading taxes. In addition, to ensure deterrence the penalties for 
                                                 
49 Zolt “Tax incentives: protecting the tax base” (2015) 481. 
50 Readhead Preventing Tax Base Erosion in Africa: a Regional Study of Transfer Pricing Challenges in 
the Mining Sector (2016) 40. OECD Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interests Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments, Action 4 Final Report (OECD Publications 2015) 38, 47 




abuse of power should be increased from the current one (three years imprisonment) and 
lift the fine from the five million shillings, which is too lenient.  
Fourth, the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act, 2015 
should lay down the criteria to be used to classify certain information as confidential. In 
absence of these criteria, a confidentiality clause may defeat the core purpose of 
transparency. Similarly, the Act should be amended to provide for a remedy where the 
disclosure of information is denied by the Government. 
Fifth, the Tax Administration Act 2015 should be amended and impose an obligation on 
the Minister of Finance to table a report before the National Assembly, indicating the tax 
exemptions granted, the beneficiaries and the justification for such exemptions. To ensure 
vigilance in the grant of tax exemptions, the Tax Administration Act 2015 should spell 
out the policy objectives for granting tax exemptions, such as attraction of new 
investments or addressing certain identifiable bottlenecks in the investment regime.51 
Sixth, the Petroleum Act 2015 or regulations should provide procedures for appointing 
negotiators as well as qualification criteria. In addition, the Act should prescribe guidance 
or procedure on how to conduct negotiations. For instance, the law should stipulate the 
mandate of negotiators in terms what they can and what they cannot do. The Act should 
also provide for a code of conduct for such negotiators. 
From the above discussions, it is clear that the discovery of oil and gas resources in 
developing countries is neither an automatic blessing nor an immutable curse. Instead, 
whatever the impact of the presence of oil and gas resources in a particular country is, 
depends on the legal framework and the competency of its Governmental institutions. As 
this study demonstrates, some of the worst ills brought upon a country for having oil and 
gas resources – underdevelopment, corruption, poverty, and inequality – can be addressed 
by tweaking the oil and gas taxation regime. To some extent, the cure for the resource 
curse hence lies outside the sphere of mere regulation of the extractive process – it lies in 
the mechanisms supporting the state to monitor and deploy the proceeds of that process.  
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